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1.Introduction
1.1.Questions
What are the differences between theology and philosophy? Theologians and philosophers have often a 
similar subject of study, use each others' methods. We can postulate that theology, study of God, is 
always a development of a certain religious opinion; on the other hand, philosophy is a research of 
relevant  questions,  as  well  as  a  research  of  this  relevance  itself.  What  theology postulates  to  be 
relevant, is for a philosopher always in doubt. The beginning is for both disciplines different, in former 
it may be a revelation of truth, in the other a question what truth is. The disciplines are, however, made 
up by a discourse, asserting and clashing of opinions, not only by the starting points. The both can be 
said of the Dialecticians, the tradition of philosophy going from Socrates through Sceptics and Stoics, 
as well  as of the Mutakallimun, their  equivalent  on the field of Muslim sciences of religion.  In a 
general scope of this work we have primarily the mutual development of these two disciplines, ways of 
how they can influence each other and were they set limits of it. Also if the both may bring reasons for 
ethics (on a personal level) or law (on the social one), a comparision of this process might help to 
discover the common terms of both.
In this work I'll present two important, although at first sight diametrally different traditions of thought 
- Stoicism and Kalam - especially for their theories of God, nature and ethics. On the one hand, the 
Stoics  generally  at  first  speculated  about  nature,  and  then  consequently  wrote  ethical  teachings 
grounded on those speculations.  On the other,  Kalam was (inversely)  first  a  debate  on the ethical 
teachings of Quran, which they secondarily tried to fit into a more scientific worldview, which became 
available  by the  rapid  development  in  9th  century Iraq.  It  is  probable  that  as  their  contemporary 
Muslim philosophers started to revive metaphysics based on ancient writings, the theologians needed 
their own. They needed a worldview, coherently linking physics and ethics, which would be based on 
Quran, thus being acceptable even by more literalist movements of the exegesis and jurisprudence. The 
question of application, how such a teaching can be reflected in personal life or in law, is thus also 
partly in this work's interest.
The main interest, however, are the points, in which these two traditions converged. Both were based 
on  a  radical  monotheism,  acknowledging  only  one  God,  a  single  active  principle  in  the  world, 
pervading  and  controlling  every  part  of  it.  In  fact,  to  accept  the  uniqueness  of  God  is  the  basic 
testimony of Muslim faith. Specialty of Kalam was their physics (´ilm aT-Táb'). They brought up an 
idea on the divine omnipresence, which may have been either influented by Stoics directly. Another 
parallel to the Hellenistic philosophy, resembling one of the oppositions between the Epicureans and 
Stoics,  was  their  debate  on  substance,  where  atomists  faced  supporters  of  a  continuous  matter. 
Epistemology of later Kalam, trying to find the role of reason in an empirically functioning soul, may 
also be analyzed for parallels. At last in ethics, the both teachings seem to be very distant from each 
other. Stoics had no basic text like Quran with ethical tenets. There are, however, some traces of the 
generally Stoic idea of reasoning as recognition of natural law, also in the later Kalam, which should be 
analyzed as well. If we expect that these parallels are not random (can they be?), then we come to 
another set of questions: how the Stoics could have influented Kalam? If they couldn't, what were the 
factors, which caused the development to go in such a similar way? And, more general, how can a 
philosophical tradition influence a theological one?
1.2.Structure
As  in  every  tradition  of  thought,  the  development  of  new ideas  was  followed  by scepticism and 
conservativism in both Stoicism and Kalam. But this could only help their internal heterogenity, which 
has to be analyzed first, before we can speak of general ideas "of the Stoics" resp."of Kalam". Thus this 
work contains five chapters, first being this introduction. The second presents the teachings of Stoa, as 
well  as  a  brief  introduction  to  the  context  of  Hellenistic  philosophy,  their  influence  on  their 
contemporary and present  culture  and theology of  other  Abrahamic  religions,  and  finally also  the 
sources of Stoic thoughts available for the Muslim theologians. Kalam itself will be presented in the 
third chapter;  because it is a more divergent tradition than Stoicism, we'll handle at  first  the basic 
questions, which they considered relevant, and then the primary divisions, which were set up more on 
the field of politics or jurisprudence already in the era of Umayyads. Latter two chapters are organized 
chronologically,  presenting  a  rationalist  development  of  Kalam in  9th  century and the  sceptic  (or 
conservativist) reaction on it in the next. Thus, the fourth chapter presents Mu´tazila, which tried to 
unify  the  answers  on  the  basic  questions  in  a  coherent  system,  similar  to  those  of  philosophic 
authorities, focusing on the connections between physics (or metaphysics) and ethics. We handle the 
development of Mu´tazila as a certain school within Kalam, but the focus is given in fact to two men, 
who diverged from the Mu´tazilite mainstream, ie Dirar ibn ´Amr and Ibrahim an-Nazzam, because in 
fact their own schools were the source of most Stoic parallels. Finally in the fifth chapter we'll look on 
the later development of Kalam, which was characterized in more coherently surviving teachings of 
´Ali al-Ash´ari and Muhammad al-Maturidi, in fact often reacting on those of Dirar and Nazzam.
1.3.Method
To compare two historically distinct traditions of thought needs a summary of the questions they were 
based on, as well as of the answers, which were given by individual thinkers. These questions and 
answers are to be orderred in a way which would enable us to recognize various schools as coherent 
teachings. But the coherence (nor any criterium of the validity) of the teachings is not in the focus of 
this work. What we seek for are the parallels between them: both those on the level of ideas, methods 
of research or in evaluating relevance, as well as in their context, relation between the teaching and its 
application, development of these relations and so on.
It seems to me important to present a distinction between terms "parallel" and "influence". While the 
term "parallel" can be seen more general as a similarity between the two teachings, an "influence" 
denotes one of possible causes of a  parallel.  Influences are  of more types:  there  can be (1) direct 
influences, ie if we had a proof that a certain theologian comments, quotes or in another way brings up 
a Stoic primary text; but we have no information about any works by Stoic authorities available to the 
context of Kalam, also we may focus rather on (2) indirect influences, which would be imposed on the 
theologians by commentaries, critical treatises, summas or other doxographic material, either in Arabic, 
Syriac or Greek1. Here we can count also other traditional sources like gnomologia2.
On the other hand, a parallel may emerge without any influence of a former tradition on the latter. We 
can say there may be two independently but nevertheless similarly formulated ideas. They may be 
taken as a premise for further reasonings and thus lead to similarities in the development of a teaching 
as well: for example, if both teachings took monism as a premise in ontology, it was likely for both to 
deal with fatalism in ethics3. These kinds of "pure" parallels, even if partly reflecting an influence of the 
former teaching in its later development, are the most valuable for the search of both the philosophical 
aspects of Kalam, as well as the theological aspects of Stoicism. There is yet another type of parallels, 
which I see as "illusionary". A particular teaching may include a formulation similar to that of the 
former tradition, but if it is answering a different question, we can hardly speak of a parallel event.
In four cases we can look deeper into the problem. The first (chapter 4) will be an earlier Basrian 
theologian Dirar ibn ´Amr, whom we'll present in a pure parallelist view, and then later a Mu´tazilite 
scholar Ibrahim an-Nazzam, where we can expect an (at least)  indirect  influence,  especially in the 
problematics of physics. An intermezzo is presented by the later Mu´tazilite theologians Jahiz, Ka´bi 
and Jubba'i, as well as their contemporaries, who tried to harmonize their teachings of one discipline 
with the other ones. Another parallels may be found in so-called orthodox schools - Ash´ariya and 
Maturidiya - which will deal more with ethics, gaining more importance in contrast to the lesser role of 
physics and metaphysics,  important more for the Mu´tazila. What we try to uncover is the role of 
Stoicism in  the  development  of  Kalam (chapter  5).  It  can  be expected,  that  at  least  the  Ash´arite 
theologians perceived Stoicism as a single ancient school of thought distinct from other philosophic 
traditions4, what may not be a case for the other ones. On the other hand, some authors present Ash-
´arites as the school which was mostly influented by them5. In contrast to this idea, it is possible that 
when the Ash´arites reacted on the "natural philosophy", they didn't think of an ancient pagan school, 
but rather on the teaching, which was secondarily reconstructed in the works of Dirar, Nazzam and 
their followers.
1 - Of the earliest known Arabic sources, we have a summa from the 9th century, called "Plutarch's book of opinions on 
nature" although its real author seems to be (according to quotations in modern works like LS) a certain Aetius from the 2nd 
century BC. Because of this I  prefer the latin name in latin named  Placita Philosophorum  in quotations. Its  first part 
contains teachings of various philosophical  schools from the pre-Socratic ones to those if  the Hellenistic perdiod. The 
Stoics, named generally as ar-riwáqiyún, ahl al-usTuwána or represented by Zeno (zínún) and Chrysippus (xrúsíbus), have a 
very prominent place in the text. Other sources could have been any commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias or Galen's 
book "On Ethics", which was translated in the second half of 9th century by Job of Edessa, the author of the contemporary 
Syriac encyclopaedia "Book of Treasures".  Ibn Nadim's 10th century general bibliography Fihrist names only Placita.
2 - cf §3.2.2
3 - Of these are known eg writings of Ibn Fatik or the modern summa in Gutas' dissertation.
4 - Already in the beginning of 20th century Saul Horovitz wrote an essay on the influence of the philosophy on Kalam 
("Über den Einfluss der griechischen Philosophie auf die Entwicklung des Kalam"), starting with a chapter on the influence 
of the Stoics. He mentions (cf p.6f) Shahrastani calling Stoics  mu´attila, the term bound with the negation of the divine 
attributes (cf §3.2.1) and also aS-SaHába 'r-rawáqi, the literary translation of the term as "followers of the Stoa", similar to 
that of the term used in Placita. However, Horovitz' thesis (cf p.8) was that of an indirect influence: the theologians knew 
the Stoic concepts, but they didn't know anything about the original authorities.
5 - Stoic influence on the Ash´ariya has been mentioned and partly elaborated by Simon van der Bergh in his translation of 
Ibn Rushd's Tahafut at-Tahafut. He does not, however, hide the context of their Stoic-looking formulations, which often are 
more clear in a Sceptic or Neoplatonic context.
2.Stoicism
2.1.Contemporary Discourse
The Stoicism school emerged in the so-called Hellenistic period of classic philosophy. As it came, the 
Mediterranean Sea was the scene of a feeble equilibrium between few quite equally strong empires. 
The east - Egypt, Syria, Anatolia and Balkans - was dominated by the successor states of Alexander the 
Great. In the west, the most influential powers were Rome and Carthage. Alexander's conquests helped 
to spread the Greek language and it became the lingua franca of the educated; a status which it retained 
for long even after the region was wholly subdued by Rome. The centers of education were Egyptian 
Alexandria  and  Athens,  which  was  the  contemporary  capital  of  philosophy.  After  the  battle  of 
Chaeronea (338 BCE) Athenians lost their  independence to Macedonia,  not to become a sovereign 
power any more. The democracy of a classic polis loses its meaning at this time, and thus also the 
philosophers'  role changes. The teachings are based more on individual ethics and development; in 
contrast  to  predominance  of  physics  and  metaphysics,  or  objective  truth,  in  the  era  of  Plato  and 
Aristotle. The new 3rd century schools, instead of bringing new teachings to control the world around, 
taught their  students how to withstand the control  of the world over them. A notion of free spirit 
(thymos) as the principle of human actions was replaced by a material breath (pneuma) functioning 
merely by natural regularities. The common starting point of the three greatest schools of this era - the 
Epicureans, the Sceptics and the Stoics - were empiricism and materialism. They spoke about what 
could be perceived; soul was seen as dependent on the temporal and corporeal changes. The ethical 
ideal of this era is a sage, able to recognize these regularities and prevent himself from being deceived, 
thus able to attain a peace of mind. However, in their particular ideas about how to attain this state, as 
well as in their other theory of nature and knowledge, these schools, differ significantly.
2.1.1.Epicureanism
Teachings  of  Epicurus  (341-270  BCE)  are  mostly  known from the  letters  preserved  by Diogenes 
Laertius and from the works of his later Roman followers, like Lucretius. Epicurus founded the school 
(better known as kepos, "garden") in the end of 4th century BCE, in the time when Stoicism emerged as 
well. His theoretical base seems to be atomism, which he adopted from the writings of Democritus1. 
His system doesn't include dialectics, a discursive method of knowledge; he defined canonics instead as 
the basis of philosophy, whose object was the criteria for truth. Epicurus chose perceptions (aisthesiai), 
terms  (prolépsis)  and  passions  (pathé)  for  them.  Perception  is  the  most  important  of  them,  as  all 
rational activity depends on its content. Epicurean theory depicts the world as an infinite void where all 
that happens is a motion of matter. Thus every perception, including that of illusions and dreams, is 
based on a certain motion and can be considered true. On the other hand, as long as we base the truth 
on experience, dialectically acquired knowledge may lead to deception2. The role of reason is to think 
about unclear visions; but everything unclearly seen is already an "awaiting" knowledge (prosmenon), 
needing an approach and a closer look from the observer3.
In nature we can perceive the (spatial as well as temporal) infinity of the universe and of quantity of 
matter  within.  Matter  is  composed of  bodies,  consisting  of  unchangeable and indivisible  particles, 
atoms.  These cannot be seen by themselves, but if there were no limits of division, bodies would be 
divisible into nothing. Epicurus thought4 of atoms being of a heterogeneous shape, size and weight. 
Their motion differed as well (oscillating or direct), although they all had the same velocity. A soul also 
consists  of  perceptions.  Perception  happens  when  atoms  of  the  perceived  object  enter  our  souls 
directly5. Passions, will, impressions (phantasiai6) and reason are all certain motions of the soul.
On this physics he based also the ethical doctrine. The good is equivalent to pleasure, the evil to pain. 
As with death we decompose and lose all perceptions, only life is relevant for philosophy. And it is 
enough for it to care making it pleasurable. Any pleasurable experience,  hedoné, is to be preferred; 
Epicurus, however, did warn7 that pursuing of some of them brings more pain than pleasure. Thus the 
perfect happiness isn't based on hedoné, but rather on limiting pain and living a rational life: being able 
to find causes for own activities and prevent self-deception8. He also considered gods to have attained 
this state; his theology is, however, in a critical attitude towards popular religion. Gods are so happy 
that they have no need to trifle in the matters of mortals. Because of that Epicurus criticized the rites to 
gain their favor, as well as the belief in an inevitable fate. If reason wasn't sufficient to attain pleasure, 
it was because of misfortune, not because of some divine fury or judgement9.
1 - DL X,2; Democritus influenced him by his atomism and materialism. Epicurus disagreed with him generally in ethical 
questions: he taught free will and rationality as an ethical value (DL X,134), while Democritus preferred determinism and 
considered fearlessness (athambié) to be the correct attitude towards the fate. It is interesting how radically they diverged on 
this; perhaps it was a Sceptic influence. Epicurus' teacher Nausiphanus learned under both Democritus and Pyrrho of Elis.
2 - cf DL X,31-33
3 - cf DL X,34 & X,41
4 - DL X,54; Aristotle already criticized Democritus on the problem of the minimal possible size of atoms. Democritus 
defined atoms in a way, that they had no size. If two atoms met each other, they could be theoretically on the same place in 
the same time. For more details  on this matter see the SEP entry by Kaston (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epicurus/, 
9.7.2008).
5 - cf DL X,49
6  -  The  term  phantasia is  central  for  all  three  epistemologies  of  this  era.  Impressions  (Hicks  translates  them  also 
"presentations" and "appearances") are caused by perceptions (aisthesiai) and they are the content of reason. It  doesn't 
always mean the illusionary or creative ideas, reflected in a modern term "fantasy",  which is closer to the Greek term 
phantasma,  translated  as  "semblance  in  the  mind",  "images"  or  "illusions".  However,  Hicks  translates  "phantasma" 
sometimes as "presentations" as well (ie DL VII,60: phantasma dianoias, "presentation to the intellect"), to this comes yet 
the version of Long&Sedley, who use "figments" instead (eg in LS 39B; see §2.2.1., n.5), what might cause the word to 
seem quite confusing.
7 - cf DL X,142
8 - cf DL X,129-132
9 - cf DL X,134
2.1.2.Scepticism
Scepticism was more a method or a movement than a particular school or tradition. Etymologically, the 
term comes from sképtomai, "to inquire", as their goal was to incite as many questions as possible1. The 
teaching gained respect especially after 266 BCE, when Arcesilaus (+241 BCE) became the head of the 
Athenian Academy. Arcesilaus2 considered the teaching to be a continuity of the Socratic tradition, 
putting into question any certainty in attaining knowledge, committing life to reason alone. According 
to a later sceptic Sextus Empiricus, they taught the idea of  akatalepsia, ie inability of human reason 
(and  senses)  to  comprehend  objects  perfectly.  There  is  some  truth  in  fact  that  we  have  certain 
impressions, but it cannot be known in how far they correspond to the external reality.
Sextus, as well as the other Sceptics of the Roman era like Agrippa and Aenesidemus, doesn't agree 
with them in certain points. They claimed to be the real followers of the first teacher of the method, 
Pyrrho of Elis  (+270 BCE).  If  a Sceptic  of the Academy thought that  nothing could be known, a 
Pyrrhonist wouldn't agree with that unless he could prove it. Even uncertainty should be a matter of 
question3. Unlike the Academicians, their method wasn't a doubt, but equipollence. This strategy was 
presented as a rhetorical play consisting of setting two contradictory, but nevertheless true arguments, 
which were set against each other, thus making the whole debate seeming vain, as the truth couldn't be 
judged by human reason4. The attitude promoted by Pyrrhonians was epoché, to hold on a judgment 
about the matter; this could lead to a peace of mind5. However, to preserve it was a similarly hard task: 
as one faces many problems, one has to search for many arguments for every new one of them to 
maintain the equipollences.
1 - Literally it means "to seek", or look about; DL IX,69
2 - Cooper, p.98
3 - PH I,226; He criticizes here the New Academy of Carneades (+129 BCE), who taught that all perceptions could be 
doubted, but trough certain tests some things seem more worth of belief than another ones.
4 - Categorizations of these tropes, which were used as a base of epoché, were preserved by both Diogenes (IX,79f and IX,
88f) and Sextus Empiricus (PH I,36f and I,164f) in the same way. According to Aenesidemus, there were ten: differences 
between sensory perceptions  of  various  species,  between  various  humans,  various  organs  of  perception,  cases,  spatial 
position, admixtures, quantity, relations, frequency of a phenomenon or a life style of the observer. Agrippa listed them 
more abstractly in five tropes: a Sceptic could mention the contradiction of theory and practice, infinite regress (as every 
assertion has to be proven, and thus also every proof has to be proven ad infinitum), relativity, questionable hypotheses and 
circular arguments.
5 - However, Sextus (as seen in PH I,233) would consider promoting  epoché as a virtue - like Arcesilaus did - to be a 
dogmatic approach as well. He tried to show epoché to be a necessary consequence of any argument, but not a moral goal to 
be attained.
2.2.Teachings
The name of Stoicism doesn't say much about the teachings. The term stóa means a "painted arcade", 
particularly the one on the Athenian Agora, where the students assembled to discuss the teachings. The 
founder of the school was Zeno of Citium (334-262 BCE), originally a Phoenician merchant. After a 
crash of  a  ship he settled  in  Athens,  where  he  started to  study philosophy at  first  from books of 
Xenophon, later under guidance of the Cynic philosopher Crates1. He founded his own school about the 
end of 4th century BCE and led it until his death; then it passed to Cleanthes (331-232 BCE) and later 
to Chrysippus (280-207 BCE). System of study was based on logic (or dialectics, the art of debating) as 
the epistemological discipline. Logic defined the rules of making assertions on physics (or philosophy 
of nature, motion). Ethics was then the starting point for ethics (practical opinions)2. We can divide the 
development of Stoicism into three periods.
The  first  of  them,  the  school  of  Zeno,  Cleanthes  and  Chrysippus,  or  early  Stoicism,  was  more 
theoretical  and  also  radical  in  its  opinions  in  its  opposition  against  the  other  schools.  Although 
struggling for a rigid coherence between all three disciplines of philosophy, they were in no way just 
followers of Zeno, like they had been called in the past3. In the second half of the 2nd century BCE the 
school was led by Panaetius (185-110 BCE), who promoted the teachings in Rome. He also started to 
prefer  physics before logic  as  the fundamental  discipline4,  he  was also adopted some ideas of the 
Peripatetic school. He and his followers are then starting a middle Stoicism. As mentioned above, the 
texts of the early and middle Stoics are only fragmentarily preserved. In the 1st  century BCE, the 
school gained quite a significant respect in the intellectual elite of Rome, hence we also call the late 
Stoicism as Roman. Panaetius' student Posidonius (135-51 BCE) founded a new school on Rhodes, 
where could be found among his students Pompey and Cicero. In Greece, the school was maintained by 
Epictetus (55-135). Arius Dydimus was a court philosopher of Augustus, what can be said also of 
Musonius Rufus and Seneca, serving under Nero; finally, emperor Marcus Aurelius (121-180) shows 
their influence as well. Their focus was on ethics.
1 - DL VII,2
2 - cf DL VII,39; Beside these general disciplines, Cleanthes divided dialectics and rhetorics, physics and theology, and also 
ethics  and politics  (ibid 41).  The  relation between the disciplines  was differently explained.  Some Stoics  saw a tight 
correlation between them, seeing every discipline senseless without the others. The hierarchy was also changing. In general, 
later Stoics write about ethics, showing less interest in logic (cf LS 56B); of the early Stoics, Aristo found only ethics to be 
relevant for study as well.
3 - cf Placita XXI,18; On the one hand, Cleanthes is known for his religious poetry and devotion to the Stoic ideals in his 
personal life. On the other hand, Chrysippus was a logician, trying to minimalize the contradictions in Zeno's teaching and 
make Stoic philosophy a coherent  system. Different  aims sometimes  also brought  different  conclusions.  For example, 
Bobzien (p.46-47) mentions one difference between the two on the question of relation between God's will and presence of 
evil in the world. This question, which we'll see to be of dire importance in the context of Kalam (§3.2.2.) had developed in 
a similar way: at first, trying to support a religious tenet, Cleanthes declares that God has no effect on evil (cf his Hymn: "O 
God, without you nothing comes to be on earth/neither in the region of the heavenly poles, nor in the sea/except what evil 
men do in their folly"); unlike Chrysippus, who identified the Fate and the will of God. The variety of opinions within the 
early Stoicism doesn't seem so radical as that between the Stoicism and, say, Epicureans, but they should not be ignored 
even if we try to generalize the teaching.
4 - cf DL VII,41
2.2.1.Dialectics
Within  the  Stoic  philosophy,  the  role  of  dialectics  or  logic  is  similar  to  that  of  epistemology.  Its 
foundation was like that Epicurus. They both are empirical: in the time of birth, human mind is blank 
and being filled only with later experience1. They are also nominalistic, both teach that we name the 
things  in  accordance to  how they appear  to  us2.  However,  Epicurus  was in  some points  closer  to 
Sceptics. His canonics, a discipline similar in motive to the dialectics of Stoicism, was educating the 
mind in a way that it would maximalize the performance of the sensory organs. Unlike these, who 
preferred to analyze only particular situations, Stoics tried to find natural  regulations of how mind 
works.
The thoughts are described as impressions, phantasiai, which appear through an 'imprint', a change in 
the soul3. There is also a common distinction between internal and sensory, the former being made by 
an activity of mind, the other by an effect of an organ on the soul4. The point of difference is in the truth 
value of the impressions. Epicurus thought that all of them were true, illusions and sensory views alike, 
although a more detailed view on the thing could reveal more of its nature. According to Stoics, to 
reach a more detailed view is irrelevant, as some of the impressions can be more telling than the others. 
These  so-called comprehensive impressions  (phantasiai  kataleptikai)5 are  for  them the  criterion  of 
truth. A comprehensive impression is that which "arises from what is and is stamped and impressed 
exactly in accordance with what is, of a such a kind as could not arise from what is not"6. But here 
comes a question if or in how far we are able to have such impressions. Sceptics, for example, didn't 
refute this definition, but they also added that there are no impressions that are really comprehending 
the thing7. The trope pointing at different perceptions of senses of various humans was really of a great 
importance here.
A solution  could  have  been  a  new  category  of  probability:  if  we  have  reasonable  cues  that  an 
impression comprehends the thing, it is probably so, but the assent itself doesn't make the criterium8. It 
needed a new criterion, the right reason or argument (logos)9, study of whose structure and value was 
very important for them10.  By means of logic we can distinguish the true and false,  plausible and 
ambiguous11. The persuasive power was always bound to the comprehension of senses, making the 
argument  meaningful  only if  both  corresponded to  each  other.  The  grammar  and rhetorics  are  its 
indivisible parts because logic was per definition a science of the denotation12. Denotations are made by 
reason in a form of verbal expressions (lektón)13, which can be of three types: a judgment (axióma), 
question or a command. Of these, only judgments have a truth-value. An rational argument was formed 
of four sentences, where first two (thémata) form the major premise, the third a minor one and fourth is 
the conclusion. They also tried to find certain figures, which would be further indemonstrable, and thus 
useful for any reasoning as a logic proof14. But as already mentioned, true judgments didn't form the 
knowledge alone. They had a meaning only in the moment facing the fact they were referring to. Logic 
didn't usually bring a truth prone to change; it was dependent on circumstances15.
1 - Sharples p.20
2 - cf DL VII,53 & X,33
3 - The ideas on the structure of the soul will be analyzed in the next paragraph.
4 - cf DL VII,50-53
5 - PH I,235; Unlike Epicurus, the Stoics distinguished the impressions (phantasiai) and illusions (phantasma). According 
to DL VII,50, the former is the process, the latter is the outcome, created by mind. Aetius (LS 39B) mentions a similar, but 
little more refined terminology of Chrysippus, showing a fourfold distinction of impression (phantasia), impressor (cause of 
an impression;  phantaston),  imagination (an "empty" impression without  an impressor;  phantastikon)  and figment,  the 
attractive illusion within an imagination (phantasma). Epicurus thought of impressions as they were made up by particles 
coming from the observed thing itself.
6 - LS 40E (quot.Sextus)
7 - cf http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arcesilaus/#3, 9.7.2008
8 - DL (VII,177) illustrates the problem on the tale of Sphaerus, who let himself being deceived by wax pomegranates.
9 - cf DL VII,54
10 - DL VII,45: "The study of syllogisms they declare to be of the greatest service, as showing us what is capable of 
yielding  demonstration;  and  this  contributes  much  to  the  formation  of  correct  judgments,  and  their  arrangement  and 
retention in memory give a scientific character to our conceptions of things."
11 - cf DL VII,46-47
12 - DL VII,43: peri tón symainomenón; Hicks uses "subject of discourse" instead, so I prefer the Czech version here.
13 - Lit."the said". Various authors (Bobzien, Sharples) translate the word as "sayable", the "verbal expression" is from 
Hicks. It denotes a whole sentence as said and heard, although not its subject nor the notion in our mind of it. Also its form 
seems quite advanced in comparison to the Aristotelian logic. In his system we deal with single terms, corresponding to 
ideas about the subject. A sentence is merely a connection of terms. Sharples (cf p.23) mentions also that Aristotle didn't 
consider a term to be a sign, a stand-alone connection of the speech and its subject. The lektón of Stoics can have such a 
function. A fact we can perceive both uttered speech and its subject, but still we may not understand the expression (in 
Sharples' example, if we hear an unknown language).
14 - cf DL VII,76-81; Chrysippus defined five of them, while all other possible proofs were thought to be based on them. In 
modern notation they stay for these: ((p -> q)^ p) -> q, ((p -> q)^ ~q) -> ~p, (~(p ^ q)^ p) -> ~q, ((p v q)^ p) -> ~q and ((p v 
q)^ ~p) -> q. Beside the first two of them (modus ponens and modus tollens) the other formulations of a predicate logic were 
virtually unknown until 19th century.
15 - cf Bobzien p.25: "For the Stoics, a proposition is a complete sayable [ie  lektón] that can be asserted, as far as it is 
concerned (DL VII,65). And at any one time a proposition is either true or false. As predicates can be actualized repeatedly, 
so (Stoic) propositions can be true or false repeatedly: they can change their truth-value."
2.2.2.Physics
Physics, the natural philosophy, is by definition1 their teaching of the universe, elements and causality. 
Theology is one of its parts2. God (theos, Zeus) is the active principle contrasting to passive matter 
(hylé).  It  exists  at  first  by  itself,  then  it  settles  into  the  matter  as  its  "seminal  reason"  (logos 
spermatikos), rearranging it in a way that other things may emerge. Thus appear the four elements 
(stoicheia) - fire, water, air and earth - whose mixture leads into creation of other things3. Unlike the 
Epicurean pluralist system, Stoic physics could be seen as monotheistic (although not really monistic). 
For Epicurus, gods were no important factor in the universe, and mentioning them had relevance only 
within the scope of ethics. God's position in Stoic physics can so be seen as the the major distinction, 
from which the other differences between both schools can be developed.
Stoics identify God and Fate (heimarmené) as the only continuous series of causes4. In their theology, 
God isn't a mere creator, a cause of the world's creation, but also the very process of this creation and 
evolution itself. As it had been pointed out by Baltzly5, this is the main point of difference between the 
Stoic and Platonic theology, in which God orders the world without being present in it. Stoic physics 
doesn't give space to any "metaphysical" entities; no incorporeal cause can influence a corporeal one6. 
God permeates the matter as its reason (logos), making thus the whole world a single animated being. 
Hence, as Diogenes mentions7, the term "world" (kosmos) itself was used differently - for God, for the 
order  in  general  or  in  particular  order  of  heavens  and the  Earth.  The  first  use,  however,  is  quite 
incoherent  with the  elemental  theory.  For  the early Stoics,  the  world  was destructible8.  God is  an 
immortal body9, either of a fiery or special nature, and seems to be the only everlasting one, as it causes 
the whole world to burn and be created once again.  By influence of the heavenly bodies,  cosmos 
becomes dry and splits into parts, thus attaining still more of the fire element, until it reaches a state of 
total conflagration (ekpyrósis).
Elements represent the primary qualities of the matter, which are made prior to all the others10. We can 
understand elements either as different bodies  or as qualities of the primal,  formless matter  in the 
moment when it is impregnated by the divine reason. Fire is a hot element, more fine than the cold air, 
dry earth is a more dense form in comparison to the moist water11. Fire and air are then affecting the 
earth and water; dualism of temperature (hot/cold) seems to be the cause. We should bear in mind, that 
no incorporeal thing can influence a corporeal one; and that counts for all qualities as well. All qualities 
can be reduced to a certain tension or intensity (tonos) of the heat and cold within them12. There is no 
void between the elements,  they are  perfectly filling the whole world,  held by a common tension 
(syntonia). The world has a spherical shape, on its other side is an incorporeal, infinite void (to kenon 
apeiron)13. Within the world fire is the most active element, being also the substance of the cosmic soul 
(psyché). Things are made and sustained in their shape trough constitution (hexis), being constantly 
imposed by this soul.
In human beings, this  hexis is on a higher level. Already animals are controlled by their own natural 
impulse (hormé), humans have beside it an individual soul. Both the cosmic and individual soul enable 
life, generation, perception and autonomous motion (hegemonikon). Besides the sensual and creative 
functions,  human  souls  also  contain  the  abilities  of  reason  (dianoia),  which  stays  for  the 
hegemonikon14, and speech. The difference between the functioning of impulse and that of reason was 
considered an ethical problem. However, they both have the same function of sustaining bodies, as the 
hexis in inanimate things. Similarly as God permeates the world, also a human soul does permeate the 
whole body in a form of a spirit or fiery breath (pneuma). Although the soul was evidently identified 
with the material spirit, there were still differences in opinions regarding how it controls the body15. 
Unlike  the  cosmic  soul,  human  souls  may  be  destroyed,  but  also  here  we  had  a  variety  of 
explanations16. In general, it was thought that they lived for some time outside the body after the death, 
but that because of their fiery nature they were attracted by the heavens, where they dissolve17.
1 - DL VII,132; Sextus (LS 44A) mentions that Stoics distinguished the term "universe" (to holon) and "world" (kosmos). 
Diogenes speaks of kosmos in the mentioned section, but sometimes refers to the universe as well. In general, both terms 
can often be interchanged, as the difference is only that  to holon does include also an infinite void (cf n.10) outside the 
kosmos. As an immaterial object, void can't be much described by physics, and thus most definitions for the world can be 
applied to the universe as well (cf DL VII,134).
2 - As already mentioned, Cleanthes distinguished the fields of theology and physics. Diogenes (VII,41) perhaps meant his 
cosmological model. According to Cleanthes, heavenly bodies were composed of the finest fire, aether, which is mixed with 
no other elements. Thus we have a similar image here as that of Ptolemy, which has an aetheric sphere of perfect circular 
motions in heavens and submundane Earth of changes. It was thought that there were two types of fire: destructive, which 
we can create and normally use, and creative, which is the substance of our soul (cf n.13) and for Zeno even of God himself. 
Sun, for example, has a similar substance as that of souls, because it has both the destructive (as it can burn) as well as the 
creative (it allows growth and ripening) power (cf LS 46D, Stobaeus).
3 - cf DL VII,136; The theory of these four elements has parallels in more philosophic traditions. Between the Hellenes, its 
first teacher was Empedocles (1st half of 5th century BCE; cf DL VIII,76), who spoke of their periodical mixture and 
division by influence of love and hate. Plato mentions the teaching in his dialogue Timaios (p.55). Even before them, an 
Indian sage Kanáda (cca 600 BCE) had a similar teaching, but instead of love/hate dualism he had chosen a special active 
principle of their animation, aether. Stoics call the adjoining factor syntonia (cf DL VII,140). A similar theory of elements 
can be found later by Maturidi, whose theories we'll handle later (§5.2.2).
4 - cf Cicero, De divinatione I,125; Middle Stoics preferred sometimes to use the term of providence (pronoia) in a more 
aesthetic context (cf Pohlenz p.196)
5 - cf http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/#Phys, 9.7.2008
6 - Sharples (p.34 & 43, quot.Cicero) mentions that by this doctrine Stoics admitted a possibility of the presence of two 
bodies  (namely  God  and  matter)  on  a  same  place.  This  is  also  another  difference  between  their  and  the  Epicurean 
cosmology, which had criticized the same point in Democritus' atomism. However, the major contrast was in a fact, that for 
Stoics there was no discrete matter, composed of indivisible particles and space between. Their physics isn't based on a 
random motion of particles in a void, but rather organic changes in a unified "body". The leading part (God) is extended 
everywhere, so it can cause these changes anywhere and in any time. Thus also Cooper (cf s.226) defined the difference 
between a Stoic and a modern understanding of a "natural law": "Nowadays, when we speak of laws of nature, we do so 
with reference to empirical generalizations like those about wood, stone and metals...backed up, no doubt, by much theory 
about the behavior of molecules and particles; but that theory is itself based on further empirically supported hypotheses 
about how molecules and particles behave under varying conditions...for the Stoics, the law or laws of nature consists not in 
such empirical generalizations, or physical theory based on them, but rather in the thoughts of Zeus, that are behind the 
behaviors of material things."
7 - DL VII,138
8 - cf DL VII,141; In  an analogy to destructibility of common objects in nature,  they (probably Zeno himself) set an 
argument for destructibility of the whole world: "of which parts are perishable is perishable as a whole. Now the parts of the 
world are perishable, seeing that they are transformed into the other. Therefore the world itself is doomed to perish."
9 - Interesting is, that in neither Diogenes' nor Long & Sedley's summa we have an argument for (nor against) immortality 
of God (or gods). It is just mentioned as one of the God's attributes (for example in DL VII,147), and seems to be taken 
from the contemporary religious traditions. They most possibly just tried to identify their own concept of a creative fire with 
the most-adored deity. The verses of Cleanthes' Hymn: "It is right for mortals to call upon you/since from you we have our 
being, we whose lot it is to be God's image" can be seen as an interesting example of pagan philosophical apologetics. Of 
course, having no source, we can't say that all Stoics would agree with the identification of pneuma and Zeus. We have texts 
mentioning a plurality of  opinions only in the debate on perishability of the world.  Diogenes mentions that  Panaetius 
considered  the  world  as  indestructible  (DL VII,142),  perhaps  because  of  his  inclination  to  Aristotelian  physics.  The 
mentioned use of word kosmos for God would have a clear reason, but less in case of Chrysippus (cf LS 54B, Cicero). In the 
problem of perishability of the world, Posidonius held the opinion of the early Stoics again. 
10 - cf DL VII,136
11 - cf DL VII,137
12 - cf LS 47C4 (Cicero) & 47K (Galen); The idea was that inside every being there has to be a certain motion.
13 - DL VII,140; PH III,124; According to them Stoics generally defined "void" as that which could be taken by a being, but 
it isn't.
14 - Bobzien p.239
15 - cf Cooper p.229; We can understand this better by an analogy to the idea of the God's extension in the world, coming 
from Chrysippus (DL VII,138): Reason is extended everywhere, but with a different intensity ("in some part there is more of 
it, in some part less"). According to Cleanthes, an act appears when our motive part of the soul, hegemonikon, extends the 
pneuma into an organ, where the motion then emerges.  It  can be seen as a brain sending a neural signal.  In contrast,  
Chrysippus thought that hegemonikon has an immediate influence: it isn't a part, but rather a function of pneuma.
16 - cf DL VII,157; Cleanthes thought that the souls live until the conflagrantion, Chrysippus thought it only about the souls 
of the wise men.
17 - cf Sharples p.67
2.2.3.Ethics
Happiness (eudaimonia) was the main goal of most ethical teachings of the Hellenistic period. It meant 
a happy life, a content state of soul; it wasn't of an eschatological nature, did not open questions of 
hope and abstract targets. The scope of philosophy was restrained with the physical world and solving 
only the problems within. They tried to know the world around and live by this knowledge a rational 
life, where rationality meant a way which would lead to this happiness. An immediate solution to the 
question of happiness had been proposed by the Cyrenaic and Epicurean schools:  to  focus on the 
pleasant,  or  at  least  minimalize  the  painful.  Sceptics,  who  saw  pleasure  and  pain  as  too  relative 
categories to be criteria, made their target some kind of a detached attitude towards them: happiness 
can be attained by holding an evaluation. But how to describe the Stoic goal? They also struggled for a 
kind of happy life, for a certain state of an undisturbed peace of mind (ataraxia)1. However, Stoics tried 
to  compose  a  model  demanding  more  activity  from the  subject.  Happiness  is  in  no  way just  an 
opportunity, but a virtue2, and thus also a duty3. In virtue, there is the true beauty, and it depends on 
rationality and accordance with the nature4.
Stoic ethics could be described from an eudaimonistic or deontic view, but their own goal seems to be a 
single concept, in which a notion of duty would support that of virtue, notion of virtue that of happiness 
etc. The concept of accordance with nature - and nature, as God, can never be evil - we can see how it 
is in a continuity of physics. In the subdivision of ethics5 we don't have only the problems of good, 
virtue, duties and ends, but also those of impulses (hormé) and passions (pathé). As we've mentioned 
before, an animal impulse functions similarly as the cosmic soul in the inanimate things, imposing the 
hexis to hold it  together.  Thus the primary impulse is that  of self-preservation.  In the animals this 
impulse reflects a general nature, while humans have an independent reason to control themselves6. 
Reason replaces the impulse, but its task is the same as that of the impulses7, although with different 
means. The criteria of a right reason and of a nature creating the impulse in animals, however, are in  
essentia the same, bound together in a sole causal chain.
The early Stoics implied from that an idea that the decisions are predetermined by the Fate. It may 
seem that if the fatalism is the base of their ethics, it can't say much at all. But they focused rather on 
the question of responsibility for the happiness. Zeno8 united both happiness and rationality in a single 
term of "smooth flow of life", but didn't say this kind of flow comes easily.  A rational life should 
contain both initiative and contemplation9.  Similarly in the case of their  physical  theories, even in 
ethics there were debates for which acts we are responsible. Zeno and Cleanthes said we should follow 
the common nature, Chrysippus added that we should follow an individual nature as well10. The former 
two thought that some general rules could be found, which, when we are grown and educated enough 
to think, may be found by everyone. Where the individual reason doesn't develop, there functions only 
the  natural  law,  contrasting  with  human  foolishness.  But  as  we've  seen,  Chrysippus  was  much 
interested in keeping a logical coherence of his teaching, and because of that he created a model, where 
all (even foolish) individual acts are predestined by the divine Fate. Even so a human still remains 
responsible for his acts, because he is the agent; every individual develops his character in accordance 
to the external circumstances, but then they are acting as an inner factor of determination. The evil 
comes out, when we always just react on the circumstances, instead of employing reason to form a 
correct, thus often an indifferent attitude11.
In the modern colloquial use, the phrase "stoic peace" reflects exactly this idea. It was also the division 
of value, which was common to all Stoic theories. Everything could be seen either as good, as evil or as 
indifferent (adiaphora). Indifferent are all the circumstances; of them, some could be considered as 
preferable  (advantageous  and  natural  things,  like  health  or  wealth),  some  neglectful  (oppositely, 
diseases or poverty) and others as properly indifferent (like the number of hair)12. The categories good 
and  evil  contained  only the  actions.  An act  could  be  either  an  expression  of  virtue  or  of  a  vice. 
Relativity or scale had no place here, either an act was right (oikeion) or not. If there is a possibility of 
performing a rightful action or to hold an indifferent attitude, we are obliged to do so; but if our action 
is determined by something indifferent or by passion, it is wrong to do so. For example, health itself is 
an indifferent thing, as we don't have a full power over it. It is, however, a natural state which helps to 
preserve life. Thus we can say it is preferable and the acts, which support it, are rational. But also, 
Stoics don't say13 that a good action always reaches the particular goal it is aimed to, like a therapy 
sometimes doesn't cure, because such things depend on various uncontrollable circumstances. That's 
why our end should be only happiness, which is attained by means of virtue. If health started to oppose 
the virtue (like in case of fighting in war for a country), we can be happy only if we can sacrifice it. 
Happiness is attained by a correct attitude to reality14.
In politics, we can find by Stoics arguments for both active as well as a quietist attitude. The early 
Stoics taught at the Agora, which was in fact the center of the Athenian political activity; on the other 
hand we know, that the role of Athens in the world-politics was diminishing. Zeno and Chrysippus both 
wrote  books  on  the  Republic,  which  didn't  survive  until  today,  but  were  quoted  frequently.  Zeno 
thought that only a wise man is really free and able to live with others in friendship and harmony. Thus 
an ideal city could be attained only if there lived only wise people15. It doesn't depend on the king, but 
rather on the thinking of its citizens. He thought the best political attitude was that of cosmopolitism16: 
a wise man sees a fellow citizen in every other one, as we all are controlled by a single natural law (and 
the wise are aware of it). The idea of a natural law was still being promoted by the Roman Stoics, but 
in a slightly different way. Cicero17 remarked that we don't need to be politically active, because the 
true, natural law was independent on the laws of society. Philosophy here isn't a tool to determine a 
correct  political  decision,  but  rather  a  way of  subjective  ethics.  The  latest  exponents  of  Stoicism 
actually showed a clear distinction between both areas18. Ethics, of course, doesn't prevent us from 
engagement in politics, but it makes us primarily aware of what we cannot control.
1 - LS 65E (Seneca)
2 - cf Arius p.21; Stoics saw happiness to be the end (telos) of virtue, but also as composed of it. The particular fragment 
came from Panaetius, but the early Stoics considered happiness to be the end as well (cf Arius p.41).
3 - cf DL VII,109
4 - cf Arius p.37
5 - cf DL VII,84
6 - Cooper (p.205) mentions Dio Chrysostom, a contemporary of Epictetus, that he was the first who elaborated the term of 
autonomy (as a creation of individual laws, similarly as God makes the laws of nature - cf §2.2.2.n.15) which he considers 
to be the base of human freedom (ibid p.209).
7 - cf DL VII,86; This is  an example of an ethical  issue being addressed by a quasi-physical argument.  According to 
Diogenes they reacted to the hedonistic teachings, which emphasized that pleasure was a common goal for both humans and 
animals.  Stoics  thought  the self-preservation is  a  prior  impulse.  God wants  its  creations to last,  and thus  it  arouses  a 
perception of  self  in  them. The perseverance  of  this  perception -  ie  life  -  is  for  the creator  more important  than the 
circumstances of the life; pleasure is thus just a by-product of life.
8 - ibid; Arius p.41
9 - cf DL VII,130
10 - cf DL VII,89; The original model of Zeno and Cleanthes shows that we can be happy by accepting Fate and following 
it. We are like a dog bound to a cart; when the cart moves, we can walk behind it or be dragged on ground (cf LS 62A, 
Hippolytus). But in fact this idea gives more freedom to the personal will than that of Chrysippus, because it accepts some 
space,  where  the  influence  of  Fate  is  lesser  than  elsewhere  (cf  below §2.2.n.3).  They accept  that  we  can  choose  an 
alternative, Chrysippus doesn't.
11 - cf Bobzien p.251 (quot.Gellius); Excerpt's context is a proof of predetermination of all things, but also to prove that this 
predetermination is a principle of morale. If we control ourselves by the right reason, we neglect the evil opportunities, 
which are offered to us by circumstances, like when a thief sees a wallet loosely laying on a bag. If our reason is mature, it'll 
analyze its impressions in a moral way and find a correct attitude. The difference between good and evil is that good is 
caused by reason and bad by the external things. Both reasoning and influence of impressions are similarly predetermined, 
but their effect is different.
12 - cf Arius p.51
13 - cf Sharples p.103; This point had been often criticized. As Sharples quotes Plutarchos, an archer should try to shoot as 
good as he can, but shouldn't consider hitting of the target as his goal. It was thought to be so, because he cannot influence 
the possibility of a sudden wind, which would deviate the arrow in flight. All he can do is to aim accurately and pull with 
adequate strength; that is the virtue of an archer, and it should be itself his goal.
14 - Virtue and vice are seen partly as customs, especially by Chrysippus. The early Stoics spoke always of a single virtue. 
If we were for example really moderate, we would have to be courageous as well etc; and also one vice was an indication of 
the others as well. But later this view was less radical, as the later Stoics aimed at recognition of the indifferent things.
15 - cf DL VII,33; In an ideal city the common law is implied from the natural one. What norms couldn't be reasonably 
supported should have been considered redundant. And so Zeno advised men and women to wear the same clothes or 
criticized the building of temples.
16 - cf LS 67A,H (Plutarch); DL VII,121: "the wise man will take part in politics, if nothing hinders him...thus he will 
restrain vice and promote virtue".
17 - cf LS 67S
18 - Some of the Roman Stoics were powerful politicians in their professional life. That's why their view of the relation 
between philosophy and politics was a much more practical one. Cf Meditations VI,12: "If thou hadst a step-mother and a 
mother at the same time, thou wouldst be dutiful to thy step-mother, but still thou wouldst constantly return to thy mother. 
Let the court and philosophy now be to thee step-mother and mother: return to philosophy frequently and repose in her, 
through whom what thou meetest with in the court appears to thee tolerable, and thou appearest tolerable in the court."
2.3.Influence
2.3.1.Roman Culture
Since the 2nd century, Stoicism was no longer a regionally bound school. In 155 BCE Athens sent 
Panaetius' teacher Diogenes and Carneades to defend the city in a lawsuit against a town of Oropus 
before a Roman court. Although Plutarch1 doesn't speak much about the outcome of the matter, they 
were welcomed by Romans and found a large audience. Dialectical skills of Carneades became very 
respected among the young scholars, but aroused suspicion from the conservative elite2. This double-
edged reputation of Sceptics made the infiltration of Stoic thoughts into Roman culture easier. They 
presented a  worldview,  which was rationally consistent,  as  well  as  compatible  with  Roman moral 
values. At first, the most interesting ideas were those of a (1) natural law, of the rational base of both 
cosmic and individual regulations; of (2) duty to promote this natural law, and thus to support a lawful 
society and lead a virtuous life, (3) preventing morally indifferent circumstances and feelings to change 
the state of mind. These thoughts could be identified with the virtus, a character of a man with strong 
will employed for the good of the state3. Despite the original didactic succession of disciplines4, Stoic 
physics became interesting as the last. It can be said that not even dialectics was very important for the 
Roman Stoics. Both were employed for the support of ethics, which consequently could serve as a 
support for political decisions of many of their students5. 
1 - cf Life of Cato the Elder XXII,2
2 - cf Baltzly: "The Skeptic Carneades addressed a crowd of thousands on one day and argued that justice was a genuine 
good in its own right. The next day he argued against the proposition that it was in an agent's interest to be just in terms 
every bit as convincing." (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/#influence, 9.7.2008); It was this Cato, who before the 
Senate supported the expulsion of "men who could easily secure anything they wished", and also threaten the "young men, 
by giving this direction to their ambition, should come to love a reputation based on mere words more than one achieved by 
martial deeds" (Life of Cato the Elder  XXII,4-5). The later banishments of philosophers from Rome under the emperors 
Nero (in 66 AD) and Vespasianus (71 AD) were reactions on their criticism of the monarchy (cf Pohlenz p.286).
3 - cf Pohlenz p.259-260
4 - cf §2.2.
5 - In how far it really did remains questionable. Cicero mentions the idea of law as a natural law (lex est ratio summa,  
insita in natura) in both a declamational (cf LS 67S) as well as in an affirming (cf De legibus I,18) way.
2.3.2.Patristic Theology
Besides the sphere of politics, the teaching also influenced that of subjective worldviews, of religion. 
Although already the early Stoics dealt with questions on religion, the spreading of various foreign 
cults in the imperial Rome (Gnosis, Christianity, Judaism, later Manicheism) created a possibility of 
using philosophy as a seemingly neutral arbitrary tool for their theological apologetics. The particular 
role of Stoicism was different. At first, it itself was in its core a way of personal attitude to God and a 
world; it provided a coherent, clearly formulated set of beliefs and motives. Various Stoics (at most 
Cleanthes, Posidonius and M.Aurelius) wrote extensively on the personal relation to God. Others, like 
Chrysippus or Epictetus, didn't try to formulate a subjective prayer. For them "the essential property of 
piety  towards  the  gods  is  to  form  right  opinions  concerning  them"1.  Although  the  former  try  a 
subjective and the latter an objective knowledge of God, ethical consequences are the same for both.
Theologians outside the Stoic discourse were interested in their ideas on cohesion2, divine providence3, 
monotheism and moral equality of men before the God. They usually contrasted it to ideas of relativism 
and polytheism, whose embodiment in philosophy were often Epicureans4 and Sceptics. The goal could 
be to support creation of the world, unity of God and also theodicy. On the one hand, Stoic thoughts 
could be used as the friendly arbiter. An early Christian apologist Minucius Felix (200-245) wrote a 
dialogue, where a Christian defends monotheism against a Sceptic arguing for the pagan polytheism5. 
He tries to actualize opinions of Stoic philosophers in a context of a Christian problem, not to adopt 
their  genuine  worldview  like  Marcus  Aurelius  did.  Between  the  arguments  we  have  a  notion  of 
ekpyrósis, (mis?)interpreted in a way that the philosophers already were aware of temporariness of the 
present world and resurrection in the future6. Stoic philosophy is here treated with respect, but it serves 
as a mere tool, without much attention to its own context. But this can't be said generally. Lactantius 
(250-326), who lived long enough to enjoy the acceptance of his faith offered by the Edict of Milan, in 
his Divinarum Institutionum criticized Stoics on various points. He acknowledged their "contribution" 
to the culture, but also thinks that the scope of their work was already exceeded7. He tries to analyze 
reasons why people did study the philosophy, but also emphasizes those reasons why they don't need to 
do so any more.
A more elaborate attempt to incorporate Stoic ideas into a theological system can be found in the 
teachings of Philo of Alexandria (20 BCE-50 AD). As for a Hellenized Jew, Philo's religious basis was 
the Torah. In general, the core of his work is a biblical exegesis, while problematic terms are cleared 
with a help of philosophers' opinions. In comparison to the later attitude of Minucius, Philo considers 
himself to be a philosopher8. What he did was an eclectic combination of Biblical, Stoic and Platonic 
ideas. For pure theology, he was closer to the middle Stoicism. God is a transcendent being, which is 
prone to any change und unknowable by human reason alone; his essence may be spoken of only 
negatively,  to  prevent  anthropomorphous  and  other  naively  attributed  characteristics9.  While  the 
essence of God is hidden from us, we still can recognize an immanent side of Him, which Philo calls 
logos. Although Philo uses the term as a translation of the Hebrew term davar, used for both divine 
words and works10,  he describes it  in a way similar to the  logos  of Stoics, as the power imposing 
cohesion, tone and life. He also speaks of logoi spermatikoi, "seminal reasons" implanted into matter to 
predestine its development11. He does not, however, accept the idea of Fate. Much deeper influence can 
be  seen  in  his  ethical  theory.  Philo  adopted  both  the  early  Stoic  psychology12 as  well  as  their 
passion/virtue  dualism.  Hedoné  was  the  cause  of  all  evil,  and  the  passions  were  thought  to  be 
judgements preferring it over virtue13. Unlike Stoics, however, he viewed passions as sins, offences 
against God, and thus not as mere barriers in personal development.
1 - Enchiridion §31
2 - Namely that of all things being held together by God. The idea of cohesion may be split into two subordinates: term 
logos, the natural law, which things necessarily follow, on the other hand syntonia, common tension of things, which can be 
understood as the effect of logos (cf §2.2.2.).
3 - This (Latin  providentia, Greek  pronoia) simply stands for an idea that God rules the world in the best possible way. 
According to Pohlenz (cf s.191f) this theory was developed by the middle Stoics, especially Posidonius.
4 - cf Lactantius p.70
5 - cf Octavius; The work is quite eclectical. In chapter 19 he uses arguments from philosophers from Thales to Stoics, he 
mentions that even Epicurus accepted a supreme position of Nature, placed "above all". The Stoic arguments, however, take 
the most space. He mentions Zeno saying hat the various gods are mere personifications of the elements or constituents of 
the world, while all of these are subordinated to the effect of nature/reason.
6 - cf Colish p.32
7 - cf Colish p.40f; He recalls especially the idea of providence, but also some of their ideas in physics. For example that 
God creates dualist elements in nature at first and only by their means the other things.
8 - Pohlenz p.369
9 - cf http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/philo.htm#H7, 15.7.2008
10 - cf http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/philo.htm#H11, 15.7.2008; According to Pohlenz (p.369) Philo personally didn't speak 
Hebrew and quoted Septuagint translation anyway.
11 - cf Pohlenz p.373; Sometimes he identifies these logoi with divine powers, angels or even Son of God, the idea which 
couldn't had been ignored by later Christian writings, including the Gospel itself.
12 - cf Pohlenz p.375; The parts, or rather functions, of soul we've listed in §2.2.2.
13 - cf Pohlenz p.376f
2.3.3.Modern Europe
In the early Middle Ages of Europe, the Stoic philosophy lost its position to Neoplatonism and later 
Aristotelian teachings.  Although they bore some ethical parallels with those of Christianity, the others 
were preferred as more compatible, unlike Stoic materialism and pantheism. Consciousness about the 
school was partly preserved thanks to the classic theologians like those we've mentioned previously. Of 
the Stoic authorities, only Seneca seems to have been respected between the scholars, but even that was 
based more on dubious assumptions1. The physics have been preserved in the works of Cicero. In early 
13th century a certain David of Dinant tried to compile them, but he was charged for heresy because of 
pantheism and  his  books  were  burned2.  It  was  merely an  unknown school  until  the  Renaissance, 
connected with the overall popularity of translations of ancient texts. The main sources were books of 
Roman Stoics. Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) wrote an essay De constantia, which compared the ethics of 
Seneca with that of Christianity,  while "constancy", defined as "the upright and immovable mental 
strength, which is neither lifted up nor depressed by external or accidental circumstances"3 was to be 
the value for interconnecting them. Later he also summarized Stoic physics (Physiologia Stoicorum), 
and  thus  propagated  their  teachings  for  the  next  generations.  Lipsius'  inspired  many  of  his 
contemporaries including Guillame du Vair (1556-1621), who translated  Enchiridion  to French4. The 
idea  of  standing  firm,  "neither  lifted  up  nor  depressed  by  external  or  accidental  circumstances", 
remained the main theme, and became identified with a notion of "stoicism" in the common language, 
influencing also our contemporary use of the term5.
1 -  Already the Apologists  reverred Seneca over  other  Stoic philosophers  (eg cf  Lactantius  p.76);  another  case is  the 
apocryphal correspondence between him and St Paul.
2 - cf http://www.iep.utm.edu/n/neostoic.htm#H2, 15.7.2008
3 - De constantia I,4, in: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justus-lipsius/#2, 15.7.2008
4 - cf http://www.iep.utm.edu/n/neostoic.htm#SH4a, 15.7.2008
5 - For example in mass-media reports on population's attitude towards natural misfortunes, eg cf http://www.reuters.com 
/article/latestCrisis/idUSPEK173833, 15.7.2008
2.3.4.Muslim Science
As we've seen,  the Stoic tradition was influential  especially in ethics. However,  their  physical  and 
logical works were indivisible from them and important for education as long as they were available. 
Christian theologians worked a lot with it, until they turned to other sources (as long as the social 
situation allowed them). The tradition seems to fade within time. At first, theological questions in Islam 
weren't bound to any older philosophic tradition. The main factor was at first politics; not only internal 
quarrels about hereditary rights, but also the rapid expansion of the Umayyad Empire. Arab elites did 
not support the more developed sciences of Persians and Greeks1 in the conquered territories. On the 
other hand, they tried to diminish the influence of these nations on their ideology. They solved the 
problems of ethnical plurality by keeping them out of any important offices in the administration. The 
ruling elite of the empire expected conformity towards a united, Muslim-Arabic culture. Also even 
within  the  ruling  ideology,  the  centralized  machinery  of  the  Khalifate  left  not  much  room  for 
philosophy. The important task was to formulate and preserve particular legal norms, to support them 
by a certain reasoning was only a secondary task.  A discourse,  kalám,  appeared only in case of a 
contradiction  between  two  traditional  commandments.  Too  innovative  theologians  were,  however, 
often silenced.
A change had come in the half of 8th century, when the Khalifate was claimed by the ´Abbasid dynasty, 
supported by the early Iranian Shi´a. In building of a new ideology, there were more parties able to 
assert their influence. What ´Abbasids needed, was to harmonize all possible points of the teaching of 
their allies not only in practice, but also in a theory. Similarly to the case of Christian apologetics, one 
can expect the first role of philosophy as a "neutral arbiter"; the study, however, led into many schisms 
within  the  theologic  discourse.  At  this  point,  the  teachings  of  Plato  and  Plotin  could  have  been 
interesting because of their monotheism, those of the Sophists or Sceptics (who, unlike Epicureans, did 
not address theological questions clearly) were valuable in logic and rhetorics. Stoics and Aristotelians 
both brought a logically coherent philosophy, which could have been considered monotheist as well as 
a valuable tool for argumentation. This mere fact could make all these teachings relevant for the study 
regarding God's attributes.  Aristotelian research developed into a separate discipline,  called  falsafa, 
which  later  went  into  odds  with  the  theology2.  In  relation  to  theology,  Stoicism  (and  the  other 
philosophic schools as well) was in a similar position as with the case of Lactantius: its theories served 
as a source for inspiration for arguments in a different context when they were made in. Unlike in case 
of falsafa, Quran and hadith remained to be the main authority, and thus Stoic theories were fragmented 
into a number of separate opinions on the elements, constitution of material things, effects of divine or 
natural powers, and also in a wide field of anthropological or psychological concepts.
It is highly probable that Stoic theories often entered Kalam being mixed with opinions of the other 
schools. Thus, before we handle the specifications of the context of Kalam, we should open again the 
question  of  sources  of  Stoic  teachings.  Book  Peri  ethon of  Galen  mentions  Stoics  alongside 
Pythagoreans, Platonists and Aristotelians, but it was interesting more to the philosophic tradition of al-
Kindi and Ibn Miskawayh3.
As mentioned earlier4, at least in the first half of the 9th century there was another book on Greek 
philosophy available in Baghdad, which contained a lot of information about Stoicism and was linked 
to the theology.  Despite the Horovitz'  claim5,  the school of Stoa is  recognized here as a historical 
philosophical movement. Its teachings (both under the school-name of Riwaqiyun and authorities of 
Zeno and Chrysippus) are only uncritically reported here within paradigma of various philosophical 
questions, contrasted to the answers of other philosophers6. Daiber wrote a philological dissertation on 
the  Placita  Philosophorum,  tracing7 the  sources  of  Tajaddin  Shahrastani  (1086-1153)  and  other 
medieval Muslim doxographers of natural philosophy to this book as well. Shahrastani spoke8 about 
9th century theologians studying works of ancient philosophers, but if he personally was aware of Stoic 
teachings (and the criteria which made them specifically "Stoic") it doesn't mean that the theologians 
were aware of them as well.  Appearance of the  Placita  sets  at  least  the critical  moment,  when an 
alleged  influence  could  take  place;  before  that,  any  similarity  should  be  handled  as  a  parallel 
development.
1 - Ibn Khaldun (cf  Muqaddima VI,18) reports the case of khalif ´Umar, who let persian books into a river, for if God 
wanted muslims to read them, he would have revelated their text in Quran too.
2 - cf ibid
3 - cf Fakhry (1991) p.6; The Galen's work, however, seems to mix the teachings, and also sometimes misplaces Zeno the 
Stoic for an earlier Zeno of Elea. As already mentioned, Fihrist doesn't mention this particular book as well.
4 - cf §1.3.n.1
5 - Namely that Stoicism wasn't perceived as a single school of thought; cf ibid n.3
6 -  However,  this structure basing on particular  themes instead of  history of  development  could have aroused certain 
anachronisms. For example, in I,11 (on causes) we have reports on three standpoints: Plato's (for whom the author ascribes 
the idea that reason is an efficient cause) Pythagoras' (and Aristotle's; for them only the first cause was incorporeal) and 
Stoic  (for  whom they are  corporeal).  The  debate  on  causality  between  Stoics  and  Epicureans  is  not  handled  in  that 
paragraph.
7 - cf Daiber p.110-120
8 - cf Shahrastani p.24
3.Kalam
3.1.Definition
Arabic term  kalám means "debate", "discourse", a mutual speech. We operate here with its derived 
meaning as a medieval speculative theology in Islam. From a contemporary viewpoint, the difference 
between the theology and philosophy or mysticism, as the other spiritual sciences, was in its discursive 
form. While the philosophy relied on the logic, coherence of the known facts, and deduction based on 
the ancient authorities; with mysticism relying on a personal experience, Kalam was always about an 
opening of questions, either abstract or practical. Where the philosophers tried to bring an objective 
logic, a system pervading all possible right assertions, the theologians (mutakallimún) held an unbound 
form  of  thinking,  speculation,  often  better  systematized  by  later  heresiographers  than  their  own 
followers1. Already in eleventh century were the most important points summarized by Shahrastani2, 
whose criteria may help us until today. It is possible to systematicize the Kalam in two ways: either 
spatially, by defining most frequently asked questions being solved by the theologians, or temporarily, 
by the evolution of answers, respectivelly to particular schools, traditions and sects, which were created 
by it.
Because of its rapid development in the first centuries of Islam we'll limit the extent of this study from 
its beginnings until 12th century; in that time, the schools of Ash´ariyya and Maturidiya established 
themselves as the theological orthodoxy of Sunnis. In general, Kalam is a much broader term than Stoa. 
At first, it contains teachings emerging often independently and in various cultural contexts of Iraq, 
Turkestan, (Greater) Iran, Egypt, Arabia and present-day Spain. Their only connection were just the 
fundamental religious texts; a communication between the schools was naturally limited by distance. 
Second, it is a tradition of discourse between various opinions. Although there have been differences in 
opinions of various Stoics, an equivalent category of Kalam would be the whole Hellenistic philosophy. 
Only since the era of Mu´tazila the theology started to face philosophers in a quite homogenous way, 
when Iraq first saw ancient philosophy books being translated into Arabic. After the Mu´tazila, which 
were the first representants of Kalam in these wider interdisciplinary polemics, this position was held 
by the so-called Orthodox3 schools.
1 - The goal of a theologian was to prove that his opinion was orthodox; not that it is a deeper form of understanding. The 
goal was not progress, but orthodoxy. Lohlker (p.86) emphasizes the point that Kalam was based on a search for a middle 
way, which doesn't stack with extreme opinion. For example, in the debate on the qadar theme (cf §3.2.2.), the extremes 
were the supporters of free will and of predestination, whereas the later theologians usually tried to find a compromise. 
Heresiographers are to be understood as those, who do the dirty work of proving that one or another theologian actually was 
an extremist.
2 - cf p.12
3 - The term "orthodoxy" is based on the classifications of various sects by Shahrastani and Tritton. The contemporary 
understanding of orthodoxy will be handled in the fifth chapter. It denotes the schools of Ash´ari and Maturidi, but the use is 
merely nominal.  From a religious viewpoint Shi´a adopts various Mu´tazili  positions instead of Ash´arite ones; from a 
philosophical viewpoint, we don't have any criteria for the rightness of theological opinions.
3.2.Fundamental Questions
An ethymological definition of theology as the science of religious creeds and God alone wouldn't 
suffice. It wasn't only in the case of Muslim theology that beside the questions of ontology and ethics 
have been laid also those of jurisprudence, politology, psychology, epistemology or of a natural science 
(in  its  contemporary  shape).  Shahrastani1 described  their  evolution  and  dividing  influence  on  the 
Community of the faithful; as the mankind is divided into nations, also one can define basic questions, 
on which are based the particular debates. Kalam is the discourse about basic questions about truth 
(uSúl, "root"). A theologian comes with a speculation, discourse or another form of getting answers 
(furú', "branches"), which are then asserted as a teaching for practical use. Shortened, theology deals 
with  root  matters,  setting  course  for  the  growth  of  branches,  that  means  defining  maxims  and 
arguments for jurisprudence2.
Thinkers could have been categorized to distinct "sects" (mahál), because an acceptance of a particular 
answer for even a very  abstract question, often given by these discussions about "root matters", was 
understood as a reflection of the personal faith. Shahrastani orderred theological questions into four 
categories:  the  first  contained  questions  about  the  identity  or  unity  of  God  (tawHíd),  the  other 
concerning qadar ("power", "determination" or "providence"3), next one about promise and threat, and 
the last one about the Revelation.
First category, questions about unity of God, contained also derived matters as His essence, attributes, 
abilities, obligations and actions; the second one about justice (´adl), as well as autonomy and morality 
of an active subject; third one more psychological questions, like inner attitudes, piety or faith of an 
individual; and the fourth one formed its specific epistemology, dealing with possibilities of knowledge 
of goodness and truth as such,  as well as questions of legitimity of an Imam, as the leader of the 
believing Community, and consequent political theories.
1 - p.11
2 - p.38; A similar definition of "roots" and "branches" we find by Ghazali (Ihya, p.31). Science of "roots" means for him 
mostly reading of the original authorities - Quran, Sunna, teachings of the Companions (aţar aS-SaHabá), with commonly 
agreed (ijma´) texts as a secondary source. The "branches" then mean the process of their interpretation, helping us to 
determine right "activities of the world", or jurisprudence, and "conditions of heart", ethics. Beside these, Ghazali also 
defined other two types of religious sciences: auxilliary (muqaddimát;  ie linguistics) and supplementary (muTammimát; 
research of the context, mostly biographies, useful for determining trustworthiness of authorities).
3 - The third one was proposed by Tritton (p.54n).
3.2.1.Unity of God
Surely the most basic question of theology is what a God is in fact, what kind of predicates may be 
attributed to Him. A Muslim believes primarily that God is one. It is the testimony, that there is no deity 
but God1, which (with acknowledgment of the angels, scriptures and prophets2) forms the first pillar of 
the  faith.  For  a  theologian,  this  is  a  dogma,  a  starting  premise,  from which  the  discourse begins. 
Although there were various attempts3 to prove the existence of God, the main idea of the shahada was 
not as much focused on the question whether God exists or not, but rather at  His uniqueness, His 
special position in the world, which a believer shouldn't compare to anything else. Quran itself handles 
primarily with the problem of idolatry, širk, not as much with atheism4.
This premise then served in other debates, which tried to describe God by other attributes. As for these, 
the tradition accepts 99 "most beautiful names", which can be found in Quran5. Other attributes have 
been derived from the Quranic verses as well, speaking about His actions or states; like his word or 
command6. The goal was  tawHíd, a description of God as a single being, but with a respect to the 
multitude of attributes. The question was, whether they were attributed by humans to Him or reflected 
His essence (jawhar). There were in general two problems arising from this. Namely, it was (1) the idea 
that the divine attributes are independent predicates, which can be attributed to anything; it could be 
said that if they were eternal, there would have to be more eternal beings, more Gods. Because only He 
alone is a God, nothing can be from Him separated in a way, that it could had been a part of Him and in 
the same time possess an individuality. On the other side, a theologian had to deal with all descriptions 
he could find in  Quran.  The next  problem was that  of  (2) anthropomorphous attributes,  as  Quran 
mentions his throne or hand7. It was a frequent question throughout the Kalam, whether they should be 
taken literally or as a mere allegory.
There were two extreme stances on the matter. The first was an inflationary stance, technically named 
as "likening" or "assimilating",  tašbíh. The attributes of God can be understood in a similar way as 
human attributes: His word is a sound, His hand is a corporeal organ as well.  It  also included the 
teaching that Quran is eternal in both the sense of an idea as well as written text8. The second was a 
deflationary, "stripping", ta´Til. It has been usually connected to the school of Mu´tazila. They tried to 
show that all divine attributes are a made by human imagination, while divine essence is inseparable 
from God Himself, impossible to describe by anything in the material world. Throne and hand are then 
just allegories for His supreme authority or power.
In practice, they also categorized the attributes of God to essential, bound to His eternal being, and 
actual, based on His manifestation in the world. The actual attributes, however, needed a motive, what 
implied a hierarchy between the essences. For example, an act could be motivated by goodness; but 
then God as an agent could be separated from His motivation9. Their critics thus tried to unify the 
attributes again,  a turn characterizing many debates.  We'll  return to them in the beginnings of the 
specific chapters about the largest sects, as the answer was a crucial premise for their stances on the 
other themes.
Relevance of this theme for the Stoic philosophy may not be apparent. In philosophy, it was possible to 
establish a system of two levels of existence, a phenomenal and an ideal. Theologians, however, could 
only comment the Revelation in the limits of the phenomenal world. Revelation itself is not a mere 
phenomenon, which was only "discovered" by humans on their quest for knowledge. It seemed to be 
eternally present and human could only try to actualize it. In fact, Stoics did restrain themselves in a 
similar way. Their philosophical creation was an immanent, all-pervading and controlling God/Fate, 
which they secondarily tried to describe in the terms of traditional religion10.
On the other hand, Mu´tazilites began with a traditional view, then elaborating it by means of a logical 
criterion11, thus trying to make traditional and philosophical theology compatible as well. Categories of 
divine attributes and His motivation were the first fields of mutual interest of the teachings of Stoics 
and those of Kalam.
1 - cf Q 3,18
2 - Q 2,285
3 - For example, Ash´ari provides one in his Luma´ §3, which we'll discuss later.
4 - It speaks of various forms of širk. The pagan Arab religion was usually based on a worship of tribal deities. Of these 
some where thought to be daughters of the highest God (cf Q 17,40), who seems to have been known even before the time 
of Muhammad's activity. Acknowledgment of human leaders (including Jesus and Jewish rabbis) could also be seen as an 
idolatry (cf Q 9,31-33). The negative category of atheism or disbelief (kufr) was often put on the same level (cf ibid).
5 - To call the divine names is a kind of prayer, recommended by Quran as well; on the other hand, their abuse is considered 
a sin (eg Q 7,180).
6 - cf Q 28,51
7 - eg Q 7,54 & 3,26
8 - Consequently, one could teach the Arabic was the language or God or, in extreme cases, that the letters of its abjad 
reflected limbs of the divine body (cf Tritton p.24).
9 - cf Tritton p.80
10 - cf §2.2.2.n.9
11 - cf Shahrastani p.24
3.2.2.Qadar
The second set of questions dealt with moral responsibility and justice1. Term qadar  denoted power, 
determination to act; the point of debate was that either the humans had this power to determine for 
themselves,  or all  actions were caused by God. It  was a  debate  of an abstract  nature,  with higher 
requirements for individual reasoning, as the Scripture didn't provide many relevant guidelines for the 
topic. Actually, one could find various verses, coming near the matter from both sides, but explicitly 
closing to the latter.  Supporters of the first idea, called Qadarites,  argued that God, being just and 
compassionate, cannot be the source of evil as well. Thus humans have their own qadar, which they 
may employ in a good way, guided by God's will, or in an evil way, ie against God2. The idea had been 
for the first time elaborated by a Basrian theologian Ma´bad al-Juhani (+699) in the beginning of the 
8th century3, later it was adopted by most theologians of Mu´tazila and Shi´a.
The opposite idea was that of jabr: there is only one power, which makes people active. A human is 
always an instrument of God, through which the power of the source is being applied on the nature. 
Humans thus cannot do anything else than what God wants of them4. They have neither power, will, 
nor choice5 to act otherwise. First of the Jabrites was a theologian Jahm ibn Safwan (jahm ibn Safwán 
abú miHráz at-tirmíđí; +745) who (unlike Ma´bad) didn't manage to found a lasting tradition6.
From the view of the first question, they asked about a relation between God's omnipotence and human 
life; to which extent is the development of the world determined by the act of creation and which 
phenomena (if there are any) are caused by the human will. To correctly understand the theme of qadar, 
one should review the crucial role of will/power (iráDa/qudra) contrast7. In history of Kalam we may 
find  two  major  tendencies  in  the  understanding  of  it.  In  first,  usually  linked  with  the  Qadariyya 
movement, we can take unify will and the desired object: we assume a goal, analyze by reason what 
means it needs for fulfillment, and by employing them we may reach it. In this view, "power" means 
the latent ability to reach the goal, its application fully depends on the will of the subject. On the other 
hand, some interpret "power" as continuously present characteristics, even if it's not actually asserted 
by the  will.  A power  is  still  present,  what  changes  is  its  intensity  (either  of  an  inner  feeling  of 
competence or efficiency of its application), dependent on other abilities or opportunities. From this 
point of view, we may gain or lose it only partially, its creation and destruction are bound to the birth 
and death. Essential for power is the agent and its constitution, not will, which determines only the 
form how  the  power  is  applied.  In  a  determinist  version  of  this  view,  the  so-called  doctrine  of 
acquisition  (kasb),  only  God  possesses  qadar,  and  His  will  is  nothing  more  than  an  absence  of 
compulsion8.  He creates in humans a  temporary ability (istiTa´a)  to perform an act.  Human's  own 
characteristic is only his ability to acquire an act, the capability ceases to exist once an action has been 
performed9. 
From a certain point of view, the later doctrine of kasb and istiTá´a were not always aimed against that 
of qadar, which threatened the premise of the divine unity, but more against the radical determinism, 
which would undermine the ethics of Islam. If human would be given no responsibility as an integral 
subject, of what use would be the law10? The kasb doctrine could have preserved the role of God as an 
active source and human as a servant, which could be judged: an idea, that both good and evil are 
wanted by God, for He creates powers for every human action, was generally accepted. Influence of 
this doctrine was immense especially in the later Kalam of 10th century, also we return to the problem 
in the later chapters.
Of  the  other  questions  derived  from  the  doctrine  there  were  various  stances  on  whether  the 
responsibility lays on acts or on the faith (imán); what's the essence and object of a divine decree; 
what's, on the other hand, the essence of human abilities; what's the relation between imán and istiTá´a; 
whether Quran is created through this  istiTá´a  of men, ability to write and understand it;  and also 
permanently actualized question of justice.
Because this debate began so early (late 7th century), it is hardly possible to expect any influence of the 
Greek philosophy in general. On the other hand, there can be found a parallel development of an idea, 
which was tagged as a soft determinism11. When speaking about the justice of God, the early Stoic 
authority Cleanthes had a similar view as that of Qadarites, namely that God wasn't responsible for evil 
acts. Divine influence is different in various situations, thus some people may act unreasonably,  ie 
badly12.  A determinist  position,  however,  did prevail  very soon as the school applied more logical 
means, leaving human responsibility only so far as the inner attitude (acceptance of circumstances) is 
concerned. As the doctrine of acquisition has been later revived in Kalam by the Ash´arite school in a 
similar way; we "feel" free, but we should seek the rules which, consciously or unconsciously, control 
us13. To search for an influence from the Stoics would be more relevant in their case, but Placita doesn't 
provide such ethical teachings. As in the first theme, Ash´arites were developing the moderate Jabrite 
teaching as an opposition to the Mu´tazila. This kind of Jabrism had some similar ethical consequences 
as that of Chrysippus' moral theory, but that one wasn't known to them.
1 - cf Shahrastani p.11
2 - cf Q 9,109: "God guides not the people of the evildoers"
3 - cf MacDonald p.128
4 - cf Q 81,28: "whosoever of you who would go straight; but will you shall not, unless God wills, the Lord of all Being"
5 - cf Shahrastani p.73
6 - ibid; Both doctrines of (human) qadar and jabr were in their times considered as radical opinions, and also both Ma´bad 
and Jahm paid for them with their lives. Jabrism could have been used to justify oppressivity of the ruling power (as it is 
interpreted by Fakhry), but it could be used as an argument for its enemies too.
7 - cf Tritton p.67: "[Will] was a guide and director rather than a cause. The cause was power, which was blind...Will 
concentrated power on an object  and made it  intelligent."  Here one can see a contrast  between Christian and Muslim 
voluntarism. Christianity considers "will" to be an ability to initiate and control an action (the Catholic position is purely 
Qadarite; cf Catechism of Catholic Church §1730, quot.Ireneus of Lyon). In the Muslim view, will seems to be resulting 
from an evaluation of consequences of the subject's activity. It is an idea, which we try to fulfill, not an immediate cause of 
some act. This cause is the power, qadar. In the Christian world these terms of will and power weren't so clearly divided. 
The later ideas of a "blind will" known from Schopenhauer, which binds itself with anything, or its opposite of a "pure 
will", spoken of by Eckhart, which has no object at all, have no equivalent in Kalam. God is powerful, thus He applies His 
will trough the acts.
8 - The view had been first developed by Najjar (cf §4.3.1, Shahrastani p.74 & Tritton p.72) and later elaborated by the 
school of Ash´arites.
9 - Term qadar denotes potence, istiTa´a capability, kasb an aquisition of this capability. Semantic difference between qadar 
and istiTa´a is not always that clear and the idea had only minimal foundation on the Scriptures; the latter word is derived 
from quranic command of Hajj (Q 3,91) and was used in combination with kasb. IstiTa´a meant favorable circumstances to 
perform an action, like corporeal health; the first, who used the term in this way, was an early Shi´a theologian Zarara ibn 
A´yan (+767; cf Tritton p.66), Najjar's contribution was the idea of its temporariness. MacDonald (p.127) connects the early 
idea of God as an unlimited ruler, who simply applies His power on the world (on what should have Ma´bad reacted) with 
the political situation of Umayyad khalifate. It is an interesting remark, but still, khalifas had various stances on the qadar 
doctrine (cf Tritton p.55).
10 - Tritton p.55: he writes about a beduin thief, who pulled with a stick some goods from a tent. When he was caught, he 
defended himself in a way, that it was the stick which was stealing, not him. 
11 - cf Bobzien p.251
12 - cf §2.2.n.3
13 - cf §5.1.3.
14 - The 9th century source Placita  (cf p.178f) mentions three Stoic positions on fate (baxt): Chrysippus' (fate is identic 
with  an  "utterance  of  Reason",  naTq  ´aqlí,  which  Daiber  translates  as  logos;  this  fate  controls  the  whole  cosmos), 
Poseidonius' (fate, God and nature are three distinct realities) and a general Stoic one (fate is the causal chain of nature, its 
beginning and consequences).
3.2.3.Promise and Threat
The third  question mentioned by Shahrastani  are  "names and judgements"  (al-asma'  wa'l-aHkam), 
altough more often described as "promise and threat" (al-wa´d wa'l-wá´id) or "reward and punishment" 
(aţ-ţawab wa'l-´iqab). It handles the judgment, rewards and punishments of humans, according to faith 
(imán) or another criterium. Quran speaks often about rewarding those who follow it and punishing 
those who don't1. The previous theme was a kind of philosophical ethics, while this theme handles with 
psychological problems like interpretations of piety and faith. The main object of questions was the 
faith alone as the reaction of a soul to the Revelation2.
Similarily  as  in  the  qadar  theme,  we  also  here  have  to  deal  with  a  question  of  responsibility. 
Responsibility doesn't  reflect  only will  (as an instrument  creating motives),  it  comes out  from the 
competence or power of an individual on the external side, and from the faith, attitude of soul to the 
world, which it faces, on the inner side. When a human errs, the question is whether it is possible to 
consciously repent or it is inevitable that he would be "led astray" and lose the faith as whole. One can 
answer by searching the cause, which power causes it, but also from the side of an object, how a human 
reacts on such a stroke of divine might, and when (if ever) he can ever become conscious of it.
The theology brought deontical ethics, but the base for it had to be found by every believer on his own: 
if he didn't, then he would become a subject under control of the others3. It may remind us of Zeno's 
idea that only wise men are free, as a way of self-justification of any theological effort4. But before 
opening such theme, the problem would be the motivation behind the moral handling: could we speak 
about faith, trust, reason, fear and happiness as interchangable? This field seems to be less open for any 
comparision with or influence of an ancienty philosophy.
Theologians were trying to describe the relation between acts and faith, basing themselves at most on 
Quran and other traditional sources5. Dealing with them, many major schools of Kalam had defined 
themselves already in the early era: in the question of judgement (until when we are just "warned" and 
when we suffer "punishment") came out the Murji'a6 and Khawarij7 as stand-alone sects, the question of 
sins and losing of faith created Mu´tazila8. It is still hard to say, to which extent a human is exposed to 
sins from his own and from divine will, also how he would (and should) then react. This theme stays as 
an important bridge between the debate on  qadar and the question of corruptability of authorities, 
which led to serious problems of legitimacy of the imamate and interpretability of Revelation.
1 - eg cf Q 28,61 (promise) & Q 39,24 (warning)
2 - cf Q 8,2: "Those only are believers who, when God is mentioned, their hearts quake, and when His signs are recited to 
them, it increases them in faith, and in their Lord they put their trust"
3 - The problem of a "blind belief" (taqlíd; namely an acceptance of judge's decree without thinking about it) was often 
open in later schools of Kalam, especially by Maturidi and Ghazali. On the other hand (but also with a more political 
undertone), Shi´a and Khawarij had specified themselves by recognition of a true authority (Imam), what we will open in 
next paragraphs.
4 - cf §2.2.3.n.15
5 - The debate can be found still in modern times. It is presented also by Hourani (cf p.27f). For example, in Q 2,231 ("do 
not retain them [women] by force, to transgress; whoever does that has wronged himself") we have an objectivist view: "to 
sin" means "to harm myself". However, in Q 35,8 ("And what of him, the evil of whose deeds has been decked out fair to 
him, so that he thinks it is good? God leads astray whomsoever He will, and whomsoever He will He guides; so let not thy 
soul be wasted in regrets for them") it is subjective, with morale depending on faith in Quran.
6 - "Those, who postpone" (Murji'tes; from irja, hope) divine reward or punishment to the times of the final judgement.
7 - "Exiles" (Kharijites; from xaraja, to leave), originally Shi´ites, who questioned the authority of the judge who tried to 
solve the conflict in the battle of Siffin (cf §3.2.4.n.5).
8 - "Separatists"; ie from the debate, whether a sinner is still a believer or not. More about them in the next chapter.
3.2.4.Imamate
Shahrastani  connects  the  problems  of  imamate  with  those  of  epistemology.  The  epistemological 
question  was in  how far  one can distinguish  good and evil1.  In  general,  an  imám  ("pattern")  is  a 
spiritual leader, who is able of this distinction, and also lives by it. The word is used for both leaders of 
ordinary prayers in mosque and for the highest authorities in Muslim jurisprudence, theology, and also 
(in case of Shi´a) in politics. Since the earliest times of Kalam, the term was used for the rightful 
successor of the Prophet Muhammad; thus the original was more political,  only later  developing a 
religious background2.
After  the Muhammad's  death in 632, the Community agreed on his  father-in-law Abu Bakr as his 
successor (xalífa), because ´Ali (599-661;  ´alí ibn abí Tálib), whom Muhammad himself appointed 
before his death, although he didn't succeed him immediately3. When he finally took the position of a 
khalif, some of Muhammad's Companions went into mutual conflicts. The unrests escalated in fitna, a 
civil war between ´Ali and the Syrian governor Mu´awiya Umayy (602-680), appointed by the previous 
khalif ´Uthman as his successor. In the Battle of the Camel (656), ´Ali defeated forces of ´Aisha (´á'iša 
bint abú bakr), Muhammad's widow and daughter of the first khalif. Consequently, ´Aisha repented, 
but Talha and Zubayr, Muhammad's Companions, were killed, thus inspiring many debates whether 
they were righteous or not4. Later ´Ali faced Mu´awiya in the battle of Siffin (657), where ´Ali gained 
an upper hand, but then let the conflict to be solved by an independent judge. He acknowledged Mu
´awiya as the overlord of Syria and Egypt, while ´Ali retained the title of khalif and the rest of the 
territory in Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. ´Ali accepted the decree, what some of his followers couldn't agree 
with - ´Ali, as an Imam and khalif, shouldn't have accepted any higher human authority5. Consequently, 
this led to a division of the Community to three sects: Sunnis, Shi´a and Khawarij.
These harsh conflicts have shaped a wide part of history of the Muslim lands. Trying to solve them 
intellectually, in Kalam came up the questions of legitimacy of an Imam6, as well as that of relevance of 
Companions'  teachings for the Sunna. Later,  they have turned more abstract.  If the criterium for a 
legimitacy was sinlessness or perfection, it was important to define what these qualities meant. Thus it 
includes also the questions of the essence of good and evil,  or whether God does the best for His 
creation or not7. Another criterium was an Imam's knowledge, his ability to judge correctly according to 
the  divine  law.  Consequent  debates  included  some  kind  of  an  epistemology:  in  how  far  can  we 
understand and reinterpretate Quran8? How can we know what is good or evil? What responsibilities 
does bring such a knowledge? Similarly, it could ignite the debate on attributes, when they opened the 
problem whether an Imam could become corrupt or whether it was permissible to rebel against such 
one. These all could have been avoided by a criterium of genealogy or direct appointment, but even this 
could become unclear9. For our own debate, the primary questions are not as important: one could not 
even exclude one of these criteria to be more important than the others. The spin-off abstractions - the 
essence of good, change of a personal character, role of reason in comprehending the Revelation - may 
create a wider picture of theologians' worldviews and their relation to Stoic or other philosophies.
1 - Hourani (1985; p.23f) finds out some general positions on the relation of epistemology and ethics. We can either see 
"good" as something that can be (1) objectively found, or (2) subjectively ordained. The first (a classic philosophical or  Mu
´tazili position) can be further subdivided: such a knowledge may be (1a) naturally accessible for anyone reasonable, (1b) 
limited to people possessing special qualities (ie Imams) or (1c) unaccessible to reason; provided only by the Scriptures. In 
how far the (2) position could be divided was one of the points of schism between Mu´tazila and Ash´ariyya (cf §5.1.3.). 
Shahrastani thus encompassed a part of a general ethics theme, which includes also those of qadar and recompenses.
2 - cf Tritton p.20
3 - cf Lohlker p.101; He was considered too young to rule yet, and thus the Companions agreed on Abu Bakr. A xalífa 
("successor") differs from an Imam in its definition, as it  denotes always a political authority representing the Prophet. 
Sunni Muslims recognize four righteous (rášidun) khalifas - Abu Bakr, ´Umar ibn al-Khattab, ´Uthman and ´Ali; after them 
the title is considered to be secular, although all Sunni dynasties claiming the title tried to ground their legitimacy on a 
certain continuity of the righteous khalifas. For the Shi´a, an Imam (I prefer to distinguish the term for leaders of prayer and 
the Shi´a definition of their highest spiritual leader with a small "i" in the former and capital "I" in the latter case) can have a 
certain political power, but his authority stretches more in moral questions. It doesn't come from Prophet, but rather also 
from God.
4 - cf Shahrastani p.21
5 - cf ibid; This movement, Khawarij, was rapidly dividing itself into many sects yet in the first decades after Siffin. Nearly 
any dispute, which couldn't have been solved by the Scripture, was accompanied by a schism. A very stark example of their 
reasoning is provided by Tritton (p.37; quot.Tabari): "The followers of Najda [+693] decided that he had done wrong in 
writing to ´Abd al-Malik and...called him to repent. He repented. They then decided that the imam could do nothing of 
which he could need to repent and summoned him to repent his repentance. He refused and there was a breach." He remarks 
(cf p.35) however that the term of Kharijites became later broadly used for any bandits.
6 - According to Ibn Khaldun (Muqaddima VI,14) discussion of imamate was seen as theological only because the school of 
Ash´arites reacted on Shi´a in this matter. For him, to accept political authority isn't an expression of faith, but rather a 
matter of public interest.
7 - cf Shahrastani p.11
8 - Arberry (1957, p.17) quotes Q 3,5 to show its different readings. At first in a "Sunni" way: "and none knows its [of  
Quran] interpretation, save only God. And those firmly rooted in knowledge say: 'We believe in it; all is from our lord'", and 
then in the "Shi´ite": "and none knows its interpretation, save only God and those firmly rooted in knowledge; they say: 'We 
believe in it; all is from our lord'". For Shi´a, "those firmly rooted in knowledge" are Imams.
9 - A typical example (cf Shahrastani p.23) is the case of sons of the sixth Imam, Ja´far as-Sadiq ( ja´far ibn muHammad aS-
Sádiq): from their followers came up various sects like Imamiya, ´Ammariya, Isma´iliya, Mubarakiya and many others. 
Imamites,  the present  majority of Shi´a,  accepted Musa (músá al-káZim),  because Ja´far  was thought to say,  that  "the 
seventh is your  qá'im  [the Awaited One]; he is the namesake of the one who brought the Torah". Isma´ilites, however, 
accepted Ja´far's eldest son ´Isma´il as an Imam, as he appointed him at first; the problem was that ´Isma´il died before Ja
´far himself; and thus others took ´Isma´il's son Muhammad as the seventh. On the other hand, a relation to the family of the 
Prophet, or at least to the Quraysh tribe, was a serious expectation for many titles - especially for the Shi´a, but generally for 
many various forms of authority reaching from Sufi sheikhs to Arab kings. More in §3.3.2.
3.3.Sects and Schools
In case of Kharijites and Shi´a, their religious specification was conjoined with a political separation 
from ahl as-sunna. However, Shahrastani's term of "sect" (milal) is in theology more abstract than its 
present  meaning.  The  term  is  philosophical  here,  denoting  more  a  movement  of  thought  than  a 
separated community. There was a term of equivalent meaning as excommunication (tabarra'a), but it 
meant only physical avoidance of contact with a certain person, it was not to have any effect on his 
moral situation1. But still, religious divisions had in times of Umayyads significant meaning. Opinion 
could have defined the person as a payer of a special tax per capita, paid by all non-Muslim population 
(jizya). Since 9th century, with rise of the Mu´tazila, there came up also an institution for preservation 
of dogmas (miHna), which controlled the correct opinion of judges and similar servants of the state2.
Contemporary doxographers tended to categorize the sects by their own doctrines. A sect was usually 
defined by its answer to one of the basic questions, other answers being deduced from this premise. 
Shahrastani defines four principal sects: Qadariya, Sifatiya, Khawarij and Shi´a. Qadaris were those, of 
course,  who  supported  the  doctrine  of  free  will;  Sifatis  accepted  divine  attributes  (Sifát);  Khariji 
defined himself by his rebellious attitude to the khalifate or belief in unforgivness for grave sins; and 
Shi´a specified the demands for a legitamate heirs of ´Ali. In his work, Shahrastani uses also partly 
political divisions and reflects the reactions on Sifatis (Mu´tazila), Qadarites (Jabriya) and Kharijites 
(Murji'a) too. His division was clear and categorized the teachings of individual theologians. However, 
such a division seems to be very general, as most of the significant theologians were dealing with all 
basic questions. Shahrastani presented at first those answers, which had the most influence. Qadaris 
weren't established as a coherent school of thought. When Ash´ari used the name for Mu´tazila, he 
thought it more in a way of convicting them of heresy, rationally supporting it in this way too3.
Also newer works about Kalam tend to use a simplified division of sects, partly based on the fourth 
theme: on the (more) traditionalist and (more) rationalist sects. We can say it was ment more for a 
general attitude than an exact expression. Many traditionalists used very rational methods to support 
the  authority  of  Quran;  many  rationalists  also  were  persuading  their  opponents  about  the 
trustworthiness of their method by Quranic verses4.
The extremes of both stances were in fact considered to be outside of theology. Pure traditionalism, 
belief in the leading power of a revelated text like by Ibn Hanbal, was often criticized by theologians as 
taqlíd. On the other hand, to put too much trust on own intellect was seen as a heathen-philosophic 
attitude5. This view shows an important aspect of the evolution of kalam, which is present in theologies 
of various religions too. However, search for analogies with other theologies should not be a natural 
argument for such a division. Theological assertions of Kalam had had often an important influence on 
contemporary jurisprudence and politics.  Movements changed into active forces within the society, 
some of them even to armed powers6. That's why we may accept the Shahrastani's term of "sect" as the 
abstract category based on a doctrine, and "school" as a historical tradition of discourse.
1 - cf Tritton p.36n; Mostly a Khariji matter, not of the inner faith. See also §3.2.3.
2 - This miHna, often translated as "inquisition", came up in times of khalif Ma'mun, to spread (and enforce) the doctrine of 
created Quran.
3 - Ash´ari's Kitáb al-Luma´ deals a lot with this matter.
4 - eg cf Q 3,5.
5 - Kalam seems to have tried to find a middle way, where rational and revelated element support each other. Philosophy 
was either understood as an alternative way to the truth (mostly in the Peripatetic tradition) or solved the dichotomy by its 
synthesis.  Suhrawardi  taught,  that  the  highest  knowledge is  also  caused  by divine  illumination,  similar  doctrines  was 
developed  by some Mu´tazilites  and Shi´ites  too.  The  contact  was  surely mutual,  but  their  relations  with  Platonic  or 
Zoroastrian philosophy would need a separate work (one of them – Arberry's "Revelation and Reason" – is elaborating this 
point enough).
6 - For example an Isma´ili dynasty of Fatimids, introduced in §5.1.n1. 
3.3.1.Murji'a und Khawarij
These two sects were in essence based on the "promise and threat" theme: Murji'tes focused more on 
"promise", Kharijites on "threat". The background of these sects is, however, significantly different, 
what could be understood from their teachings too. Murji'a became a theological sect, a discoursive 
movement, which tried to find a way of compromise between both the secular and religious power1. 
Their thoughts were influential between theologians of various schools2. They taught a certain openess 
to  the others:  everybody,  even somebody,  who would disagree with their  opinion,  may hope for a 
divine reward, if he's faithful. A human is tested by many ways during the life, but he isn't in general in 
full control of the situations. That's why he's judged only after his death, when God rewards or punishes 
him for his faith. The teaching was quite cosmopolitan, although not in a rationalist way. For example 
Ibn Surayj (al-Haríţ ibn surayj) criticized the preference of Arabs in Umayyad administrative in a way 
that  national  identity  is  no  factor  of  person's  moral  quality.  They  did  not,  however,  judge  the 
administration itself. If a man had faith, it was also irrelevant if he did good or evil acts. Good deeds 
led to no improvement, sins did no harm3.
Kharijites were, oppositely, a closed sect in a modern sense, considering everybody who didn't agree 
with them to be damned. At first they were the political opposition of Sunni khalifas and Shi´ite Imams: 
the theory was that judgement belongs to God alone (lá Hukma illa li-lláhi), and thus no man is a 
legitimate judge. Shahrastani, commenting this point, literally demonizes them4. In practice they were 
unifying  the bedouins  against  the central  government.  The  sect  was  defined more negatively than 
positively; more from the side of Sunni writers than from their own5. ´Uthman, ´Ali and their political 
heirs were considered to be sinners, because they didn't follow Sunna; resistance (both in personal 
opinion  as  well  as  in  politics  or  war)  against  such  leaders  was  an  obligation  for  Kharijites6.  By 
definition, a person loses his faith, when he commits a grave sin7. Extreme, but in those times broadly 
present  view was the stance  called Wa´idiya  (wá´íd,  "what  is  believed to  be evil"):  a  sin  and the 
consequential loss of faith meant an eternal damnation for the sinner. For the question of imamate it 
meant that everybody, from any ethnic group or even a woman or convertite may become an Imam, if 
his/her moral character and devotion to the divine law is perfect; however their Imam would pay with 
life, if he sinned8.
About their influence on the later Kalam, Murji'tes were the first to give a number of definitions of 
faith and Kharijites brought the doctrines of Imam delegation and creation of Quran. Both teachings are 
at opposite poles of the theme, when God judges the men. Either we call the judgement upon ourselves 
by an act or we are constantly approaching it. An act or sincere faith can be evaluated only by God, 
specifically by a reward or punishment. This doubt of authority of human judges was common to both 
sects: only God was a sufficiently legitimate judge for them.
1 - Shahrastani p.121; Ghassan al-Kufi thought Abu Hanifa, the founder of the great school of Sunni law, was a Murji', 
because he taught that faith is of primary importance for God, acts and virtue only secondary.
2 - Tritton p.43; Besides the controversial case of Abu Hanifa, Tritton ascribes Murji'te thoughts also to Jahm, teacher of the 
jabr doctrine, as well as to Ghaylan of Mu´tazila. Shahrastani (cf p.119) mentions, that Murji'te thougths were present even 
between some Kharijites (eg Shabib), while only the Shi´ites disagreed with them utterly.
3 - cf Tritton p.44
4 - cf Shahrastani p.16
5 - cf Shahrastani p.98; Kharijites of course didn't call themselves so, the term having been imposed on them by remaining 
followers of an ("commonly accepted") Imam, against whom the group rebeled.
6 - Khariji teaching is often reduced to the practice of  isti´rád, the killing of unbelievers; they are sometimes seen as a 
historical prototype of terrorist movements (cf Lohlker p.137). Murji'a is from this view an opposite extreme, a philosophy 
of pure tolerance, although the base for both arguments - Kharijite and Murji'te alike - is in essence the same, ie that only 
God may judge the morale and fate.
7 - An extreme case was that of Azariqa (Tritton p.40; Shahrastani p.102f), a separatist sect founded by Nafi´ ibn al-Azraq in 
second half of 7th century. The sect conquered a wide territory from Ahwaz to Kerman; in the beginnings their manpower 
was about 30 thousand horsemen, as Shahrastani mentions. They killed everybody who didn't agree with them on sight; 
children alike, as they considered all unbelieveres damned. Even if one did agree with their teaching, but didn't join the sect, 
he was considered to be an unbeliever too. To join them meant also various tests. They were in a nearly constant war with 
the khalifate since 685, until they were defeated and scattered by Umayyad general Ibn Hajjaj in 698. However, the later 
sect of Ibadites allows to kill the others only if war was openly declared by either side and the unbelief of the enemy is  
proven (cf Shahrastani p.115).
8 - cf Tritton p.40
3.3.2.Shi´a
In  a  contrast  to  Murji'a  and  Khawarij,  Shi´a  accepts  human  authorities.  Original  definition  was 
primarily political - they were the followers of ´Ali (arab.ší´a ´alí, "´Ali's faction") during the wars of 
fitna.  After his death in 661, his  descendants tried more times to rebel against  the Umayyads,  but 
unsuccessfully. Thus the Shi´ite Imam changed from a military-political to a primarily spiritual leader, 
altough this had no effect on a form of this sect. Similarly as to Kharijites, even here is the Imamate a 
religious matter. However, there are very strict rules for his appointment, it's independant from will of 
the people1. The extreme in this question was presented by the sect of Kaysanites, which identified the 
obedience  to  a  man  with  piety  as  such2.  Opinions  about  the  Imamate  were,  however,  more 
differentiated. Real extremists (ghulát, what means "extremism" also literally) considered Imamate to 
be a light, special soul reflecting ultimate truth (Hujja), which incarnates from one Imam to another, 
since it was brought down to the world by ´Ali, identified with God, an angel or at least a "piece of 
heaven"3.  A similar,  but  perhaps  not  as  fantastic  view  on  imamate  was  that  of  Isma´iliya.  These 
believed in a historical circulation of periods of seven visible and seven hidden Imams, which manifest 
a special esoteric knowledge. The longest chain of Imams had the Ithna´shariya ("Twelvers"), or simply 
Imamiya, which believed in particular 12 Imams. The last one of them, Muhammad al-Mahdi, vanished 
in Samarra in 870, and he is expected to return once again to unite the faithful4.
The person of an Imam is often not only in the center of politology, but also of a certain kind of 
epistemology.  It  is  primarily  his  knowledge,  not  that  much  his  moral  quality,  which  makes  him 
trustworthy in the eyes  of his  followers.  The main idea is,  that  a  human doesn't  always solve his 
problem alone, but tries to find somebody more competent, either learned or experienced, who knew a 
similar situation. An idea of instructive leadership (ta´lim) came up with Isma´iliya, but had a broad 
influence on Kalam. Competence doesn't imply the authority, also from a believer one can't expect 
taqlíd, blind trust. One has to recognize his Imam.
But  also  what  he's  searching  for,  so  a  believer  should  turn  the  questions  against  himself.  Such a 
temporary "socratic turn" had been originally present only in a closed community of the Brotherhood 
of Purity (ixwán aS-Saffá), based on Isma´iliya. Their members had been given an exact plan of their 
personal growth. At the age of 15 they should have developed their intelligence and purity of heart, 
until 30 various social skills etc5. For a European it may evoke an idea of an elitist society, but the 
Brotherhood was primarily a religious community,  which considered a human to be an improvable 
being,  obliged  for  his  own personal  develompent.  This  view had a  significant  influence  on  Shi´a 
psychology. Mu´tazila, a movement at first defining Sunni theology, united this Shi´ite individualism 
with the qadar doctrine.
1 - Shahrastani, p.125
2 - At first they followed Kaysan, teacher of ´Ali, who should have possessed supernatural perception and knowledge. 
Kaysanites were anthropomorphists and believed in reincarnation generally. Their teaching had been spread in the first half 
of 8th century in Khorasan by Rizam, who appointed his student Abu Muslim as next Imam, to lead a rebellion against 
Umayyads.  Abu Muslim declared himself to be an incarnation of God's spirit  and then helped ´Abbasids to claim the 
khalifate. See Shahrastani, p.132.
3  -  Shahrastani  (p.152)  considers  this  to  be  an  influence  of  zoroastric  teachings.  These  sects  gained  no  significant 
importance, however such teachings were present already in the times of ´Ali's khalifate. Tritton quotes (p.19) a report that 
he burned them, a similar fate awaited numbers of Ghalite theologians.
4 - The influental idea of a "hidden Imam" was brought already by Kaysanites. After the vanishing of al-Mahdi, Imamites 
had been led for a century by so-called representants (ná'ib; this time is also called ghayba sughrá, "minor hiding"), which 
has been followed by an era of awaiting al-Mahdi's return (ghayba kubrá, "major hiding"), which lasts until today. Isma´ilite 
circle was also based on the chain of Imamiya, but they consider Muhammad ibn ´Isma´il to be the seventh Imam instead of 
Musa. The main difference is that the circle from ´Ali to Muhammad ibn ´Isma´il is only one of many periods in history, 
while for Imamites there is only one family beginning with the Prophecy and ´Ali. An important question was then presence 
of Hujja between the people, whether it's intelligible to humans even during the ghayba.
5 - Fakhry p.169
3.3.3.Qadariya and Sifatiya
Of the particular sects, the Qadariya didn't establish itself as a school of thought. As we have already 
mentioned,  there were just  few polarized answers present when the debates regarding power were 
opened; these were the doctrines of qadar and jabr. Shahrastani gave no specific space in his work for 
this sect, incorporating the doctrine into Mu´tazila. Similarly we can speak about Sifatiya. In Quran are 
mentioned many antropomorphic divine attributes like God's face1, sometimes interpreted as if God 
really had a physical body2. These sometimes were connected to a view that the universe consists only 
of material bodies. The question of attributes was generally answered by Mu´tazilites: such an attribute 
is only an allegorical description of the divine essence. In this they were attacked by Ash´arites and 
others, something to which we will later return.
1 - Q 2,109
2 - Mushabbiha; cf Tritton p.48-51. Many of such scholars were extreme Shi´ites, but some of them, like Ibn Karram, were 
accepted among Sunni theologians.
4.Mu´tazila
The method of the early theology was based on debates, where Quran was to be the main source of 
arguments. Mu´tazila, "people of unity and justice" (ahl at-tawHíd wa'l-´adl), was the first movement, 
which tried to define the orthodoxy by philosophic terms, and thus make it reasonable even to the 
ðimmi and unbelievers. Beside the intracultural discourses, in the same time grows the intensity of the 
contact with Christian and Zoroastrian theology as well. A next stage in development of Kalam begins 
in the times of khalif al-Ma'mun (813-833), who founded the first Muslim university and supported 
translation of the Greek philosophical texts. Kalam opens itself for newly discovered ideas of so-called 
Metaphysicians (al-iláhíya) and Naturalists (aT-Tab´íya) too, where the former will be later roughly 
recognized as followers of Plato and Aristotle, the latter as Stoics, Epicureans and other materialist 
schools.  On the other  hand,  it  begins  to  draw exact  lines  of  an orthodox doctrine not  only in the 
spiritual matters, but also in the area of physics, or natural philosophy. Many well-known ideas, often 
in forms of interpretations from the first centuries AD, seem to be accepted by Mu´tazilites too. As they 
became the dominant school of theology, imposing miHna on the officials, many of these ideas were 
considered as a standard part of any debate concerning God.
The general creed was laid down already in first half of the 8th century in Basra by Wasil ibn ´Ata, in 
the end of the century was established another Mu´tazili school in Baghdad. Under al-Ma'mun they 
developed further, led by Abu Hudhayl and Nazzam in Basra and Bishr ibn al-Mu´tamir in Baghdad. 
After the era of downfall during al-Mutawakkil and Ash´arite reaction in 10th century their thoughts 
spread throughout the Muslim world. Mu´tazila had not developed much further in the Sunni world, as 
the Ash´arite theologians declared it a heresy, but had influence between the Shi´ites, partly surviving 
until today.
4.1.Roots
The founder was Wasil (abú huðayfa wáSil ibn ´aTá al-ghazzál, 700-748), known as a perfect manager 
and student of Hasan al-Basri1. Another great promoter of the early Mu´tazila was ´Amr ibn ´Ubayd 
(+762),  who  also  served  to  khalif  Yazid  III2.  They  distinguished  themselves  at  first  in  a  debate 
concerning the divine attributes: their answer was such that God had none, despite the popular beliefs 
and literary meaning of Quran. This doctrine, known as  ta´Til  3, became a standard assertion of the 
contemporary  theology.  The  same  answer  was  given  by  Wasil's  best  known  opponent,  Jahm ibn 
Safwan, teaching in Khorasan and developing his teaching parallely. Fakhry mentions4 Wasil's students 
sent to Jahm, who at first identified him with their school.
However,  Wasil  and Jahm didn't  agree on another  important doctrine defining the Mu´tazili  creed, 
namely that of qadar. Jahm, as we've already mentioned, was a pure determinist. His teaching about 
jabr was often considered as an influence of Christianity5: when God wants to change something, He 
affects it at first by His spirit (rúH), which is omnipresent, although cannot be perceived. In the same 
way doesn't function only nature, but also the human, who has no individual power or will. Unlike 
Wasil, Jahm had not enough productive students, and after his exectution his ideas saw only minimal 
development,  until  the  Mu´tazila  itself  didn't  assimilated  few of  His  points.  Wasil  represented  the 
second pole of the qadar topic, namely Ma´bad's teaching of Qadarism. God gives to men a full power 
over the goal of his acts. According to Wasil, a human has powers to move, to rest, to choose and 
consider, to reflect the done and knowledge6. Qadarism created ethics on a philosophical foundation 
Mu´tazila, however, held its theological foundation. The rules were written down to serve as laws: they 
were to be written for all Community, not only for the learned.
1 -  Hasan  al-Basri  (abú sa´íd  al-Hasan al-baSrí,  641-728),  a  Persian  by origin,  was  an  ascetic  and  later  a  qadi.  He 
emphasized self-examination (muHásaba) instead of trying to understand as much as possible from the world outside, 
which he sought rather negatively. However, his attitude was in no way quietist as in case of Murji'tes. He often criticized 
the Umayyad dynasty:  when he heared they were cruel  because they followed God's  decree he answered simply that 
"enemies of God lie". But he didn't support Shi´a as well. It was he, who brought the thesis into Islam, that from God is 
everything  but  sin  (for  both  cf  Tritton  p.58).  He  founded  a  school  in  Basra,  which  had  an  important  role  in  later 
development of  both theology and mysticism. He had between his students both Wasil  as well  as Rabi´a,  the famous 
reformer of the Sufi movement (Fakhry 2004, p.242). There was a debate between Hasan and Wasil about Murji'tes and 
Kharijites and their definition of Muslims, who commited grave sins. The question was, whether they could be considered 
believers yet. Hasan said it would be just a hypocrisy from the sinner, Wasil answered it's a corruption (fisq) of a believer; a 
position between a true believer and a sinner. The idea didn't gain support of the other debateers, so he left (i´tazala) the 
Hasan's circle. It  is said the word "mu´tazila" rooted in this event, as "those, who separated themselves". According to 
Fakhry  (2004,  p.46)  this  main  quarrel  between  Murji'tes  and  Kharijites  was  an  effect  of  mischanging  the  terms 
"sinner" (fájir; or "hypocrite",  munáfiq) and "unbeliever" (káfir). However, Wasil taught that belief means primarily good 
characteristics  of  a  person  (Shahrastani  p.45).  Similarly  Kharijites  called  sinful  Muslims  to  be 
"monotheists"  (muwaHHidún;  and  thus  not  "unbelievers",  kuffár),  although  they  lose  the  status  of  true 
"believers" (mu'minún). This idea remained as one of the Mu´tazili tenets.
2 - Tritton p.61; Yazid III, one of the last Umayyad khalifs, ruled for only a half-year in 744, gaining a reputation of a 
3 - More on ta´Til doctrine in the next paragraph.
4 - Fakhry (2004) p.47
5 - Tritton p.63 quot.Ibn Hanbal; The question was, whether it was possible to see God.
6 - Shahrastani, p.44
4.2.Basic Creed
Since the beginning there were five principles defining the Mu´tazili creed1. They can be seen as a way 
to unify the moral concepts of Quran with the qadar doctrine. The idea of an omnipotent God became 
abstract and his followers put a lot of efforts to describe His justice in a more logically coherent way 
than in the case of Ma´bad. The tenets, with some changes, were adopted by the most adherents of the 
school throughout the medieval period.
The first tenet was that of divine unity (tawHíd), foundation of Islam as such. In the interpretation of 
Wasil  (and most of Mu´tazila),  it  meant in fact  the doctrine of  ta´Til.  As already mentioned,  they 
reacted on a common-sense answer on divine attributes: if God is knowing or living, it is caused by His 
knowledge or life. The premise of Mu´tazila was that God is single and eternal; if we would have 
accepted the existence of some of his attributes, it would have to be eternal too, and then we would 
have two eternal entities. Two eternal things, two Gods. As God is only one, there can be no particular 
attributes  defined2.  Abu Hudhayl  (abú 'l-huðayl  Hamdán ibn  al-huðayl  al-´alláf,  750-841)  tried to 
overcome the mere denial of attributes by replacing them by a concept of an unified divine essence. 
The whole cannot be divided to separate parts, each being a cause for a different activity (ie life causes 
living, knowledge knowing etc), but rather it is one God having various manifestations3. In fact they 
spoke of  one  special  predicate  in  the  essence,  namely its  eternity,  proneness  to  change;  the  other 
attributes were metaphores or derivates of it4. Bishr (abú sahl bišr ibn al-mu´tamir, +825) came up with 
a difference between indivisible essential attributes (of which eternity was the first one) and those of 
His actions in the world, including creative actions and moral commands5. In short, God becomes a 
creator first when He creates something. Similarly they made it through quranic anthropomorphisms. 
Hand of God6 or His throne7 were allegorical names for His generosity or power, things which people 
tend to associate with hands of thrones in their world8.
Next four tenets defined Mu´tazila as a specific school of theology more clearly. (2) God is just, what 
means  that  (3)  He rewards  good and punishes  evil9.  Another  two were  ethical  categories:  already 
mentioned definition of (4) a corrupted believer and their basic deontical ethics (5) to do obligations 
and avoid doing evil deeds. Baghdadi Mu´tazila derived the definition of justice from the division of 
His essential and actual attributes. Every action has its cause and end, while God changes only the 
ends, as His essence (the only cause of His action) does not change10. Human is created to worship 
God. Divine will is created to create the world. Justice became an essential attribute, which is a cause 
for His acts, however it is hard to define the end here. If there is a concept of good or law, which we 
also may ascribe to His essence, then this essence would not be unite; its parts would be in a teleologic 
relation. Because of this, later Mu´tazilites11 tended to show that God does not create concept of good 
as such, but it is an absolute principle, which He does necessarily follow. However, if there is any 
absolute principle beside Him, it contradicts the first tenet.
This  problem occurs  often  in  Mu´tazili  debates,  but  every  possible  solution  brought  up  so  many 
questions that it paved a way for criticism from outside12. It was similar with the third axiom, that we 
may expect from God a reward and punishment for certain deeds, which is a simple justification for 
setting a law and even ethics as such; the question was, why in fact the people break the rules? Why 
does God allow it, is it just? Qadarism, as described in the previous chapter, was to become a partial 
solution for this problem. As we have seen, the problem set by Mu´tazila by it was much wider. It 
expects an absolute definition of good, which would affect God in the same way as human. This would 
serve God as a guide for His judgements and rewards, for human it would serve as a source of moral 
(reasonable) fundaments for his acts. Basic goal of theology would be to research this absolute moral 
law, if there weren't two another contradictions. Beside the problem of unity, can we know motives of 
the divine will? For theologians, third axiom reduces God to a mere machine and foundation of legality 
of religious law. On the other hand, if only God was to be an absolute, he would have to be the cause 
and creator of good as well as of evil. However, if God was the cause of evil, second pillar of the Mu
´tazili creed would crumble.
1 - cf Tritton p.79 quot.Khayyat
2 - It was Wasil already who put up this kind of reasoning (cf Shahrastani p.43, Tritton p.62), as well as the very term 
"attribute" (Sifa), as some kind of a separate quality causing an activity (creating, knowing et al.). Names attributed to God 
don't reflect such attributes but rather what we see of His manifestations. It seems that most of the early theologians didn't 
open the question (whether an attribute is different from the divine essence) at all, only the anthropomorphists and some of 
the Shi´a (eg cf Tritton p.31).
3 - cf Shahrastani p.46
4 - cf Shahrastani p.41-42
5 - cf Tritton p.96
6 - Q 3,26
7 - Q 7,54
8 - Very often they addressed the vision of God after resurrection in the Paradise; cf Shahrastani p.42.
9 - cf ibid; Another (and perhaps more important) conclusion was that God can't do injustice.
10 - The proneness to change of divine essence was promoted here by Mu´ammar ibn ´Abbad. He criticized the use of term 
"eternal" for God on the ground that it meant originally "everlasting", while according to him God didn't belong to the 
sphere of time at all; cf Shahrastani p.59.
11 - These ideas (cf Shahrastani p.65-67) were presented especially by the 10th century Mu´tazila schools of Jubba'i (in 
Basra) and Ka´bi (in Baghdad). Unlike the earlier Baghdadi branch (ie the schools of Bishr and Mu´ammar), they also held 
the opinion that God does the best for men.
12 - cf §5.1.1.
4.3.Philosophical Themes
4.3.1.Causality
The mere doctrine of qadar couldn't solve the contradictoriness between the first two tenets, and thus 
the Mu´tazilites started to develop ideas merging with those of another directions. One of these was 
their two-fold description of causality. Bishr ibn al-Mu´tamir opened a question: if an archer fires an 
arrow, but then he is killed before he hits the target,  is the archer responsible for the death of his 
target1? According to Bishr, when archer looses the string, only the loosing is the direct effect of his 
action;  consequent  shot  and  death  of  the  target  person  would  be  secondary  effects  (mutawallad) 
generated by the act of firing2. The justice depends on responsibility: the archer is the agent only in the 
moment  of  firing,  but  it  may  not  mean  he  determines  the  hit  as  well.  This  created  a  physical 
terminology comparable to that of Hellinistic philosophy. All motion in the passive matter was thought 
to be an effect of a certain agent. The questions like in how far the body of the agent was involved in 
the "primary" act, or how God determines the secondary effects, 
1 - This problem was inspired by a typical Shi´ite controversy (cf Shahrastani p.21; §3.2.4.). After ´Ali had been accepted as 
khalif, two of Muhammad's former companions, Talha and Zubayr, rebelled against him. After they had been defeated, 
Zubayr was shot in flight by certain Ibn Jarmuz. According to one hadíþ the murderer of Zubayr was condemned to hell. 
However, the Shi´a theologians (and Wasil as well) always seen these two as enemies of ´Ali, thus setting into question 
many sayings concerning them.
2 - cf Tritton p.67
4.3.1.1.Qadarite View
A standard Qadarite (and Bishr's1  ) answer is that the humans are responsible for all  consequences 
generated by their actions as well. The problem is that a human can't be aware of all consequences of 
his action, and then, in how far he can be considered morally responsible for things he cannot foresee? 
Thus Bishr founded his epistemology on the theory of the secondary effects too. Human causes his 
sensory perceptions, being secondary effects of his actions. He says the perceivable accidents of things 
are then caused by humans as well. According to Shahrastani2, he took the idea from the Tab´iya. The 
possible  source3 hints  here  how  the  parallel  could  appear:  the  emergence  of  perceived  accidents 
(impressions,  we  can  say)  is  described  only  from  the  viewpoint  of  Stoics  (Rawaqiyun).  Senses 
(hearing,  sight  etc)  are  identified  with  certain  parts  of  the  spirit,  whose  activity  make  up  the 
impression3. Bishr thought of human to be a composition of body and spirit, while only together they 
could be considered an agent4. However, from what is available, it is impossible to say whether his idea 
of spirit (rúH) was in other aspects the same as that mentioned in Placita too.
He categorized knowledge into intuitive (which is not influenced by a human), sensual (caused by 
human actions in the world) and rational (acquired by thinking, actions within). Intuitive and sensual 
knowledge was necessary; rational was thought to be secondarily acquired. It is the rational knowledge, 
by which we know properties of the things. Knowledge of the whole or perceived phenomena were 
thought  by him to be necessary;  knowledge of "them" didn't  necessarily mean knowledge of their 
details. Human doesn't have to know, what his act will cause, but he still remains responsible for it. On 
the other hand, it leads into an idea, that one can know God, as well as moral category of good, by his 
own mind alone. Human does not need more knowledge about Him. While God doesn't determine 
(primary) acts, He judges their moral status5.
The other view was that of Abu Hudhayl; namely that we are responsible for all consequences of his 
acts, even those occuring after his death; but excluding those how they are perceived. Human is the 
body, life and soul are its accidents. He thought that mind comes out from heart, and thus he brought 
also a dichotomy of cordial (ie mental) and manual (ie corporeal) acts. In the former, the power (qadar) 
is present only during the act, in latter case it depends on the constitution of body6. The typical cordial 
act was will, which according to Abu Hudhayl causes illusions and knowledge, typical corporeal act is 
the motion7. He taught also we don't cause perceived qualities, like color. It should be noted he brings 
this idea further. We can "cause" knowledge only in ourselves, but we're not responsible for what we 
teach  the  others8.  He  seems  to  present  some kind  of  a  self-defence:  a  view that  when  I  instruct 
somebody, it depends only on God, how the other would hear and consequently understand me.
1 - cf Shahrastani p.56; "Whatever is generated from our deeds is our doing." (Fakhry 2004, p.50, quot.Ash´ari quot.Bishr)
2 - cf ibid
3 - cf Placita p.280-282; The author speaks of Stoics in general, but it can be either the Cleanthes' version of the spirit's  
function (cf §2.2.2.n.15) or that of Epicurus. Epicurus' view on physics had a similarity in acknowledging atoms instead of 
continuous stoixeia, as well as the secondary position of accidents in composition of things. On the other hand, the Mu
´tazilite atomism (cf §4.3.2.1.) wasn't necessarily a development of the Hellenistic version. Bishr thought the things are at 
rest when created (cf Tritton p.97), and also his assertions that heat and cold are mere accidents (and not bodies) could had 
been a reaction to the previous views of Dirar ibn ´Amr, which we'll present in §4.3.2.2.
4 - cf Tritton p.98
5 - cf ibid; It is interesting that in Bishr's view the secondary effects are irrelevant for the moral quality of the act. The agent 
can't foresee all the consequences, only God can do that; but he still can perform his own actions in accordance to the divine 
commands offered in Quran. The reasoning is very similar to the one acribed to the Stoics by Plutarch (cf §2.2.3.n.13), 
although it wouldn't help Ibn Jarmuz in a hypothetical plea, as he evidently did the best to kill Zubayr and the moral base is 
somewhat different.
6 - Abu Hudhayl here partly adopts the theory of acquisition, ie the Najjar's version (cf next paragraph).
7 - Precisely quoted, action of heart is not a motion. Tritton (p.84) mentions an antinomy; he could not have answer why 
people find slumber pleasurable. When we sleep, there is no thinking, which would cause the perceived pleasure, when 
awaken, there is no slumber, which would cause the pleasure as such. The problem was in his connecting of an object with 
its cause, when defining it. The logic went up from an axiom, that a non-existent cannot cause effects.
8 - cf Shahrastani p.47
4.3.1.2.Jabrite View
As we've seen, in the second half of the 8th century a few tried to find a moderate form of jabrism by 
the doctrine of double cause of acts. An act was at first created by God and then acquired by human, 
either  directly  or  by  creation  of  a  certain  capability  (istiTá´a)  to  acquire  it.  The  teaching  was 
speculative at most, but the both central terms - kasb and istiTá´a - retained support of a certain quranic 
foundation1. Capability to act is per definitio ability to acquire, not to create the act. An act is a matter 
of a moment: in moment we are capable of performing an act, but later not anymore. It could be present 
only during the act or it could be present in a latent form before it, as it was taught by Bishr2. Another 
question was, what exactly did this capability mean.
Dirar ibn ´Amr (Dirár ibn ´amr, + cca half of 8th century) was a student of Wasil and the second leader 
of the Basrian school. His doctrine was itself a compromise between Jabriya and Qadariya. Thanks to 
its soft-deterministic model, it was also the first one in Kalam bearing parallels with Stoicism3. He 
taught that God is so different that He can't be known; it was possible to speak about God by only 
negative definitions: He is defined in that way He is without limits. His attributes did not exist in the 
meaning as if He is powerful, then it means He isn't impotent in any case; also He is not dead (living) 
and not ignorant (knowing)4.  During his time, the theory of causality and secondary effects wasn't 
developed yet, however his teaching led to the same conclusion as Bishr's, namely that a human is 
responsible  for consequences of his  actions.  A human act had two causes:  divine and actual.  God 
creates the act, human is its agent (actual cause). In other words, human acquires the act - an idea, 
which will be later very influental.  Role of God as the creator of the acts leaves enough space for 
maintaining His omnipotency; on the other hand, human remains a moral agent, which can be judged 
and rewarded, if he acquires the act. Divine will as such could be then divided to two forms, either it 
was the creation itself, or a command, reflected as an act, if the human acquires it. Human will is seen 
by Dirar as some kind of a  liberum veto, he can disagree with the act. If a human could have not 
wanted the effect (if he could not want to hit the target), then he is responsible for it5. But still, it seems 
that  Dirar  saw even this  disagreement  as  an  act  created  by God:  for  He creates  belief  as  well  as 
unbelief6. Human will reflects then its moral quality on consequences of the act.
His follower Najjar (Husayn ibn muHammad ibn ´abdalláh an-najjár abú ´abdalláh ar-rází, early 9th 
century) was a pure determinist. Responsibility for every event, which occurs in the world, could be 
ascribed only to God. Najjar accepted most of Dirar's metaphysics, but also in a more idealistic tone. 
He accepts his negative theology, altough he considers God as the source, which defines of good and 
evil. God wills all what is done, because He sees Himself in it; according to Shahrastani, "He wills 
Himself as much as He knows Himself"7. When speaking of the relation between God and the world, 
Najjar says God is unwilling all that, which doesn't occur. He is omnipresent, but not materially, more 
just as the "light", which controls all phenomena, including human. It was also interpreted in a way, 
that His being gains a phenomenal level by it (a pantheist view). Unlike for Dirar, human was no mere 
matter, but also a spirit, although more in the sense given by Jahm ibn Safwan than that of Bishr. Jahm 
taught about a divine spirit, being the cause of most activities of men, what was an idea coming not 
from Stoicism, but rather from Christianity8.
1 - According to Tritton (p.68), Quran mentions word "istiTá´a" about forty times. On the other hand, root of "qadar" occurs 
only four times, and even these are in a form of a verb. Actions of humans are often described as their acquisition (iktisáb) 
of good resp.evil.
2 - cf Shahrastani p.56; According to Bishr, while the Jabrites state this similarly, capability was just the health of a body. 
An effect, which was usually thought to be not only temporarily but also spatialy distant from the agent - as an arrow doesn't 
usually hit the same bow it is fired from - did not fall into this capability. However, Bishr thought the agent were responsible 
for it too.
3 - In his physics can be found more similar aspects (cf §4.3.2.2.&.3.).
4 - cf Baghdadi p.17
5 - cf Tritton p.70, quot.Iji
6 - It is a similar logic as that applied by Chrysippus on Cleanthes' view (cf §2.2.3.n.10). Similarly as Cleanthes his fatalist 
view faced the fact humans feel responsible for their actions, and even if we are forced to do something, we can at least 
disagree in mind. But as Chrysippus also added, even this disagreement depends on God.
7 - cf p.74
8 - cf Tritton p.63
4.3.1.3.Compromise
The debate came into a dead-end compromise. Thumama (þumáma ibn ašras an-numayrí al-baSrí) was 
not very coherent with it. He was from Basra, however he lived more in Baghdad on the khalif's court. 
He had especially good relations with al-Ma'mun; he had a significant influence on his positive attitude 
towards  Mu´tazila1.  He  was  a  student  of  Mu´ammar,  who  will  be  mentioned  more  in  the  next 
paragraph. Thumama adopted from him the these that human was primarily his spirit. Body is just a 
tool,  the  closest  object  under  an  influence  from the  spirit.  Spirit  is  a  controlling  monad,  without 
accidents or space. However, it has will, knowledge and power. He was in a contact with Bishr, with 
whom he had much opinion in common, like the understanding of capability. They identified it with 
health,  absence  of  illness.  Human  acts  only  by  his  will;  responsibility  of  an  act  depends  on 
understanding of good and evil, not on the capability. Fulfillment of a will is a secondary effect, which 
can't be directly ascribed to the will alone. Secondary effects should have no agent at all. The argument 
was the one we've seen in  the beginning of  the theme:  if  human could have been the agent  of  a 
secondary effect, then dead could become agents too, what Thumáma finds absurd. We could have also 
ascribe it  to God, but then He would be responsible for evil and injustice,  what is for him absurd 
thought too, because He acts according to nature, which is always just2.
Thumama  perfected  this  thesis  into  interesting  dimensions.  Knowledge  is  a  secondary  effect  of 
perception (or Revelation), and thus it has no agent, which would make it. In a certain twist of terms he 
also interprets the thesis of creation of Quran. On the one hand, Quran may be a direct creation of God; 
on the other hand, if it weren't created by God, then it would be a product of nature, thus it would be a 
secondary effect, having no creator at all. "Uncreated" means absence of any creator. It is surely not 
absolutely  correct  to  read  the  answers  of  Thumama  as  a  system,  however  it  seemed  to  have  an 
influence  on  the  further  development  of  Kalam physics.  Causality  couldn't  solve  the  problem of 
responsibility, and thus the theologians had to redefine the idea of a natural necessity again.
1 - cf Tritton p.99
2 - cf Shahrastani p.65
4.3.2.Substance
As we can see,  the questions concerning consequences of our acts,  essentially an ethical  problem, 
developed into an area not very typical for theology. And so we may enter the theme of what they saw 
as pure physics. The main term is the substance (jawhar, pl.jawáhir) which constitutes bodies (jism, 
pl.ajsám). Accidents (´araD) then were either identified with the substance, its specific form or as a 
separate third category of being. In Mu´tazila there were two physical models contesting against each 
other. Both models were in basic materialist, but in detail we may see a difference based on this aspect. 
One of them, quasi-rationalist model, became the mainstream. It was the theory of Abu Hudhayl, Mu
´ammar and Bishr, whose concept was partly adopted by the Ash´arites as well. Their idea of substance 
was  that  it  were  an  atom,  hypothetical  indivisible  particle  of  material  being.  It  represented  the 
ontological  substance  of  bodies  as  well  as  the  carrier  of  its  characteristics1.  Another  one,  quasi-
empirical model, began its development already in the times of Dirar ibn ´Amr, while we may consider 
Nazzam as its main defender. In his time it was usually formulated in spite of the atomistic model, 
while  it  was  also  condemned  because  their  sources  were  primarily  philosophical;  that  is,  of  the 
Naturalists between them2.
1 - The idea of atom in Kalam could be found similar as that of leibnizean monad. However, as even Hudhaylites saw 
human materialisticaly, it would be precise to say it only about the definition given by Mu´ammar, who had been because of 
it often accused for dualism (Tritton, p.102).
2 - cf Horovitz p.10
4.3.2.1.Atoms
"Atom" is a general translation of the term jawhar, although the term isn't the correct equivallent. The 
Arabic term jawhar could mean both part of a body as well as its constitutive substance in a general 
sense1.  As the smallest  particle it  was often denomined as  jawhar waHíd ("unit  of  subtance";  the 
formulation was used mostly by Nazzamites) or al-juz' allaðí lá yatajazza' (indivisible particle, plural 
ajzá'). In space, it represents the same as a geometric point; in time it presents a moment (zamána). 
Body (jism),  any material  object,  is  created only by composition (ta'líf)  or  simply mutual  contact 
(mumássa) of more atoms. Body itself could be thus defined as a thing with dimensions, while an atom 
is dimensionless2. The opinions about the minimum number of atoms necessary for constitution of a 
body were changing3: according to Abu Hudhayl six would suffice, Mu´ammar saw eight as minimum, 
their colleague Fuwati (hišám ibn ´amr al-fuwaTí) said 36. Atoms also couldn't exist outside of bodies4.
Another details were different, but the relation between atoms and bodies was the same. Followers of 
Abu Hudhayl stated5 five proofs of the existence of atoms against the Nazzamites. (1) The first plays 
with term of infinite: if  there were no atoms, then the distance would be infinitely divisible; there 
would be an infinite number of particular distances, and thus it would be possible to reconstitute whole 
distance from it as an infinite. (2) Two bodies in a contact need at least one atom, which would touch 
the end of the another. The argument was, that an infinitely small body would not be able to touch a 
much  larger  body.  Also  (3)  God  created  the  bodies  from certain  particles;  if  He  could  not  have 
destroyed them back into particles, He would not be omnipotent. Next one (4) is quite empirical: the 
same divisibility was in small as well as in large bodies. In that case, it would be absurd to thing, that a 
mountain would have the same (infinite) number of particles as a mustard seed6. The final one (5) is 
again theological: God has to know the number of the particles in the world, so the bodies cannot be 
infinitely divisible. Especially the third and fifth open an important question - whether or not there 
comes up a fully new phenomenon or if  there  are existing particles only reconfigured.  Unlike the 
ancient  Atomists,  in  Kalam we  don't  have  an  idea  that  atoms  are  eternal.  They  are  created  and 
destroyed, just the opinions about the means of this are differing.
Another school of Mu´ammar ibn ´Abbad as-Sulami answered with an interesting idea. Similarly as 
Thumama,  he  saw  human  as  an  immaterial  and  indivisible  spirit7,  controlling  the  body.  He  also 
supported the thesis, that secondary effects are ascribed to no one. He distinguished will (as a true 
human activity) and corporeal activity, which may be ascribed to a human only metaphorically. It is, 
technically speaking, a secondary effect of the will, and thus it cannot be ascribed to us in reality. In 
physics, he held a similar view about the relation between God and the world. God controls the world 
from outside, He isn't present in space nor time8. Because of this, Mu´ammar said that God wasn't 
eternal, before He creates the world. Then, God creates only bodies. Accidents and powers are created 
only by the matter alone. Matter contains the laws, determining how to gain power, life or knowledge. 
The system was, however, apparently inconsistent. Mu´ammar for example considered endurance to be 
an accident too; but if the bodies create their accidents alone, we can imply they create and destroy 
themselves too9. He thought that every accident was caused by another one, which makes the presence 
of  the  caused  accident  necessary.  Because  of  this,  he  considered  the  number  of  accidents  to  be 
infinite10.
The system seems to  be fully deistic  here:  God has a will,  which formulates itself  as the laws of 
change, instead of creating every particular change11. God creates time (He Himself was supratemporal, 
what wasn't usually so clearly formulated in that time12) as well as the matter as such, which then 
becomes  independent  of  Him.  Atoms change and organize  themselves  alone,  existing  forever.  Mu
´ammar defines the beginning, but no end. In fact, as he tried to prevent ascription of evil to God, he 
prevented  everything,  what  exists  in  the  world,  to  be  ascribed  to  Him.  Mu´ammar  left  here  the 
Hudhayliya wing of Mu´tazila and comes closer to the conclusions of Nazzamites.
1 - A deeper analysis of the term jawhar could be found in Pines p.3-4. Similarly, a grain of sand may be equivallent to "a 
sand", but not to "a dune".
2 - Number of atoms is based on dimensions of a body, not its minimum critical weight, like quanta in modern physics. 
Dimensions are also always relative. Hypothesis of six-atom minimum is based on a formation of a central atom, which has 
another  ones  over,  under,  ahead  of,  behind  and  on  the  left  and  right  side.  Pines  (p.112)  finds  a  parallel  with  Indian 
philosophical schools Vaishesika and Jayna, which had a similar view on atom as a constituent of dimensions, which itself is 
dimensionless.
3  -  Pines  p.5,  quot.Ash´ari;  Fuwati  defined  three  levels:  6  atoms  (in  the  same  way of  Abu  Hudhayl)  form a  single 
"part" (rukn, pl.arkán), 6 arkán form a minimal body.
4 - cf Pines p.97-99; Pines compares the term of atom in Kalam to that of Epicurean  elaxista, a minimum, which was 
defined to replace the dimensionless character of Democritean atoms. However, the Indian influence seems more coherent.
5 - cf Pines p.11, quot.Ibn Hazm; It's interesting that while Christian theologians tried to prove the existence of God by 
philosophical means, the Muslim ones were using theological arguments to prove the existence of atoms.
6 - Pines (p.113) mentions, that a vaishesikan scholar Jayanta Bhatta used this formulation in the same time. Nazzam 
thought that a mountain is larger because its particles are larger too.
7 - cf Tritton p.99; Pines (p.101) mentions, that Mu´ammar used term juz' lá yatajaza for human too.
8 - cf Tritton p.101
9 - Shahrastani (p.57) reacts that according to Mu´ammar God does nothing while creating. Bodies create themselves as 
whole, their matter and nature as well.
10 - cf Shahrastani p.58; Tritton (p.100) considers this to be an Indian influence. Mu´ammar was sent to a certain king in 
India to present Mu´tazila teaching. Another source could have been another theologian of Baghdad, Ibrahim ibn as-Sindi. 
The idea roots, however, only in his name. By the way, the doctrine of "entities" and infinity of accidents became another 
point of criticism (cf Tritton p.101f). The number of bodies (created by God) was limited, but the number of accidents 
(created by bodies) infinite. Thus it seemed the matter is more powerful than God Himself.
11 - This point, preserved by Tritton (ibid), doesn't contradict the problem in n.9 with the present definition of secondary 
effects.
12 - Shahrastani p.59: "It is related of Mu´ammar that he objected to saying that God is qadím (eternal), because the word 
qadím is taken from qaduma,  yaqdumu, hence qadím (active participle). It is, therefore, a verb, as for example, 'He took 
from it both what had become old, qaduma, and what was new, Hadutha.' He also said that qadím implies priority in time, 
whereas God's existence does not belong to the sphere of time."
4.3.2.2.Accidents
Term jawhar  was more a  rationally defined "matter",  and that  was also how they worked with it. 
Empirically, we perceive only certain characteristics1 (ma´ná, pl.ma´ání), which belong to the bodies 
(or their substance). Beside this general term there were thought to be two various categories, which at 
first were very close in definition, but became widely distinguished in the Mu´tazilite discourse. They 
both came up in the early debate about capability (istiTá´a) in the end of 8th century. The question was: 
what is the nature of it and how long does it occur in man, when he performs an act? It was needed to 
overcame mere words and describe something corresponding with perceivable reality.
First of them was the term of an "attribute" (Sifa, pl.Sifát), which meant a description of its state2. The 
term was brought into Kalam by Hisham ibn al-Hakam3 (hišám ibn al-Hakam, +814), who, as a Ghali 
and an alleged anthropomorphist, was perhaps in the most striking opposition against Mu´tazilites. He 
spoke only about bodies and their attributes; there was no need for him to speak about substance at all. 
Sifa  meant an inherent property, which can't be separated from a thing. A typical definition was that 
Sifa  is "not body and not different from body"4, but some of them were thought to be material (like 
colors).  It  is  an  always  applicable  description  (waSf).  The  term  became  widely  used  for  divine 
attributes, to ensure a notion of their eternity and proneness to change. However, the later generations 
didn't identify it with ma´ání any more and used it only for descriptions. In Hisham's view, a capability 
wasn't some special attribute of human but a word denoting the variety of factors, favorable for an act. 
It contained some attributes like health or a motive, but also tools or enough time to perform it. Also, 
for him all acts are determined by God, whom he considered to be material (ie  jism), or at least His 
attributes similar to those of other things5.
The  second  one,  an  "accident"  (´araD,  pl.a´ráD),  meant  any  characteristic  of  a  body which  was 
imposed from without and which could (or had to) change. In definition, it was the property different 
from body6. The term was introduced by Dirar ibn ´Amr to describe differences between bodies. Unlike 
Hisham, in his theology we have a clear difference between an incorporeal God, which cannot be 
known, and corporeal nature, where all bodies are determined by the divine will in the same way. 
Accidents were the very constituents of all bodies7, as the term jawhar wasn't developed yet. There are 
two further types of accidents. The first are (1) material, inherent ones (color, taste etc) which can't 
exist separately and endure for a longer period of time8. Dirar also thought, that bodies have not only 
the perceivable accidents, but also their opposites, while there is always one of the opposites turned 
into body and the other one latent (kumún) state. Into this category belonged the capability too, while it 
is God who interchanges it with the incapacity9. However, Najjar was even more radical in his saying 
that accidents are created separately even before they unite in a body10. Beside these (2) there is yet the 
class of accidents created only in the latent state, not able to subsist longer than one moment; these 
include motion or pain.
But the later development, led by Abu Hudhayl and Bishr, was generally a reaction against Hisham 
with  his  anthropomorphism and  against  Dirar  with  his  fatalism.  Mu´tazila,  pointing  at  difference 
between  God  and  men,  adopted  the  term  a´ráD  for  description  of  properties  and  Sifa  for  divine 
attributes. Pointing at difference between men and nonsentient bodies, they defined distinct  natural 
laws for  jawáhir,  for  a´ráD  and for their  interaction. Human will  was considered to be one of the 
accidents, thus subordinating the atoms not only to God, but also to man.
1 - cf Pines p.11; Root  ma´n means "devotion" or "deep research",  ma´ná denotes its result. Horovitz translates it in his 
book as "der Begriff", what does make it quite hard to distinguish from the term "attribute". In fact, Horovitz (cf p.54) 
points this out to describe Mu´ammar's sect of followers (aS-Sahaba al-ma´aní) as "idealists".
2 - cf Pines p.16, quot.Ash´ari
3 - cf Tritton p.77; According to Tritton the reports of when he lived aren't unanimous. He should have studied under Jahm 
(+745), discussed with the early Mu´tazilite ´Amr ibn ´Ubayd (+762) and been invited to Baghdad by viziers of the Barmaki 
House  in  812.  The  Barmakis  (ruling in  782-803)  were  already expelled  by that  time.  A similar  problem is  with  the 
biographic reports about Abu Hudhayl, who is said to had lived for hundred years.
4 - cf Pines p.16, quot.Ash´ari; Hisham's idea was that only bodies may be different from each other.
5 - cf Shahrastani p.159; According to Hisham, if there was no similarity between God and the world (and humans) it would 
be impossible to have any idea of Him at all. However, as Horovitz (cf p.39) mentions, in Ka´bi's report Hisham teaches that 
God  is  a  body,  but  not  similar  to  anything  else.  That's  why  Ka´bi  also  doesn't  count  him  between 
"anthropomorphists" (Mushabbiha), as the others do, but rather between "materialists" (Mujassima). Ka´bi's report tempts 
comparision with the Stoic theology (§2.2.2.), Hisham's sources are unknown. He was known for changing opinions (cf 
Tritton p.76) and that he discussed with scholars of various traditions; thus he could be inspired by some Stoic ideas, but it 
is  unlikely  he  went  through  them  as  a  coherent  teaching.  His  own  theory  is  too  inconsistent,  there  are  too  many 
contradictory reports.
6 - cf Pines p.19f, quot.Ash´ari
7 - cf Tritton p.69f
8 - cf ibid; Every body has at least ten of such accidents (like color, taste, but also life/death etc) and the bodies were created 
already with them. 
9 - cf Shahrastani p.76; If capability to act means health, then we can say the diseases are inherent in our body. For Dirar  
there is no functional difference between humans and other things.
10 - cf Tritton p.72
4.3.2.3.Nazzam's model: Elements
Before the physics based on bodies composed of atoms and accidents became the prevailent one in 
Iraqi Kalam, its creators had a strong opposition not only between the followers of Hisham and Dirar, 
but also in their own ranks, thanks to Ibrahim an-Nazzam (abú isHáq ibráhím ibn háni' ibn sayyár an-
naZZám,  808-844).  Significantly  younger  than  Abu  Hudhayl,  he  already  had  numerous  sources 
available for his studies, including those about (if not of) ancient philosophers1. He also adopted some 
ideas of Dirar and Hisham, as well as certain "Dualist" (Dahriya) and "Sceptic" (Samaniya) teachings, 
in a quite eclectical way. Hisham and Stoics, reported under their school-name, seem to had inspired 
him at most. His physical theory has been reported in two ways. According to the first2 the world 
consists of substance and motion, which is the only accident. By motion are created all other accidents 
created,  even rest.  The  other3 says  he  followed Dirar  in  saying the  substance is  "composed of  an 
aggregation of accidents". From Shahrastani's report, it seems that he was using both categories (bodies 
and accidents) for description of each other4. He didn't consider them to be separate ontological classes, 
like the Hudhaylite wing.
According to Horovitz5,  his materialism is itself is the proof that Nazzam adopted Stoic teachings, 
while the particularities of his own teaching prove the general similarity isn't "random", ie parallely 
developed. Horovitz,  operating mostly with reports  by Shahrastani and Baghdadi,  mentions at  first 
Nazzam's  theory  of  accidents,  namely  their  material  nature.  Stoics  operated  with  term 
"element" (stoicheion, ar.sTuqs) to denote both the primary qualities and substances, while the other 
were considered as dependent on their configuration. Similarly, Nazzam thought6 of every accident - 
not only the primal qualities, but also perceivable qualities like sounds, colors - to be of a material 
nature as well. In fact even this point may be compared to a certain Zeno's expression: "Color is the 
first shape [šakl, pl.aškál] of matter"7. But it is only of a particular nature, as we don't have a word 
about "accidents" in general in Placita. On the other hand, within the general physical theory Nazzam 
himself doesn't speak of elements at all. Yet we can trace the similar idea to Hisham al-Hakam, who is 
reported  as  his  source  as  well8.  He  thus  used  a  terminology  of  Kalam (especially  of  Dirar)  and 
described by it a theory, which in its core mixed Stoic/Hishamite ideas of a material continuum as the 
model of universe and qualities as a principle of differentiation of things.
Another interesting part was his theory of motion. As we've already mentioned, Nazzam opposed the 
Hudhaylite view that substance, space and time may be divided to smallest units, atoms, which are 
dimensionless. First of the Abu Hudhayl's arguments for the existence of atoms was that of infinite 
distances. Distance between two places would be infinitely divisible, and thus a body would need to 
pass through infinite number of places to get through. Nazzam's answer9 was that a body moves in a 
"leap"  (Tafra).  Hudhaylite  idea  was  that  a  mation  is  a  number  of  rests:  a  body comes  from one 
particular  place to  another  and when we speak of traversing distance,  it  is  just  a  summa of  these 
motions.  The  "leap"  theory meant  a  body can  traverse  through more  places  at  one  moment.  It  is 
possible Nazzam adopted this view from critics of ancient Atomists10, although this can't be clear. The 
point is there are no "places", acting as obstacles to a continuous motion. According to Placita11, both 
Atomist and Stoic physics considered the world to be filled with matter, while Nazzam supports the 
original statepoint of Stoics: motion means change in bodies, not a travelling of parts from one place to 
another.
1 - cf Shahrastani p.48
2 - cf Tritton p.92, Rudolph p.290
3 - cf Shahrastani p.50
4 - According to Horovitz (cf p.11 n.1) this reasoning was present in Plutarch's De communibus notiis, ascribed to Stoics in 
general.
5 - cf p.10
6 - cf Tritton p.92, quot.Ibn Hazm
7 - Placita p.170; "Shape" is defined as a surface and limit of a body (jism). Thus it is the most manifest part of it. Author 
(or translator) distinguishes it from the term "form" (Súra), equivallent to the Greek term morphé. Stoics (cf Placita p.168) 
are reported to think of these forms, of "incorporeal substances" (jawáhir lá jismi) as phantasies in our minds. It is more 
similar  to the term  Sifa  as  used by Hisham than to ´araD,  preferred by Nazzam and other Mu´tazilites.  However,  the 
translator of Placita didn't use the term ´araD at all; he uses the term "quality" (kayfíya) instead.
8 - cf Horovitz p.38
9 - cf Shahrastani p.50; According to Shahrastani, Nazzam argued in a quite weird way: let's imagine a well and a bucket 
within it, hanged on a rope. To take water from the well, one may pull it up by another rope with a hook. Both ropes have 
the same length, say 50 yards. The bucket will then go through 100 yards, the length of both pulling and holding rope, one 
by pull, other by leap. Well, this could have been a mocking of what the Hudhaylites were doing: replacing the idea of a 
distance,  a  merely  descriptive  category,  with  real  places,  some  hard-predetermined  preconfiguration  of  space.  Also, 
Hudhaylite definition of motion and rest was even more unwieldy: "Movement and rest  are not the same as modes of 
existence and both need two times [ie moments]...rest is the arrival of a second body in the first place, movement the arrival 
of a first body in the second place" (Tritton p.86).
10 - cf LS 11D3
11 - p.172
4.3.3.Psychology
Another thing which makes Nazzam's teaching interesting for this work is his psychology. There were 
two general tendences of describing soul and men in early Kalam already, evidently reflecting the qadar 
question. Some theologians didn't speak much about the soul as a separate entity, which survives the 
body. As we've seen by Dirar, it was usual to reduce human to a mere piece of matter, while life is just 
one of the accidents, similar to eg color of his skin. Some Shi´a theologians introduced an idea of spirit. 
Hisham too made a threefold model of man: body was for him a passive part, being controlled by a soul 
or spirit (an active, decisive part, a mind) and a light (the perceptive powers)1. Of what we know of 
Hisham already, this division of human was more on functional than on a substantial basis. All three 
were "bodies", ie of a material nature, and thus there wasn't a lot of difference with the Jabrite/Dirarite 
view.
On the  other  hand,  Mu´tazilites  in  Baghdad,  Bishr  and  Mu´ammar2,  elaborated  their  own theory, 
showing  soul  as  some  separate  entity.  Especially  that  of  Mu´ammar:  he  considered  it  a  special 
substance, which is incorporeal, not of accidental nature, and also not occupying space as well3. To 
define some kind of incorporeal soul was on one hand a natural way to define an agent of free will 
separate from God, but also from the matter, which is perfectly predetermined by Him. Abu Hudhayl's 
standpoint was a quite vague one. He defined soul as an accident of human, but different from body, 
senses, spirit and life4. It seems to have been a mere negative answer to those of his adversaries in 
debates: his distinction of soul from body could have been a reaction to Jabrites, and the distinction 
from spirit against Nazzam.
1 - Tritton p.77
2 - cf §4.3.1.1.
3 - cf Tritton p.102
4 - cf Tritton p.87
4.3.3.1.Nazzam's model: Spirit
Even if we were able to reduce Nazzam's physics to a synthesis of theories of Dirar and Hisham, in his 
teaching  about  the  soul  we  have  statements,  which  are  very  clearly  similar  to  the  general  Stoic 
psychology.  First,  it  differs  from  the  other  Mu´tazilites  in  the  identification  of  soul  and  spirit. 
Shahrastani reports1 he thought that the body is just a tool of soul, while he described it as "a fine 
substance permeating the body". It is diffused perfectly throughout the whole body. Although the fiery 
nature of spirit  has not been explicitly mentioned,  it  can be derived from other reports,  like soul's 
upward motion after a body dies2. As Horovitz mentions3, Nazzam also tought the spirit in human is 
shared by all alike. We've already seen these ideas: it is the materialist psychology of early Stoa, closest 
to the Chrysippean model: an action occurs when the organ is affected by the spirit directly4. Nazzam 
tought the same at least about perception, what was in their time similarly reported about Stoics in 
general as well5. Motion of spirit was identified with other accidents denoting mental actions and life. It 
also bears the capability,  istiTá´a, before the performed action as well. This capabality is the spirit 
itself, to speak of other, especially imposed accident in the moment of action would be redundant. Here 
we don't have any preceding way of thinking in Kalam. Identification of soul with a fiery breath is 
interconnected with the ideas of fire's inherent upward motion and restless activity. Jabrite authorities, 
like Jahm or Dirar, didn't speak of any accidental entity as being inherently active and changing. On the 
other hand, it also doesn't fully stack with the Mu´ammar's physics, which comprehends the idea of a 
natural necessity (instead of a direct divine decree), but still considers human soul to be independant on 
it.
1 - cf p.50
2 - cf ibid; Placita p.254
3 - cf p.11 n.3, quot.Baghdadi
4 - cf §2.2.2.n.15
5 - cf Tritton p.93; Placita p.260
4.4.Theologic Questions
As the Mu´tazila is primarily a school of theology, it characterizes itself mostly on the definition of the 
divine essence. On the one hand, they tend to refuse ascription of any attributes to God (ta´Til), what 
had already began with Wasil. On the other hand, they were defining another necessary factors, which 
were to determine His actions. Yet there was a general difference in understanding the divine essence, 
which separated the branches of Baghdad (Bishriya, Thumamiya) and Basra (Hudhayliya, Nazzamiya, 
Ma´mariya).  Mu´tazila of Baghdad asserted a definition between necessary and phenomenal being, 
which  are  in  a  causal  relation:  if  a  certain  phenomenon is  to  endure,  it  means  that  the  necessary 
principle,  God,  creates  an  accident  of  endurance  in  it.  Basran  school  didn't  find  this  necessary. 
According  to  them, phenomena were enduring  inherently,  until  they were destroyed (or  left  to  be 
destroyed) by God. Both schools followed the idea that essences of world and God were similar, but in 
a different way. For Baghdadi theologians,  God was the foundation of their  physics and theory of 
causality. Divine activity is tighthly bound with all the changes in the world. For Basrans, God was 
more transcendent, spiritual, known only by reflections of His acts, labelled as commands or "creative 
words". Their system could not be physically, causally understood; metaphysics were based on divine 
will. God functions like an overseeing ruler, who orders the world according to His knowledge and 
taste. For both, however, a physical cause of the world is an ethical in the same time as well. God 
knows what is best, and that is done. The question whether God does the best for men or if He could 
have done something better was present in Baghdadi Kalam too. In short, Baghdadi school thought He 
could have done better. The difference was already set by Abu Hudhayl and Bishr ibn al-Mu´tamir, and 
thus we can look on their followers.
4.4.1.Basrian Theology
Despite the differences in their physics, Abu Hudhayl and Nazzam had similar opinions in this matter. 
Nazzam was, however, little more radical with his stoified theology. As reported by Tritton1, he asserted 
God had no will nor life. God has no will, because He doesn't need it. According to Nazzam, only 
imperfect beings need will due to their lack of knowledge and thus they sometimes need to aim their 
powers by pure choice: like humans do.  However,  unlimited knowledge and power form the very 
essence of God. His knowledge contains everything: what was created, what is and what will become 
out of it. It is reflected in the latent motion, which we mentioned in the previous paragraph. Matter has 
a predestined form, into which it develops. Nazzam also says that the world could have been created 
infinite times over and again, but never in a better way. It is similar to the cyclic model of ekpyrósis 
and consequent re-creation of world in an identic shape. The idea was characteristic for Stoics, of 
whom only Panaetius is known to have not followed it2. The knowledge of God may be seen also as a 
preconfiguration  of  the  world,  which  is  then  reflected  on  the  world's  development.  This  divine 
knowledge is always not only affecting the world, but also constituing it3. Creator's knowledge is also 
always reflected perfectly in the creation, otherwise He wouldn't be perfect. This is used also for his 
theodicy. Theoretically, God could have chosen by His will and created the world in a worse way, but 
as He is perfect, He would not. A later Nazzamite, Muhammad ibn Shabib described it in the way, that 
if God says, that only a donkey may enter a certain house, and then no man would enter it, it doesn't 
mean men would change into donkeys if they did it4.
Nazzamite thoughts had been reviewed directly by Jahiz (abú uþmán ´amr ibn baHr al-jáHiZ al-baSrí, 
781-869). He followed the idea God had no will, but also said it may be ascribed to Him in a way that 
as He never choses evil, it would be more correct to say He was not careless5. Jahiz saw will as a 
knowledge and absence of refusal, also if we see divine essence as a universal knowledge itself,  it 
doesn't have to be denoted separately. Another interesting point is the connection between morality and 
knowledge: a change in God would be seen, according to Nazzam, as injustice; for Jahiz it seems to be 
already a redefinition of morality. In this way his view is similar to Stoics, in identification of divine 
knowledge and universal morality, with logos. This point became characteristical for the Maturidites, 
who will be handled in the last chapter.
1 - cf p.91
2 - cf Nature of Gods II,46
3 - The Nazzamite term of latent  being may be again took up here.  God creates latent  accidents in things which are 
inherently determined when to actualize. Stoics called the idea of latent accidents as  logos spermatikos, seminal reasons 
which determine how the things develop from elements (cf above §2.2.2., Colish p.32). Later theologians were interested in 
this reasoning as well. The idea is used in the beginning of Ash´ari's Kitáb al-Luma´ (§3) to prove the capacity of human 
mind to discover its Creator.
4 - Tritton p.127; Perhaps if he would think it himself, but then he wouldn't need to enter.
5 - cf Tritton p.131
4.4.2.Baghdadi Theology
Baghdadi theologians were not so clear with it. God surely knows and can do what is best, but why 
should He? Bishr asserted God had the will, because His essence is that, what is reflected at most. It 
opens many ethical questions, about which could Nazzamites think they were already solved. Bishr 
distinguished two forms of divine will: essential (commanding good) and active (creative), the latter 
being unlimited in effect. That was the cause, why he considered those, who asserted that God did best 
(al-aSlaH) for them, to be unbelievers1. Term of God is wider here, connected to human activity as 
well. The ta´Til doctrine is avoided. Divine attributes are seen as essential and active too, where acts 
are identified with its object.
Mu´tazila of the 10th century differed much more in this question. The mainstream was still formed by 
Hudhaylites, Nazzamites and Bishrites. Most theologians preferred a certain attribute, from which they 
deduced all other attributes. There were two duos of a teacher and a student: in Basra there were Jubba'i 
and his son Abu Hashim (abú hášim ´abd as-salám) and in Baghdad Khayyat and Ka´bi (abú 'l-qásim 
´abdulláh ibn aHmad al-balxí al-ka´bí). The main question was now the meaning of the quantity of 
divine names. Jubba'i had a quite complicated view on His essence, perfecting the  ta´Til  doctrine. It 
could be read as  a direct  sharpening of Wasil's  teaching.  He thought,  that  the divine essence was 
different  from  everything,  because  it  is  eternity.  As  God  is  eternal,  we  shouldn't  understand  the 
attributes as eternal separate substrates too. Then we would have (at least) two eternal entities at once - 
two Gods. Ontologicaly, only He is eternal, besides we can speak only about His essence, inseparable 
from Him, as it is Himself. Thus His attributes would be the divine will (iráD) as well as its negation, 
refusal (kiráh)2, but their cause (iráDiya resp.kiráhiya), as well as causes of His power and life, is the 
essence alone. Then, only humans see His actions in variety and thus they give Him various names. All 
names are based on the same essence, thus an attribute is just a word, ascription (waSf) of an action to 
Him.  Abu Hashim followed the  thesis,  that  God had no  attributes,  as  even a  denomination  of  an 
attribute could be understood as a separation. His activities are in no way varieties of His attributes, but 
it  is a change of whole state (hal, pl.ahwal) of the essence. He distinguished caused and uncaused 
states,  former  being  those,  derived from a  fact,  that  He lives  (life,  power,  will),  the latter  in  fact 
describing the attributes essence, like an ability to occupy space or be a substrate for accidents. Names 
of God are given to these states, which are attained by essence, not the essence alone3.
It is quite similar to the problem of universal terms, later coming up in the Christian philosophy as well. 
In case of Jubba'i, we have a pure nominalism: names themselves have no separate existence. Their 
variety reflects only colorfulness of our imagination. View of Abu Hashim seems more conceptualistic. 
A term could be used only for a certain thing, altough the thing isn't its essence; the concept exists in 
the mind only. There is no grave difference between these conceptions: Jubba'i himself argued to his 
son, that the essence of an attribute and a state is the same, so it could be said, that a state is in a certain 
state, and this may also have states ad infinitum4. As later could be seen, nominalism was to prevail in 
the debate. Khayyat and Ka´bi were deducing more from the viewpoint, that the primary attribute was 
His knowledge. There is a sign of a Nazzamite influence: as He has a perfect knowledge, He has also a 
perfect  power.  They took from him also  the  ideas,  that  God  had  no  will  and  that  things  change 
according to their motion, not because of a direct decree of the Creator in the moment.
1 - Tritton p.96; Baghdad branch brought similar assertions very often. However, it wasn't always taken seriously. Once 
Murdar (´ísá ibn SubayH abú músá al-murdár)  declared, that everybody who doesn't accept his teaching is an unbeliever. 
Theologian Sindi (the friend of Mu´ammar) asked him then, if he thought, that whole enormous Paradise was created just 
for him and his three followers!
2 - cf Tritton p.143
3 - cf Tritton p.151; The universalistic realism had its champions too, but it was not the same as that of philosophicaly 
inclining directions. There were various schools of Sifatiya, presenting a literal meaning of names, like Mushabbiha or 
particularily that of Ibn Karram. Ash´ari was more a conceptualist like Abu Hashim, altough the philosophical basis of this 
problem is to be doubted. Jubba'i himself realized, that a not yet created thing may be already considered a thing, what 
seems incoherent with his view on divine names. This contradiction had been pointed out already by Shahrastani (cf p.68).
4 - cf Shahrastani p.68
4.4.3.Practice
There was a lot discussion about death: what happens then and what does that imply for life. At first, 
there is a question, whether death is created, if it could be understood as a certain "accident", or if it 
isn't  only  an  annihilation  of  another  accident,  life.  For  example,  Ka´bi  saw  death  as  a  separate 
organism, perhaps more precisely an "anti-organism", which is in us created in the appointed moment 
to destroy our life. From aspect of the  qadar  debate there is a question, who can cause death: how 
precisely does God predetermine our time, if we can think about it even if a man is murdered, or if one 
can cause his own death. Abu Hudhayl found this all irrelevant. There could be only one appointed 
time of death, no matter the cause of it. In Ka´bi's view we have two various times of death: a natural 
and a violent1, in certain cases. Third basic question had been even based on death, or to be exact, on 
what  comes  after  it.  Eschatology  of  Kalam  contained  debates  about  the  endurance  of  rewards, 
recompansetions and punishments, where Mu´tazila erected very strict rules, as well as the problem of 
who everybody will be affected by a certain judgement. The fourth question was connected with the 
problem of death too. There were ideas how death affects our knowledge, responsibility, sinfulness and 
even imamate.
Mu´tazila - already yet in person of Wasil - brought the teaching about a corrupted believer (fásiq), 
what became a technical term for many later debates. And thus the first problem was, when a believer 
becomes a  fásiq.  Often it  is  identified with a  grave  sin  (kabá'ir)2,  but  Nazzam for  example set  a 
financial limit; if the damage reaches an equivalent of 200 dirhams3. Another problem was the form of 
the Paradise and the Hell. Quran is clear4, but there were many interpretations. Mu´ammar tried to 
describe both as immaterial realms5, it was, however, thought of a minority. Another idea came up from 
Jabriya. Jahm refused the eternity of punishment and said, that in a certain time, all motion in the 
heavens and hells will cease, leaving only God alive, who thus destroys both spheres. This was adopted 
by Abu Hudhayl too6, who speaks about an eternal rest, in which the heavens will come in the end. 
Paradise and Hell will be created after the end of world, when God will also resurrect all humans. In 
the next world, nothing will be necessary to be done. The idea was connected with the material heaven, 
stars  flying eternaly in  the same lines.  Most theologians were,  however,  speaking about  the world 
beyond only from the Revelation. Despite their characteristic rationalism, only Murdar's student Qasabi 
(dža´far ibn mubaššir al-qaSabí) and no other influental Mu´tazilite brought a thesis, that the duration 
of a reward or punishment could be found by the human mind alone7.
We should also look at the relation between world of present and the one beyond. Nazzam formulated, 
in spite of his Stoic teachings, that reward and punishment can come only after the death. There is a 
certain grace (lutf), by which God blesses the living believers, but according to Jubba'i, it is usually 
nothing  sensually  pleasant8.  In  general,  Mu´tazila  sees  a  difference  between  spheres  of  now and 
beyond as the realms of ratio and of Revelation. Concept of good is absolute, often determinant even 
for the divine activity, its goal, however, lays without the world, where it is done. Mu´tazila thus could 
not find something like a natural ethics; to live morally in the world without the Revelation about the 
next world. But not to present the view of Mu´tazila as void of Stoic influence in the matters of ethics, 
we may also note that Jahiz had a quite naturalist view on the concept of sin. Like all things try to adapt 
to their enviroment, thus also sinners are attracted by the fire. Thus they act in the way, which enables 
them way to the ultimate fire, which is in the Hell. In the end they are fully swallowed by it, changing 
their nature to that of a fire9. This idea remembers us on the idea of universal burn-out, ekpyrósis, 
which affects all souls. The ethics of Revelation, however, enable us to think, that the good won't be 
consumed with the world, but transcend into a new world, the Paradise. On the other hand, he wrote an 
essay on praise of self-control (Hilm), where he puts interesting arguments for the rational control of 
emotions10.
1 - Tritton, p.160
2 - Like murder. The gravest sins like polytheism (širk) or unbelief (kufr) don't belong to this category as they are a per 
definitio speaking about belilef as such.
3 - Shahrastani p.52; minimal taxatible property.
4 - Q 9,107
5 - Tritton p.103
6 - Shahrastani, p.47
7 - Tritton p.122
8 - The best (al-aSlah) could contain pain. Cf Shahrastani p.67
9 - cf Tritton p.133
10 - cf Pellat p.223f
5.Sunni Kalam
In the second half of the 9th century, theological scene becomes more diverse. The primary role is still 
played  by  the  followers  of  Mu´tazila,  but  new  traditionalist  schools  begin  to  grow  beside  them. 
Development of the traditionalism was caused by many factors, political and spiritual alike. On the one 
hand, the effective power of the ´Abbasid Khalifate had been seized by the military. During his reign, 
al-Mutawakkil (*821, ruling 847-861) relied much on Turkish slave soldiers, whom he used to suppress 
unrests of nobility and hostile sects. In the time he was murdered, this personal army was so influental 
that they could depose his son and replace him with their own choice. Khalif himself had since then 
only symbolic or internal power, not reaching beyond his court in Samarra. The real power was in the 
hands of amír al-umará, commander of the army. Khalifate was also no longer controlling the realm. In 
the beginning of the 10th century three great Shi´a dynasties came to power: Egypt and Syria were 
subdued by Fatimids1, Bahrayn and part of Iraq by Qarmatians2, and Persia by Buwayhids3.
Sunni orthodoxy became formulated in a reflection. The population, in their view on four righteous 
Khalifs, did not follow  the Shi´ite opinion. Theologians and jurists of the old regime tried to preserve 
their spiritual authority by repelling innovations. In the spiritual sphere comes out philosophy, based on 
the quanta of newly translated texts, as well as on a support of Ismai´li governments, fascinated by their 
metaphysics. It brings, primarily, an advanced rhetoric and logic, effective arts of persuasion. As a new 
science,  defining the truth as such,  it  has the crucial  role on further form of Kalam as well  as of 
jurisdical formulations, especially that of the Shafi´i school. Also there are Sufis, which enters public 
consciousness at first in forms of heresies. Both "new" spiritual sciences have their opponents. Already 
mentioned jurist Ahmad ibn Hanbal (aHmad ibn muHammad ibn Hanbal abú ´abdalláh aš-šaybání, 
780-855) went so far to forbid using analogies (qiyás) as means to decide judgements, core of the Shafi
´i and Hanafi method4, promoting use of literal meaning of the traditional scriptures. This tendency, 
after being at first persecuted under Mu´tazila supremacy (Ibn Hanbal himself suffering torture for it), 
received full support of al-Mutawakkil. He was the last "independent" khalif, combining political and 
spiritual authority in one person, and thus his role in forming future Kalam was significant as well.
´Ali  al-Ash´ari  (abú  'l-Hasan  ´alí  ibn  ismá´íl  al-aš´arí,  874-936),  originally  a  student  of  Jubba'i, 
adopted more of Ibn Hanbal's  theses,  but also tried to set  his  own rules  of interpretation.  He was 
repulsive to the teachings, or more exactly, to conclusions of philosophers, as well as to those of Mu
´tazila, whom he considered to be a theological branch of them. However, he accepted their logical 
method. His own method was even more empirical, not bound to mere syllogism. His method was to 
show faults of the philosophers (and especially Mu´tazilites) by their own means, by attacking premises 
of their theories. He tried to prove their unbelief and harmonize what he found to be discovered trough 
mind alone with the Revelation. Logic, as a tool of proving truth, was accepted; interpretations (ta'wíl), 
altough being within the borders of logic,  not anymore, as its possible conclusions he found to be 
generally infinite. Ash´ari struggled for a compromising teaching, which would not oppose rational and 
sensual knowledge, but exploiting it for support of the tradition. His greatest follower Ghazali (abú 
Hámid muHammad ibn muHammad al-ghazálí, 1058-1111) summarized the teaching of Ash´ariya into 
a  form,  which had been in  15th century adopted by Ottoman theologians  too,  thus broadening its 
influence from Egypt to Bosnia.
With the development of Turkestan came up in Kalam also another school considered as orthodox by 
the Sunni theologians, being based on the teaching of Muhammad al-Maturidi (ibn muHammad ibn 
maHmúd abú manSúr muHammad al-máturídí, +944). Maturidi was from Samarqand in Mawarannahr, 
today's Uzbekistan, having only scarce influence in the Iraqi debate, immediately having an influence 
only in his native region. Their influence was more widely spread in 12th century by the dynasty of 
Ayyubids,  who adopted Maturidiyya  as their  own and supported contrasting ideas  against  the Ash
´arites, seen as the ideology of Seljuks5. Doxographers of Kalam, like his contemporary Ash´ari or later 
Shahrastani, in fact didn't mention his teaching at all. It is hard to say to which extent, if he ever was 
influented by the Ash´ari's creed or method, but his criticism of Mu´tazila theology stays on similar 
principles. School of Samarqand itself was based on the law school following Abu Hanifa6, while Mu
´tazila,  and the philosophy as well,  seemed to their  theologians as a strange innovation.  Later this 
school  became predominant  in  the  Kalam of  Central  Asia  and  India,  as  well  as  in  other  regions 
adopting the Hanafi law. It seems for both Ash´ari and Maturidi, that both of them discovered, if not 
founded by themselves, the prevailing trend in the theology, and their followers retained this position in 
Sunni Kalam until these days.
1 - Fatimids (al-fáTimiyyún) took their name from Fatima Zuhra, daughter of Muhammad and first wife of ´Ali, from whom 
they also  claimed their  descendancy.  The  dynasty was  founded  by ´Ubaydallah  al-Mahdi  (ruling 909-934).  By aimed 
propaganda  he  gained  a  significant  power  in  Ifriqiya  (Tunis)  and  declared  himself  a  khalif.  In  969  his  descendants 
conquered Egypt, where they founded Cairo, which became their new center. In next years they subdued even most of Syria, 
Libanon and Hijaz. However, wars with Seljuks and crusaders weakened the empire, until it suffered the mortal blow by 
Salahaddin ibn Ayyub in 1171.
2 - Qarmatians (qarámiTa) were another Isma´ili dynasty, or rather a sect, founding its power by Abu Sa´id al-Jannabi in 
899 in Bahrayn. Their original center of propaganda was in Kufa, where their first teacher Hamdan Qarmat lived as well.
3 - Buwayhids (al-buwayhí) were descended from a tribe originating in the region of Tabaristan (south coast of the Caspian 
Sea). Their bravery was valued already by the Sasanid rulers of Iran, later they adopted Islam of the Twelvers' creed. In 10th 
century they founded a number of emirates throughout the Middle East, which were in 945 unified by Ahmad ibn Buwayh. 
He expelled Yaqut, the amir of Baghdad, and captured Iraq. He took the title of the highest khalif's commander and of a 
persian emperor (per.šáhinšáh, literary "king of the kings"), with the name Mu´izzaddawla ruling until 967. The empire 
fragmented with every generation, as the rulers parted the domain unto all heirs. Finally, in the half of 11th century they 
were defeated by the Seljuks.
4 - Arberry p.18; The method is based on a comparision of a cause (far') to another one mentioned in the tradition (asl). 
Unlike the literalists (ie Hanbalites) they thought human reason was capable of extracting the essence of this asl (illah) as 
well as its judgement (Hukm) be it a command or prohibition. If the essence of asl is a similar to another one, met in the 
practical life, then we shoul apply the traditional Hukm on it. lillah is the main problem here. Traditionalists required its 
basis to be written in Quran, Sunna and often supported by a consensus of the community (ijma´) too, many innovators 
(including some of the Maliki school) permitted a use of analogies as asl for another ones. For details cf Hannan, part 
"Qiyas".
5 - Seljuks were a turkish tribe controlling Syria, Iraq and Anatolia in the 11th century. Their wars with Greeks and conquest 
of Jerusalem from the hands of religiously quite tolerant Fatimids were a significant factor behind the crusades. Ash´arite 
Kalam developed in Iraq thanks to the vezir Nizam al-Mulk, who founded madrasas in Baghdad and Nishapur, led by 
Juwayni and Ghazali.
6 - According to Tritton (p.174), the school of Kalam founded by Maturidi is often called Hanafiyya as well. Ash´ari and 
Ghazali were learned in the Shafi´i law. The difference in reasoning of these schols may be partly reflected on their theology 
too: where Ash´ari tries to found a logically coherent system of justice, Maturidi leaves responsibility in acts as much on an 
individual as possible.
5.1.Ash´ariya
5.1.1.Theology
At first there is the question of divine unity, particularly its relation with plurality of His names. In 
general,  Ash´arites tend to accept more of them than Mu´tazila;  their  image of God, tough always 
abstract,  is  a  little  more  colorful.  There  were  only minor  differences  in  accepting  one  or  another 
attribute between the scholars. Ghazali1 summarized them in a quite coherent form in his Ihya ´ulum 
ad-dín: within the first part of the Muslim creed (lá iláha illá-'lláh, there's no deity but God; Q 3,18) 
we should not think about all the attributes, which we know by the tradition, but only of seven principal 
ideas. At first there is His transcendency, separation from all creation, being immaterial on the one 
hand, on the other hand being closest to any of its created things2. Then there is His life and power, 
ability  to  create  the  things,  change  and  destroy  without  changing  or  weakening  Himself.  Next  is 
knowledge and perception, containing and overseeing places of all atoms, every motion and change 
alike. Will, by which He determines the rules of the universe, presence of good, evil and being as such, 
is the fourth: all He wants, is, what He doesn't want, is not. Fifth, His seeing and hearing, an addon for 
the knowledge, is His ability to see without eyes and hear without ears all what could be seen or heard. 
Next is His eternal speech, through which are the moral maxims set, including the content of books of 
prophets. And at last also His activity, including the whole world. Here it could be said, that it is a mere 
effect of His will and speech, He is in no need for it. God creates the world just because he wants it.
Already Ash´ari  opposed the doctrine of  ta´Til,  acknowledging plurality of divine attributes. In his 
interpretation of Revelation he accepted fifteen divine attributes. On the other hand, he supports them 
with logic. By the ta´Til doctrine, supported by Jubba'i, it seems that knowledge and power, as divine 
attributes, denote the same thing. There was a question, for what reason it would be revealed under two 
various names? Ash´ari brought two possible answers. It could have been understood in terms of Abu 
Hashim's modes of the essence. One name is used for a perceived attribute, another for a latent one, 
which neither is, nor isn't. Ash´ari also marks out the feebleness of this argument, as it contradicts the 
basic rule of logic, exclusion of the third. Another answer can be only to doubt the premises: there have 
to be attributes in God, which are named by the divine names3. But still, he was a follower of Jubba'i in 
the idea that some attributes of God have double meaning, interpreting it nominalistically. Every name 
reflects a certain attribute subsisting within His essence.
He categorized them into three types: those denoting the essence as a whole, by which we may consider 
God as adequately described (as wáHid, One or kádim, Eternal); the names reflecting the attributes of 
actions, which describe His external activity (like xáliq, Creator), in other words just "parts" of Him4; 
and  also  predicative  names,  showing relative  properties  (Hakím,  Wise;  including  the  attributes  of 
"hand"  or  "sitting  on  throne"),  which  "neither  are  Him nor  are  different  from Him".  These  latter 
attributes, mentioned in Revelation, are ment to be accepted literarily, without any further description 
or deeper analysis5. We can say about them, generally, only that they are eternal, as they subsist on an 
eternal essence. Ash´ari saw His life6, will7, sight and speech8 as such predicative attributes too. As 
created we may consider only the effects of His life; what He wants, sees and speaks, but not by what 
He sees or what He speaks about. His commands, prohibitions and messages are created and perceived 
by men, but in essence they are a unified speech. Ash´ari searches for signs, which would show us the 
way to God, something more clear than a mysterious character present in the holy scripture. From the 
names he found the Creator to be very important; it should have been an original meaning of the Arabic 
term of God (alláh). We see primarily the world around us, while our mind should lead us to discovery 
of  a  creator,  needed  by all  these  things,  whose  activity  is  bound to  everyhing9.  About  the  divine 
knowledge  Ash´ari  thought  it  were  uncreated  and  eternal,  on  the  other  hand  different  from God 
Himself;  nor  "view" of  God nor  changes  in  the world don't  change it.  It  was  either  an idea  of  a 
universal "writing tablet", all what objectively may be known, or, more likely, a faint trace of Nazzam's 
teaching, that the world may be created only in one, the best way.
Ash´ari tries to maintain the unity of God trough His immunity to change, while accepting the plurality 
of the attributes in spite of Mu´tazila. In short, there is nothing beside God, what could influence Him. 
The question is now, whether God exists in time forever but remains unchanged or He is unaffected by 
time at all. The idea is no Ash´arite invention. In Kalam, already Mu´ammar ibn ´Abbad speculated that 
God is a supratemporal phenomenon, as He is the cause of time itself10, although most of Mu´tazila 
thought God was primarily uncreated and everlasting. In the view of Mu´ammar we have a God, who is 
conscious  of  the  presence,  containing  time  as  a  (let  reader  forgives  me  the  anachronism)  fourth 
dimension of the world. God is fully separated from the world, and in His single moment He perceives 
whole being with all the changes within as well. It isn't a purely eternalist view: as we've seen, Mu
´ammar also taught, that God can't be called eternal before (!) the world isn't created. He inclines to the 
idea of divine meta-time, which would be independent from that of the world (meta-time being its 
cause),  but  implying certain  changes  and causal  relations  in  God.  World itself  has  a  cause,  which 
creates an effect in a certain "moment"; this cause had to have a cause too, and this one its own cause 
ad infinitum11.  If this  was a result  of placing God out of time, the other option to present God as 
everlasting was more likely to be adopted.
One of the first Ash´arite theologians, who have made a system out of the teaching, Baqillani (abú bakr 
muHammad ibn aT-Tayyíb al-báqillání), qadi of Baghdad and a diplomat12, adopted the theory of states 
of Abu Hashim. His intention was to harmonize the common language with that of theology; thus he 
tried to explain the existence of God in the same way as the one of the world,  as well  as divine 
knowledge in terms of human minds. Attributes were for him like model situations, into which the 
essence  tries  to  reconfigure13.  There  is  a  finite  number  of  them,  also  these  states  are  causally 
interrelated; also one state is a cause of the necessity of all other states. Ash´ari, however, didn't accept 
any form of a "reconfiguration" within the essence. God can't be influented, none of His activities could 
be generated by something particularily existing, like an attribute. Nor any of His activities can't cease 
and be replaced by another one. Existence of the world and the God were differenct for him in the way, 
that divine activities were aimed at the world only in one way, God doesn't receive anything14. God 
creates a throne for Himself  and grants grace towards the believers,  but also this  has no recurrent 
influence, neither human believe nor sins. His later follower Juwayni (abú 'l-ma´álí ´abd al-malik al-
juwayní al-Haramayn),  added that God has reflects no love towards us,  and thus He also can't  be 
loved15. He has the power like the universal principle, trough which all is defined: good, truth and 
justice alike. In this idea, Ash´ari seceded from Jubba'i: once Ash´ari gave him a question, how would 
three brothers be rewarded, if one dies as an elder believer, second as a sinner and third as a child. 
Jubba'i thought the first was in Paradise, second in Hell and third in a secure place; Ash´ari opponed, 
why God left the child to die before being able to earn a better reward, on what Jubba'i answered, that 
He knew the child would sin. A rhetorical trap closes, why didn't God leave to die the sinner sooner as 
well16?
Ash´ari thought the question was simply answered: why should He? Justice is defined by His acts 
alone; if we point out its general properties, it remains possible they would be suddenly changed. It is a 
characteristic Ash´arite view of the punishment and reward. What we see on one day as good and 
worthy of reward may be punished by God on the other17.  He defines His own logic. Ash´ari also 
teaches,  that  God wants  the good deeds  of  the other  beings as  well  as the bad ones,  what  seems 
problematic. From a Mu´tazilite view, He wouldn't be then just, at and also "good" would be a separate 
category. Logic, which Ash´ari sets here, would also be readable, that no act in a human could be 
considered es evil. Ash´ari tried to solve it, that God doesn't wish the evil directly, bud only as he wants 
and act to be done by an evil man18. It may be also described as a problem of His will. The will is seen 
in the lines of the basran tradition: will (iráDa) contains the idea, which motivates and act (in case of 
God, His knowledge), satisfaction (riDá) is nevertheless different from the idea. This opens the field of 
ethics. In short, it seems that God wants everything, even if not all is satisfying Him (what doesn't 
affect Him tough). Ash´ari concentrated himself on so many purely theologiac questions (tawHíd), that 
then he had to show, what is done by the men.
1 - Ihya-faith II,1
2 - He also quotes famous aya Q 50,16: "We verily created man and We know what his soul whispers to him, and We are 
nearer to him than his jugular vein."
3 - Shahrastani p.79
4 - "they are not Him" literaly; Tritton p.168
5 - cf Shahrastani p.85; Besides the Mu´tazila, Ash´ari attacks here also his contemporary Karramites, who spent time with 
discussions like if God were heavier than His throne. He didn't forbid interpretations to his students, however himself was 
an agnostic. Double meanings he accepted "without (asking) how" (bi-lá kayfa). He accepted certain phenomena, like God 
on the throne, as "real", but there should be said nothing about; there can't be said nothing fruitful on the matter. Ash´ari was 
inspired in this stance by Ibn Hanbal, who aimed it on the anthropomorphisms too. Ghazali (Ihya-faith II,2) adds: "The true 
middle-road between this complete allegorism and the rigidity of the Hanbalites is subtle and obscure. It is found only by 
those who enjoy divine guidance and comprehend things by the aid of divine light, not by hearsay. Then when the mysteries 
of things are revealed to them, so that they see them as they are, they go back to the Quran and traditions and their wording; 
whatever agrees with what they see with the light of certainty they affirm, and whatever disagrees with it they interpret 
allegorically."
6 - There was a question to Murdar what he thought God was before He lived.
7 - God without will was quite a mechanistic view, which would hardly make it a true theological and ethical factor.
8 - Divine speech was in mind. It's verbal reflection is in quranic recitations. Recitation is caused by a poem, but poem itself 
is not the recitation. He also saw a difference between a commanding and creative word. Both are present eternaly, but only 
the creative is perpetually actual in the world. This interpretation was aimed against another anthropomorphist school called 
Hashwiya, which taught that every particle of the Divine speech was eternal. One of them called ´Ijli went so far to teach 
that the letters of Arabic abjad were His limbs and organs. Cf Arberry p.22.
9 - Attribute of a "Creator" remained very important  for the Ash´ariyya.  The most  chapters of the Incoherence of the 
Philosophers argues on the fact, that philosophers lead to unbelief by doubting creation and promoting eternity of the world.
10 - Tritton, p.101; Mu´ammar's theory of time is similar to that of Augustine (Confessions XI). Altough we don't have 
many reports of Mu´tazila debates on matter of time, it seems to be a reaction on the anthropomorphists too. Namely, there 
was a problem if God can change His decree.
11 - More about two interpretations of eternity - eternalist and temporalist - is in the article by Paul Helm in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Eternity", which is at the moment online available.
12 - cf Tritton p.177; On the other  hand,  he liked to show some intellectual  superiority everywhere.  Once he had an 
audience by the Byzantine emperor, whose meeting hall had so small doors, that one had to bow to enter. Baqillani thus 
entered backwards.  An interesting stance he had also when debating;  as Tritton comments,  he would rather attack the 
principle of truth by definition than to admit his thesis was proven false.
13 - ibid; according to Baqillani, there is no difference in definition of a state and attribute. 
14 - cf Tritton p.168; Baghdadian Mu´tazila considered granted endurance to be a cause of things' continuity to exist. In the 
same way, it could be seen with God: as He granting Himself it to His essence. Ash´ari disagreed with it, proclaiming that 
endurance was not an entity but a fact; not a cause, but an effect.
15 - cf Tritton p.185
16 - A more allegorical version of the story presents Ghazali, often depicting this grave difference between Mu´tazila and 
Ash´ariyya. A child dies and asks God: "Why did you let me die so soon?" God: "I knew you would sin and go into hell." 
Then a strong cry comes from Hell: "And why didn't you kill us to?"
17 - According to Leaman (cf p.109) the Ash´arite stance was such that the definition of good and justice changes not only 
in present and future times, but also in the past. Justice exists in a way, how it is defined by a divine act. Ash´ari looks 
incoherent with his thoughts on the unchangeability of the divine knowledge, as God not only knows the meaning of good, 
but even controls it. Leaman's interpretation opens another problem. In the case of the three brothers, we may go into an 
extreme: in one moment, a divine act is good and just, but then comes a contrary one. One believer could be taken to heaven 
and later be punished. Is it possible, that the previous act, the reward, would become injust? Or are both, despite being 
contrary, just? Ash´ari seems to choose the latter.
18 - cf Tritton p.168
5.1.2.Epistemology
The  question  "what  can  men  know"  became  more  important  following  the  rising  influence  of 
philosophy. Ash´ari followed Jubba'i here: knowledge is belief in a certain fact about the things, while 
true is that knowledge, which is consistent with the real facts. It's the standard correspondence theory. 
Similarly, Ash´arites also taught difference between a necessary and acquired knowledge. Necessity 
isn't reflecting a causality or temporal order, but rather a hierarchy of meaning. Necessary knowledge is 
gained in a way, which can't be affected by will. Juwayni defined it in a way, that such knowledge 
carries an inherent proof within. According to Ash´ari, there are two types of necessary knowledge: at 
first there are facts known a priori (yaqíni), then sensual perceptions. Our mind is based on both of 
them.  Rational  knowledge  is  the  acquired  one1.  Besides  these,  Juwayni  mentions  also  intuitive 
knowledge,  which  is  also  unaffected  by  human  will.  It's  content  is,  however,  not  necessarily 
predestined, it's a spontaneous imagination. Mind itself can't think alone, it has to work with a certain 
object, idea, which it would support or negate trough arguments (dalíl ´aqlí). Usually, mind activates by 
a doubt about accuracy or sufficiency of the perception, but it doesn't have to be the only condition. 
Although a mind works with all  knowledge,  thanks to the Revelation we may define also another 
properties of certain knowledge: besides their necessity or acquirability also their moral value2.
Baqillani thought that if morale would be a certainty, necessary knowledge, all men would be able to 
agree with each other on it, what (apparently) isn't the case. Mind is able to discover, that the world is 
not eternal, as well as God, it's creator, what Ash´arites see as an obligation for everyone. Also His 
influence  and  presence  of  His  messenger  could  be  recognized  by  a  mind  alone.  Necessities  and 
obligations then, are all based on the Revelation, as well as the predicates of God, like limbs, His mercy 
and  various  characteristics  of  the  prophets  and  imams.  All  Ash´arites  but  Qalanisi  (abú  'l-´abbás 
aHmad ibn ibráhím al-qalánisí) preferred empirical  knowledge to be more exact than the rational. 
They used the traditional naming of the senses: sight, hearing, smell, touch and taste. Baqillani added a 
sixth sense, representing the feeling of pleasure or pain. It was usual to assert that God can be seen, for 
everything, what exists, can be seen as well3.  Sight and hearing were for them the best sources of 
knowledge; mind is more a negative element, which defines the borders of acceptability of the facts, 
Revelation more a positive one, bringing content to be followed. Something like a philosophical ethics 
can't be defined here, every ethics can be negated. But also the Revelation is never enough effective, if 
it  won't leave enough space for men to discover the foundation of its authority by the mind. Their 
collaboration is necessary, as if we would prefer one mean in spite of another one, we would be led 
astray by heresy or blind believe4.
The real  task of  Kalam was for  them to support  or create  a  method of  formulations for  religious 
jurisprudence. Perhaps in a reaction to the development of the philosophy, however, they tried to create 
a similar method for the profane sciences like physics and mathematics as well. Ash´ari's empirism is 
here in a brighter contrast with the Mu´tazili rationalism; especially with Nazzam, who as we have seen 
tried to describe all the phenomena in the nature by abstract notions of matter and motion. Ash´ari 
disagrees with an idea, that one and the same force would cause both power as well as weakness. They 
are two different accidents, which are present in a powerful resp.in a weak being. He saw it in a similar 
way with most qualitative accidents:  they endure when they are perceived, not being based on the 
nature of the object, but of the perceiving subject, or their creator. A fire doesn't cause heat, only human 
feels it, when he comes near5. This idea occurs later in the Christian philosophy as well, known here as 
occasionalism6. A substance has no inherent power, which would have an influence on its enviroment. 
All influence is caused by the functional accidents, capacities. A capacity to act doesn't endure more 
than a duration of an act, being defined purely by the divine will. Not only the laws of nature and 
matter are created, as Nazzam thought, but also every single motion. Ash´arites tend to follow the idea 
to two characteristic extremes.
First is the negation of any notion of a natural causality, or nature in the meaning of inherent powers 
(Tab´). A natural law is a thing of formulation during an observation, God can change it in any time; 
thus it isn't needed to formulate it at all. A theologian could use this as an argument when somebody 
asserted a doubt his ideas about nature were relevant for the science. The second extreme is a negation 
of inherent endurance of all created beings. It's in fact a negation of time as such. The accidents don't 
endure in the substance, and thus even the substance alone is nothing, if it isn't perceived by its Creator. 
From this follows that the whole world is in every moment wholly destroyed and again recreated in a 
slightly different form by God. Human sees the changes and because of a character of his mind he 
perceives it as a natural change. Both extremes are in fact just different formulations of the same idea: 
for the Ash´arites, time and causality are in a semantic equivalence. The idea came out from the debate 
on jabr doctrine: as an act of human is created by God, according to Jahm, the same applies to any 
spatio-temporal atom in the universe. This used also Ghazali7 when criticizing the ideas about divine 
knowledge of Ibn Sina8. According to Ibn Sina, God knew only the universals, not particular situations. 
From an occasionalist view, God is the only relevant factor during any change in the material world. 
Thus He wants every situation, which occurs in the world. We se them in natural relations with another 
facts, those out of a common logic seem as miracles to us. Universals are thus just an imagination of a 
natural order, which comes out in a human mind.
The problem of universal terms had been present within Kalam already with the school of Ibn Karram 
(abú ´abdulláh muHammad ibn karrám) in the half of 9th century. Ibn Karram taught in Iranian city of 
Nishapur, a Sifati, devoted more to negate Mu´tazili doctrines on divine attributes than to systematicize 
his own teaching. It was said that none of his students but few could understand it9. However, in the 
teaching could already be seen few influences of new philosophic texts, which became available; for 
example he considered the divine will to be an eternal form. He also adopted few thoughts of Khawarij 
(idea, that everybody who hears a prophet should follow him even without a proof of his message), Mu
´tazila (acknowledging, that good and evil could be defined by the mind alone) as well as Mushabbiha. 
A system  into  Karramiya  doctrine  was  brought  by  Ibn  Haysam  (muHammad  ibn  haySam),  who 
interpreted anthropomorphisms as allegories. He opens the matter of universals more in ontology than 
in epistemology. As primary attributes of God were His will and speech. Speech, which is reflected in 
quranic "Be"10, occurs when every particular thing is created, be it a substance or an accident. Every 
created thing is willed by God. The eternal divine will, however, is a will of universals; this will is a 
special substance on which subsist all possible accidents. Divine will would contain both good as evil 
as categories (unlike Jubba'i and Mu´tazila in general) what Ash´ari adopted as well. But Karramites, 
according to Tritton11, defined truth in a quite Platonic way. Moral categories could be understood only 
through the mind, and yet mind itself had to be restrained from searching proofs in case there was a 
prophet teaching what was good. Thus they were on a way to define an objective reality of universals, 
but their incoherence and Khariji-style antiintellectualism were barriers for it. Ash´arites reacted by 
denying any idea of universals, expecting that God is involved in every phenomenon directly.
The main  common element  of  both  Stoic  and Ash´arite  teachings  was  empirism,  identification  of 
knowledge with present, immediate perception. Subject and object are not in a clear distinction; human 
is a natural system, which is the same as what he perceives. Human is only better refined, able to hold 
the  perceptions  in  memory  and  great  quantity.  The  activity  is,  however,  purely  mechanical.  For 
example, pressing a key is as well a motion of finger as well as of the key. Finger is no subject, tough 
being defined so by human mind. The only subject is God as a creator of all changes, and also the 
motion in both things at once.
Ash´arite theory of necessary knowledge also resembles the idea of autonomous function of senses: 
they collect information on the enviroment whether we want or not, human mind can only think about 
it. Sight doesn't have to mean a consciously focused glance, it is a system perpetually collecting visual 
images, which may occur to be later examined by mind. They create impressions by physical necessity, 
not  by  any  effect  of  will.  Placita  even  says  that  the  objects  of  perception  stamp  themselves  on 
perceiving organs12. It's not only the general empiricism which Ash´arites seem to prefer; it's also their 
understanding of a knowing and perceiving subject, who is more like a spatial convergence of more 
autonomous systems.  The soul has a leading part,  the mind, which converges the impressions and 
proceeds with their  development,  but has no influence on their emergence.  But as we can see,  the 
necessity in physics had a fully different meanings for the Ash´arites. They saw every change in the 
universe as an act of divine will, not as an act of nature separated from God. The question is in how far 
the Stoics differed: is there any difference between divine knowledge and will?
In both views, God is the sole active and integral subject, and upon Him are based all the other natural 
laws. Ash´arite occasionalism may be interpreted as a denial of any natural law; especially when we 
consider  their  epistemology to  be a  reaction against  that  of  Mu´tazila  and philosophers.  But  from 
another view, it integrates God into physics, in the Stoic way known since their early exponents, not 
influented by Platonic model of God. In the view of Mu´ammar, we saw God and natural law to be two 
subordinate eternal constants, which makes God a quite redundant category at all - as the causal chain 
of creators would follow ad infinitum. Ash´arites presented natural law as will of God, integrated into 
the world. Placita mentions the pantheist source of the natural law13, but it is hard to say if the book was 
their source. It is in a formal contradiction with Ash´arite voluntarist model, if we overlook the context, 
which seems of greater importance. These thoughts, however, may have been adopted from the earlier 
periods of Kalam. They may have been adopted from Nazzam, who already elaborated them a century 
ago. Nazzamite teaching was generally condemned by Ash´arite doxographers, but in these details they 
extracted points which were parallel points with that  of Stoics. The parallel remained only partial: 
unlike Stoic, the Ash´arite epistemology didn't have any consequences for their ethics. It seemed so that 
ethics  taught  by  Revelation  don't  need  any  philosophical  reasoning  for  legitimacy.  The  role  of 
reasoning is to prove there is no other way.
An individual Stoic, in the end, defines his morale alone; and only then it is in a harmony with the 
divine will, if he would use the term. Flood of empirical data may lead the leading part to pathetic 
decisions, but it remains self-sufficient, as it is a seed of omnipotent God. On the other hand, Ash´arites 
saw a grave difference between the minds of men and God. Human can know the creation of things, but 
not the means, how to morally act with them. Thus he would search primarily for what he should be 
learned. Ash´ariyya teaches the identification of rationality and divine will in so deep extent that any 
rational being should have nothing else to do, than to search for any formulations of this will. Any 
categories of matter, including good and justice, would be only of a secondary value, abstractized by 
human for himself, having no real essence. These categories show not a principial value of things, they 
are an effect. 
1 - Tritton p.187
2 - Tritton p.169
3 - Mentioned by Qalanisi as well (Tritton p.182)
4 - To quote Ghazali (Ihya-knowledge p.12): "Verily I pity no one as I pity a man who seeks knowledge but understands not, 
and him who who understands but seeks not."
5  -  Tritton  p.170;  This  interpretation  shows  a  tendency,  or  rather  its  extreme,  not  an  explicit  formulation.  From  an 
interpretation of miracles (eg cf Shahrastani p.87) is obvious, that an "ordinary course of nature", which is placed in contrast 
or contradiction with a miraculous event, was not thought to be a random coincidence of two phenomena, but the causality, 
at least in a sense as defined by Mu´tazilites.
6 - It's another extreme interpretation, tough not as often formulated. Ghazali (Tahafut  XI) says, that "everything besides 
Him is temporally created by Him trough His will", and also "nothing is everlasting but His essence", it doesn't have to 
mean already, that  the created doesn't  endure a certain period of time. The extreme was brought up by Baqillani, who 
thought, that matter has its inherent power to destroy itself. On the contrary, Qalanisi thought the matter has an inherent 
power to endure; creation and destruction are two different accidents, created by God in one moment, causing in next the 
substance' birth or annihilation.
7 - cf  Tahafut  XI; the problem is derived from a major difference in thought between Plato and Aristotle. Later it also 
characterized the development of Christian philosophy in Middle Ages. In these times many possible solutions were given: 
besides extreme realism and nominalism came up also compromises in teachings of Aquinus and Abelard. With Kant the 
problem seemed to be solved, however recent developments in logic show again uncertainties.
8 - Ghazali's reputation as a theologian could be in philosophy equalled perhaps only by Ibn Sina (abú ´alí al-Husayn ibn 
´abdalláh ibn síná). Both were born in Transoxania and perfectly educated in both platonic and aristotelian philosophies; 
and too, both tend to see them as a single system, a wide tendency caused possibly by the apocryphal Theology of Aristotle, 
in fact an excerpt of Plotinus' Enneads. Metaphysics of Ibn Sina was inspired by Farabi's commentary on Aristotle. He 
thought, that God is an unmoving primary cause, which permanently creates a principial active intellect (´aql al-fa´al), 
where we also have a first difference between necessary and possible being. For Ibn Sina, a cause is necessary, an effect (eg 
existence of things) possible. This intellect, contemplating its own existence, creates a second intellect, which by its own 
contemplation creates a third one, developing still clearer form. There are ten of these intellects, being reflected on the 
contemporary cosmology: second intellect is the universe (sphere of the spheres), then follow the angelic and astral spheres, 
planets, Moon and finally ninth intellect is so clearly formed and remote from the source, that it is divided as a universal 
soul in all material being; tenth then is decomposed to individual souls of men. The idea, that divine power and knowledge 
over clearer particulars would diminish by development of creation, is itself unacceptable for Ghazali. Ibn Sina goes even 
deeper.  Spirit,  as the carrier of will and conscience,  is never effective,  when it  isn't  connected to matter by an active, 
changing soul. God wouldn't have no effect, if He wouldn't create humans. Thus God created human by necessity, for a 
certain goal - He needs him.
9 - Shahrastani p.92
10 - Q 16,40: "And Our word unto a thing, when We intend it, is only that We say unto it: Be! and it is."
11 - cf Tritton p.109: "truth is a report, which has a spiritual reality behind it"
12 - cf p.260; And not vice versa, the organs reaching the objects actively, by means of some rays, like the Atomists thought.
13 - cf p.149
5.1.3.Ethics
Another  answer  on  the  question  of  what  men  do  lays  beyond  them.  We  prepare  for  ourselves  a 
judgement, which we'll suffer after death. However, it would be hard to apply any moral category on an 
act, which is created by God. Could there be anything considered evil, when God is a creator of all 
human  acts  and  He  Himself  also  defines  what  is  good  and  what  not?  It  could  be  understood 
fatalistically: God creates human motives, circumstances and acts as well. He may create some people 
nominally as evil, while the act itself, creation, would be still considered as good. Ethical field, where 
human activity may be evalued,  would be only an introspective of will,  understanding of the own 
situation. Ash´ari, trying to ascribe all activity to God, tried also to redefine freedom of will. A willed 
act is that, which has a goal determined by mind. If we are to act rationaly, we have to consider all 
effects caused by the act, we need a detailed plan1. However, a human is very limited. We see only 
those consequences, which are closer and somehow connected to us. If we would think about past for 
personal development, we would find out that we didn't have much plans, but that we often had to 
make  compromises  and  assimilate  ourselves  to  the  enviroment,  thus  accepting  only  certain 
opportunities proposed by it.  Thus we can say that a human has free will,  in meaning that he can 
choose, but receives all other causes for an act from the enviroment2. That would be also the reason 
why he searches for God, who created these circumstances in a way, that human could find a clue about 
Him in them. Ash´ari develops here the idea of kasb, acquisition of an act, which was brought up first 
by Najjar. As we've seen, he thought, that every act has two agents: an active and a passive. Human will 
is free and untouched, but also powerless. God would be the one, who moves all things of the world 
and human can only want to stop or affirm it. We can only learn how to think in harmony with the 
divine will, with the circumstances which occur by us and according to which we may act. Practically, 
we can only declare ourselves to be agents.
Anthropology of Ash´arites is an attempt to find a middle way between jabr and qadar doctrines. We 
can feel the difference between an act, which we want, and those which happen unconsciously, like 
trembling; thus human has a free will3. But it isn't a Qadari as well. As we've already seen, we're not 
creators of our acts, nor of its moral value. We don't affect the causes and effects of acts, only its 
performance. An act is primarily a material change, motion of body. For example, writing this may be 
seen as a formulation of thoughts in language of letters, but also as an orderred motion of hands on a 
keyboard. There is a difference in the empirical data: we don't see the thoughts. Already Jubba'i tried to 
bring a  materialist  method.  Human was primarily a  body for  him,  soul  was  an accident,  meaning 
constitution of an organism (binya) capable of bearing life4. Ash´ari twisted it: life could exist without a 
body, organism would not move without it. His argument was, that if life itself would be an accident of 
body, either one accident would have to exist in many atoms, or body would be just an ensemble of 
autonomously living atoms5; he found both ideas absurd. Ability to act, istiTá´a, occurs only during the 
act, as an accident of one time-unit6. Technically we aren't able to perform anything before we actually 
do so, as well as after it is done, as all circumstances change.
This idea was deeper developed in the thoughts of Baqillani. He identified life with a spirit, which he 
distinguished from soul. Human is for him a being, which gives to an event specific individuality and 
character, making it an act, which could be judged. In both cases it is knowledge, which connects a 
human with his act and enviroment. Human accepts a motive, and thus also an act too. The means of 
performance are derived from opportunities proposed by an enviroment. We can choose from them on 
basis of our knowledge, thus we can't speak about full predestination. If human doesn't want to do 
anything, then he doesn't have to, but when he wants, he has to hold on opportunities. If we want to 
write on a keyboard, we press a certain key with a letter, as our knowledge leads the finger to the 
position of the correct key. This knowledge is empirical, unless we haven't constructed the keyboard by 
ourselves. Also, even if the knowledge has a certain power when determining the act, it doesn't mean 
the will is fully free and a man is the true creator of his acts. Perhaps that's why Baqillani says, that the 
difference between voluntary and involuntary activity is just a feeling; human becomes conscious of 
the fact, that he didn't choose the motion7. As we've seen in the previous chapter, Ash´arites thought 
that  an  individual  person  doesn't  have  the  control  over  creation  of  his  knowledge  as  well.  The 
development was not one-sided. For example, politically active Juwayni criticized the kasb doctrine. To 
deny man a certain power or capacity to act would contradict the experience. If we would consider 
human power to be ineffective (´ajz), it would be a denial of the term of power as such. An act should 
come out of the power of man. However, Juwayni still accepts the Ash´arite differentiation between 
creation and acquisition of an act. To not diminish the divine power, he thought the human power has to 
be caused by something, thus defining God as the only independent being, a sufficient agent able to 
create something out of nothing8, in this contect the capacity, present in the moment of action.
Perhaps the most important role of Kalam was to formulate obligations (taklíf), which are given to men 
by means of Revelation. They are interpreted in the hard-line way. According to Ash´ari it is possible, 
that  God  obliges  men  to  do  something  what  they  are  incapable  to.  God  Himself  isn't  obliged  to 
anything; on the other hand, He doesn't have to show mercy (tawfíq) by creating belief, which contains 
the  consciousness  of  the  obligation  as  well  as  a  motive  for  its  fulfillment9.  Belief  is  a  certain 
knowledge, it contains both sincerity of heart as well as good external acts; there cannot be one without 
another. Only God may cause it, and thus an unbeliever is being placed outside the sphere of moral 
activity. An unbeliever has no possibility to do good, as he doesn't know his obligations and has no real 
term of "goodness" as well. The primary obligation, to know God as his creator, is imposed upon him, 
but not revelated. Only the others, while human has to recognize their use in particular situations. To 
know God brings immediately next obligations according to Quran and Sunna. As long as a human is 
rational and follows Quran10, his belief "grows", but if he commits a sin or ignores the obligations, he 
loses it. It is like the universal virtue of early Stoics, either we believe completely or not at all11. There 
can't be developed only one virtue without the others, as then the vices brake the integrity of the person 
as  good.  Juwayni  formulated  the  idea,  that  goodness  is  more  important  than  particularily  good 
matters12. However, altough the term of logos and God is the same as the creator of goodness in soul, it 
isn't  so with evil.  The Stoic doctrine differs in leaving more responsibility to an individual.  Logos 
cannot by itself corrupt a man, only his own ignorance can, holding on a spontaneous idea without 
thinking it over. Ash´ari, however, speaks of leading astray and sealing hearts13. God is the creator of 
evil as well; but not as an evil from His sight, but as an evil of man14. Evil is in the unbelief. Unbelief is 
not exactly the opposite of belief.  It  is a different belief,  different idea of rationality,  by which an 
unbeliever also can justify his actions. The stance of Ash´arites, seen often as a traditional islamic view, 
is  that  in  this  way humans  do  damage to  themselves.  Stoic  idea  of  rationality  isn't  bound to  any 
Revelation or particular commands, it is a general ethics, which may contain the idea of an Ash´arite 
good believer as well as of a sinner with a "sealed heart". God, in the Ash´arite view, is a cause of both 
belief and unbelief, Stoic logos may develop only into the phronésis.
There is still a problem behind these thoughts left: even if we find the borders of human power and 
responsibility, it doesn't answer the question how it will be evaluated. According to Mu´tazila axioms, 
good should be rewarded by a just God. However, we've seen that God isn't affected by any conditions. 
Acts of God towards one does not imply, that He will do the same for another one15. His activity would 
be still just in the same way even if it from our viewpoint would change. Why does God have free hand 
and  human  only uncertainty?  The  goal  seems  to  be  to  carry  the  ethical  problems  from levels  of 
reasoning and philosophy, as the Mu´tazila did, to the Revelation and belief in it only. Revelation is 
clear  with answers.  Here lays  also the main distinction to  Stoics,  who have always tried to  equal 
morality with reason. In a personal development of virtue they expected no eschatological reward, as 
eudaimonia, a state of spiritual joy, is reached in the life. In Ash´arite notion of Paradise, reward and 
recompensation has to be at first deserved. Desert itself may be postulated as the meaning of an act: the 
goal is to be positively evaluable, to have no dirt on self before oneself and God as well. Both systems 
(as well as eg Christianity) find in this aspect a common notion of immediate evaluability. A person 
should act in every moment like if it was the last one. The same is in their understanding of character 
changing; in every moment should be a person aware of a possibility, that he is imperfect and may lose 
the faith16. Human could easily corrupt himself, if he doesn't direct his awareness on himself. An Ash
´arite, as well as a Stoic, have a quite hard system of obligations, trough which one gains a rational 
meaning of his own acts, but still must be sure, that he may lose this meaning in any time. It is more 
this negative idea of self-corruption, which makes human responsible, than the idea of good acts17. 
Ethics is complicated here as much as the ontology is simplified: I won't think about the motive or 
source of the situation, and thus I may face even such demands, which I won't be ready for18.
Ash´ariyya way of thinking was in the end at most defined by Ghazali. He tried to solve the problems, 
which came up from compromises made by Ash´ari, like the relation between divine justice and human 
freedom,  as  well  as  a  meaning  of  declaration  of  faith.  Ghazali  recalls  traditional  stance  on  the 
endurance of faith; but immediately he defines the term in a way to prevent any mixing with another 
terms, like that of faith and reward19. On the other hand, his ethics (at least in his theological age) was 
identic  with  commands of  the  traditional  texts.  Reason is  a  tool  only to  discover,  understand and 
implement them to life. Kalam and reasoning themselves don't create any ethical assertions, any norms 
or commands, they have only one meaning: to spread and support the religion in the nation20. As such, 
spiritual sciences were thought to be used only there, were they are necessary to support the basic 
creed.  If  somebody  studies  them  only  superstitiously,  he  may  only  "injure"  his  mind.  Even  few 
centuries later, historian Ibn Khaldun criticizes philosophy, logic and Kalam in the same way21. Ethical 
consequence of Ash´arite determinism was thus not a promotion of knowledge, as in the Stoic case, but 
rather a sceptic approach.
1 - cf Tritton p.171
2 - cf al-Luma´ §96
3 - cf Shahrastani p.81; It's a matter of feeling, but also it remains a free choice to denominate it so. When we say something 
is our action, it is our freely. A similar definition of the sphere of influence may be read in Epictetus: "Things in our control  
are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions. Things not in our control are body, 
property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions." (Enchiridion §1)
4 - cf Tritton p.145
5 - cf Tritton p.171
6 - Hourani p.121: "No one can do a thing before he does it"; There is a distinction between Ash´arites and Stoics in 
understanding of the objective future. Either it is a gradually developed causality in time or the world has no causality, 
enduring purely on the will of God, it is in no way a cyclical time. However, for both traditions the higher importance was 
ascribed to an individual life-time. Questions were like how God defines the time of death or other occurences. Also, while 
the early Stoics agreed on some logic in divination, Epictetus (Disourses II,7) did not. Not that he would disagree with a  
method or trustworthyness of divination in general, but he says the information gained by it  won't show to us what is 
important. Only individual reason may do so.
7 - cf Tritton s.180; The difference between a necessary and acquired act isn't more deeply developed. In fact, Ash´ari 
himself said, that humans acquire their voluntary and involuntary facts in the same way (al-Luma´ §95).
8 - Shahrastani (p.83) says this idea was inspired by "metaphysicians" - (Neo)Platonists.
9 - cf Shahrastani p.81
10 - Hourani (p.38) speaks much about the connection between guidance (hudá), Revelation and rationality in general. He 
also cites Q 39,17-18 ("Announce the good news to my servants who listen to the statement and follow the best of it. They 
are the ones whom God has guided, and they are the possessors of minds."), where the identification of being rightly guided, 
following Quran and being rational ("possessor of mind") is written explicitly.    
11 - cf Colish p.46; She mentions the term tonos ("tension") is based on an idea of harmony between thoughts of a human 
and of God. It is no harmony of norms, words, which we see in Revelation, the idea was more musical, like when two 
strings - will of God and human mind - are being tuned to the same tone. Of course, God defines the tone and mind is  
obliged (if not "set") to follow it.
12 - cf Tritton p.189
13 - cf Hourani p.122; Q 13,27
14 - al-Luma´ §97: "q: Has not God, then, created the injustice of creatures? a: He created it as their injustice, not as His."; 
In §107 is this view a little more clear: question is, whether evil comes from God (the debate is continuing a problem, 
whether an evil-doer or a cause of evil is worse, where Ash´ari chooses the latter), then he answers, that God was a creator 
of everything, not "only" of evil. He uses an analogy to saying, that we may accept, that the whole world belongs to God, 
but it would be absurd to say that a particular woman or what would belong to Him. By induction we may say, that He 
knows the whole, but doesn't deal with particular facts, a problem answered by Ghazali in the opposite way. A possible 
interpretation would be, that evil, justice and ownership are only relations between men; however this would imply, that 
God is neither good, nor just, nor the world belongs to Him, what would be  ta´Til  and in general  a quite unorthodox 
formulation. This distinction of particular and general is often a weak spot of the Ash´arite Kalam.
15 - In §186 of al-Luma´ is the problem of particular and general viewed from another aspect. The question comes out of Q 
82,14 ("while the profligate will certainly be in a burning fire"), whether these profligate men (including believers) are 
condemned forever? Ash´ari points out, that the verse has no quantifier, also it could mean for all as well as for only some 
of them. Suddenly he abandons this argument, because if it was applied on Q 39,53, God would forgive all sins.
16 - Shahrastani p.82; Arabic language has no distinct conjugation for imperfect/present and future tense of verbs, thus a 
standard declaration "I'm a believer" would mean "I'll be a believer" as well (ie aná mu´min). Thus it would be correct to 
add always "if God wills" (inša´alláh) to it.
17 - al-Luma´ §85; "faith is good (Hasanan), toilsome (mut´iban) and painful (mu'liman)"
18 - This will be seen as one of the major differences with the school of Maturidi.
19 - cf Ihya-faith II,2; (quot.Ibn Mas´úd) "If I say that I am a believer it will be like saying that I am in Paradise.", on which 
reacts Yazid ibn ´Amira: "O Companion of the Apostle of God, what is belief except to believe in God, His angels, books 
and aspostles, as well as in resurrection and the balance, and to perform prayer, observe the fast, and pay alms. Yet we have 
trespasses which, if we but knew that they will be forgiven us, we would know that we will be of the people of Paradise. For 
this reason we say that we are believers, but we do not say that we are of the people of Paradise."
20 - ibid; "Disputation...has only one benefit:  it  preserves the creed for the common folk and safeguards it  against the 
confusion of innovators by different kinds of argumentation."
21 - cf Muqaddima VI,31
5.2.Maturidiya
5.2.1.Epistemology
Where  Ash´ari  differs  from Stoa  at  most,  Maturidi  seems  to  be  much  closer  to  them.  The  main 
difference between Ash´arites  and Maturidites  in  Kalam reflected that  between Hanafi  and Shafi´i 
schools of Fiqh. Namely, Maturidi taught it was possible to judge good and evil by reason alone. One 
doesn't imply from the creation the existence of the Creator only,  but also his relation to Him. He 
speaks of signs in the nature (dalá'il), which we perceive and trough it we come to knowledge of God, 
as well as about His knowledge, wisdom and unity; through knowledge about the divine wisdom, one 
finds the notion of morality. However, Maturidi also adds that it would be insufficient to rely on the 
senses only, as that would imply too deep connection between God and the world. Between one of his 
definitions, world is that, what is apart from God1. Thus Maturidi still promotes the tradition, speaking 
of prophets, to whom He speaks directly2.
In other points, the epistemology of Maturidi wasn't very different from the Ash´arite one. Human is 
defined in an aristotelian way as a living, mortal creature, equipped by reason3. He preferred empirical 
knowledge instead of rational as well, altough he found that truth could be reached only by cooperation 
of one with the another. Unlike the Mutakallimun of Iraq, he didn't distinguish necessary and acquired 
knowledge  and  focused  on  the  means  of  its  acquisition:  knowledge  could  be  sensual  (i´yán), 
intellectual (´aql) or learned from the others (sam´, lit."heard"), while every type helps to evaluate the 
truth value of another two. Sensual knowledge is composed of perceptions (´ilm al-Hiss), which are 
clear and certain, but also very limited. It perceives the parts of the world, an ability common to all 
living beings. Intellect, on the other hand, tries to understand the whole by speculation (naZar); thus it 
is  composed  of  conclusions  (´ilm  al-istidlál).  Disadvantageous  on  it  would  be,  that  often  two 
conclusions while speculating over the same matter may contradict each other, and in this case the 
senses  would have to  judge.  Also the  learned knowledge doesn't  include only the Revelation,  but 
everything  tought  to  us.  Maturidi  was  cautious  when  speaking  about  this  learned  knowledge;  he 
thought that taqlíd, trusting authority without reasonable proof of it, was the primal source of errors in 
theology, and also the cause of plurality of the Community. Knowledge from a single source is not only 
inaccurate  without  a  certain  support  of  another  one,  but  also  it  can't  be  created  at  all.  Even  in 
perception, it is the mind, which defines and names a thing. Inversely, the intellect must follow certain 
premises acquired trough perception. Maturidi didn't have to mention, that even while learning there 
has to be perceived a text or voice, as well as the mind has to understand it.
1 - Otherwise, the part could have been a criticism of putting too much value on signs insted of significant, such as Quran 
(49,37) mentions: "Among His signs are the night and the day, and the Sun and the Moon; adore not the Sun and the Moon, 
but adore the God, who created them, if you wish to serve Him."
2 - cf Rudolph s.293
3 - cf Rudolph p.335 (quot.Maturidi 43,3)
5.2.2.Physics
The debates at Transoxania were way too different from those of Iraq. Maturidi himself considered the 
questions of physics to be of only secondary importance1. He was reacting not only on Mu´tazila, but 
also against Manichees and Isma´ilis. Manicheists were more materialist and dualist movement2:  in 
their ideas we have two substances, where one tries to gain supremacy over and consume the other. 
Both substances, physically described as light and darkness (matter) or ethicaly as forces of good and 
evil, were also a source of their motion. External properties, gained by bodies, were not important for 
Manichean philosophy;  only their  primary cause was important,  all  other  attributes would be only 
derived  from  it.  Isma´iliya  based  its  (meta)physical  teaching  on  Neoplatonism,  they  were  more 
idealistic and monists, they believed in a hidden ideal world, while the material one is its reflection. 
Matter itself has no inherent capacity to change. Accidents do change according to the presets in the 
eternal forms. Substance, however, is always united, controlled by divine reason. All the characteristics 
of the material world - temporariness, quantity, dialectics - were just to be illusive reflections of the 
hidden, unified reality. Mu´tazila offered the atomist compromise to this debate: there was to be only 
one principle (as they were still Muslims), ideal, but functioning as a causa prima in the material world, 
composed of atoms and their accidents. Maturidi himself reacted especially on Ka´bi, who inspired him 
with the idea, that bodies endure due to a granted accident of endurance, giving the atom a spatio-
temporal meaning. Maturidi's teaching, however, is in general speaking about matter as a continuous 
phenomenon. Matter can be divided into bodies and parts, in theory ad infinitum; one can't speak about 
a unit of existence, an atom (jawhar wáHid).
In previous chapters we've seen similar views of Dirar ibn ´Amr and Nazzam. As many contemporary 
theologians (as well as scientists), Maturidi was using the terminology of objects (a´yán) and accidents 
(a´ráD),  where  the  former  denotes  a  perceivable  whole,  a  body (also  maHsús)  and  the  latter  its 
properties. Of accidents, similarily as Dirar's student Najjar, he also distinguished some as enduring, 
common to all bodies3. These are constituents, not mere reflections, of the substance. Najjar thought, 
that the constitutive accidents fill space (taHayyuz); these include perceivable properties as color or 
taste, but also abstract ones like for example life. Maturidi uses a similar term of nature (Tabá'i´4), 
which may be defined as primary qualities of a body. Natures are denoting more objective properties, 
an essence of a body, instead of focusing on empirical source, if there could such a distinction made. 
Namely, these natures account to the ancient attributes of heat, cold, moistiness and dryness; specific 
on them is their contrary effect on each other, all try to divide themselves from each other5. At first 
sight,  the  universe  of  Maturidi  seems  to  be  very  dialectical;  substances  of  matter  are  mutually 
destructive natures, while all other accidents are thought to be created by their interaction and (very) 
temporary configuration. A very interesting fact about this idea is, that he uses it in a debate against 
Manichees: their dualist stance wasn't correct, as empirical knowledge leads us to at least four natures, 
yet if we don't count the bodies (ajsám) themselves (substance, which unites the natures) as a fifth 
principle.  Then Maturidi  refutes also the dialectic ontology.  Contrariness of natures was for him a 
proof, that these powers don't really have any inherent power at all, but they are empowered by God in 
a way that leads to their perfect configuration in the world6. Natures try to part from each other, and 
thus if there was no God reorderring them, they would never constitute a body. Maturidi applies the 
same functionality to a human. There are various contrary desires, needs and feelings in our souls, 
while there is a mind, which weakens them or focuses them in a right direction7. The ontological notion 
may remind us on early Stoic physics of an active God, configuring the passive matter composed of 
four elements. Configuring, or controlling (tadbíh) of matter contains creation, formation, enduring 
(baqá') and destroying too. However, it isn't this, in which the traditions of early Stoa and Maturidiyya 
come close. Later Maturidite scholar Salimi (abú šakúr as-sálimí), reacting in fact against the "natural 
philosophers"8,  pointed out a difference in definition between an element and nature;  which would 
perhaps better mark a distinction between Maturidi and Najjar. Element itself may be understood as a 
wider body, changing its mass and spatial dimensions in spite of another element. Natures were to be 
more of an accidental character, a form of matter: they don't "subsist in themselves, but substances and 
organs"9. However, altough Maturidi could only do better for himself by using a scientific argument 
when proving the unity of God, the context itself was more important for him than an accuracy of a 
part.
1 - Rudolph (s.289) expects this to be an influence of Sufis, who were very numerous in the region. They were spreading 
belief mostly between the nomadic population; religions of settlers were in general more distinct and in terms of systematic 
theology also more detailed. Samarqand itself was an ancient junction between two great caravan routes between China and 
the West: nothern route from Black Sea and Russian cities trough Khwarizm and southern (the well-known Silk Road) from 
Levantian shore trough Baghdad and Marw. From Samarqand led generally a single route trough the Tarim Basin to the 
great rivers. This brought a very colorful  demographic composition for the city,  as well as frequent shifting of eras of 
intensive progress and rapid downfall; the same reflected on its intellectual scene. For peculiarities of the intellectual life of 
Central Asia see Adshead (1993).
2 - Another great dualist religion, beside Manichees, which gained some support in Transoxania, was a gnostic sect of 
Nabateans, worshipping John the Baptist as the real Christ. They were accepted as  ahl al-kitáb  in the Muslim world in 
general. Few disciples of Nazzam (aHmad ibn HáíT and al-faDl al-Hadaþí) worshipped one eternal and one created God 
(Jesus), who created humans and himself had a human form. Beside that, Ibn Hait also did accept eternity of the world (in 
fact of five worlds - primordial, two heavenly, our "testing" world and hell), another important problem, which Maturidi 
criticized. See Tritton, p.137
3 - cf above §4.3.1.2., Rudolph p.290, Baghdadi §196
4 - Maturidi adopted the term from Ka´bi. Root Tab´ means nature, as well as pressure; it reflects an idea of animal instincts 
or four humors, on whose equilibrium Galen defined health. Rudolph translates the term Tabá'i´ as "die Naturen". Here it 
means a nature of a body, not nature in general, physis; however, out of context would be the meaning blurry in arabic as 
well. Similarity of Maturidi's physical theory with those of Dirar and Najjar was marked out already by his student Nasafi 
(abú 'l-mu'in an-nasafí). As Rudolph (p.280) adds, this similarity may distract us from seeing a difference between a´ráD 
and Tabá'i´, where natures are no spatial entities.
5 - It's obvious, that these primary qualities are based on an older (mythical) idea of four basic elements of matter - fire, air, 
water and earth - while the idea was a foundation of the early Stoic cosmogony as well (see DL VII,137).
6 - Rudolph, p.284; Actually, there are six principles: God, bodies and four natures; from these are made all objects (a´yán) 
and their accidents (a´ráD). If we would need an ontologic hierarchy, bodies and natures are secondary forms. Objects and 
accidents are nominally defined parts of our perception, more epistemic than ontologic categories.
7 -  Tawhíd V,2; Natures, desires and pain were thought to be common for the world in general as well as for it's smaller  
form, microcosm (´álam aS-Saghír) - a human.
8 - Rudolph, p.286; As already known, Horovitz shows (p.14) evidence this term (aT-Tabá'i´íya) was used for Stoics or their 
later theologian followers. However, he adds that the term may denote a discipline of science instead of a particular school, 
like Ghazali does (Ihya-knowledge, p.47). On the other hand, Salimi criticizes a particular idea of natural philosophers, that 
of seeing nature as a fine substance (jawhar laTíf), which seems to be of Stoic origin. If we recall note above §2.2.2.n.2, 
about the difference in theology between Zeno and Cleanthes, it may have been so the Zeno's position (namely that God was 
made of a fine fire) was less acceptable.
9 - ibid; For comparision: "Hence, again, their explanation of the mixture of two substances is, according to Chrysippus in 
the third book of his Physics, that they permeate each other through and through, and that the particles of the one do not 
merely surround those of the other or lie beside them." (DL VII,151)
5.2.3.Metaphysics
In his Book of Unity (kitáb at-tawHíd) Maturidi uses two arguments, reflecting a physical theory. The 
problem had been already mentioned many times: foundation of the Muslim creed is, that there is only 
one, unique God. It was no problem within Ash´arite and Mu´tazila discourse; Iraqi kalam uses this 
creed more as a premise, harmony or contradictoriness of a theory with it was to serve as an argument. 
On the one hand, Manichees possessed a widely developed worldview based on two principles, while a 
dialectical debate with them would itself support their opinion. The apparent difference of opinions 
could be understood as an influence of two different Gods: of two moral systems, two different beliefs. 
In physics, the point of discussion between them and Islam wasn't in such a contrast. In fact, we've seen 
that contrariness of natures within a body was used as an argument for an idea of a higher power, which 
holds them all. The problem is, if there could be two such powers, which would form things differently, 
according to their own properties. Muslim theologian had to deal also with many questions of theodicy 
and plurality of religions; idea of a devil could lead to a certain dualism as well1. On the other hand, 
there was another opponent, which accepted an idea of God, parted from the world and known trough 
prophets and imams. The teaching of Ismai´liya, however, included also an everlasting influence of 
God on His creation; He can't "turn" His activity somewhere else. He perpetually creates the world, 
what leads to an idea, that it endures forever (dahr), despite temporariness of its particular phenomena. 
Endurance of the world would mean then, there are two eternal entities. The idea is criticized in a 
similar way as by Jubba'i and Ash´ari: two eternal things would mean two Gods. Maturidi uses against 
this "Dahriyya" arguments based on empirical as well as on traditional knowledge2.
Traditional arguments are primarily those of Quran, but they include even such ones, like semantic 
connection between number "1" and glory or power. Quran itself is clear in the matters like unity of 
God and creation of the world. One would argue, that a dualist would not accept such an argument, 
which expects from him to be Muslim. Authority of Quran would be the matter of question; however 
Maturidi states, that if there were two (or more) Gods, another one would try to prevent any monist 
Revelation. If He would, there would be two Gods in a conflict. Reality would be of a dialectic essence, 
what Maturidi considers to be an absurdity and thus an argument for him, what may be questioned, as 
conflict of principles is exactly what Manichean metaphysics uses as a foundation. However, the idea is 
developed further. A conflict would mean certain insufficiency in power, which both sides try to solve 
somehow; even if one of the parties would be in a superior position3. Insufficiency of power would 
mean a contradiction with God's  omnipotence:  if  a being may gain or lose something,  it  changes, 
therefore  it  can't  be  eternal  and  not  a  God.  Of  empirical  arguments,  Maturidi  uses  the  already 
mentioned  problem of  natures,  both.  In  a  way quite  as  Stoics  did.  Against  dualists  he  says,  that 
contrariness  at  first  needs  a  unified  principle  of  interaction  and  formation;  reversibly,  their 
configuration also seems to  be based on a  unified principle.  Against  Dahriyya  he asserts,  that  the 
influence of natures is always very limited. They can't upheld their configuration forever, and thus also 
an everlasting existence of a thing. Maturidi continues, that finite parts can't compose an infinite whole; 
thus also the world is temporarily limited4. World itself is insufficient for its own uphelding, it can't 
endure as a whole forever. It needs an external principle, which would also be its cause of existence, 
motion and all the accidents5.
The idea, that this principle can't be material, is refuted only by tradition - besides Revelation, there are 
is nobody saying he lived from the beginning of the world. In general, he doesn't refute the Dahriyya 
completely,  he  only relativizes  their  assertion.  If  God wanted,  the  world  could  endure  forever,  in 
question would be then the beginning. Maturidi uses yet an interesting ethical argument against the 
Manichees, namely that nobody is completely good or evil. We're not perfect, but nor we are fully 
incapable6. He thought, that Manicheism didn't give much free space for human efforts or rationality, 
ethics was purely a matter of choice. In an everlasting world there would be no final goal, which would 
define this rationality; or which would be possible to discover by a mind and in which its sense would 
be fulfilled.
1 - According to Quran, the devil (šayTán) may influence human only by distracting his awareness of God and the truth; for 
example by wine or hazardous games (Q 5,91).
2 - Rudolph, p.258-264 & 299-302
3 - An interesting solution to the problem, contrary to that of Stoics (and later that of Maturidi), was an idea of an infinite 
(spatialy,  materially  and  temporarily  as  well)  world,  whose  configuration  would  be  based  on  a  chance;  the  idea  of 
Democritus and atomists. In such a world, there could theoretically be at once an infinite number of Gods. If their domains 
were  perfectly  isolated,  their  omnipotence  would  be  sustained.  Maturidi's  arguments  don't  consider  an  infinite  whole 
composed of infinite parts; medieval logic didn't have tools of dealing with such problems yet.
4 - For comparision: "They hold that the world must come to an end, inasmuch as it had a beginning, on the analogy of 
those things which are understood by the senses.  And that  of which the parts are perishable is  perishable as a whole.  
Therefore the world itself is doomed to perish." DL VII,141
5 - Thomas Aquinus (Summa Theologica I,3) uses these arguments (primal mover and cause) as two of his famous "ways to 
prove God's existence".
6 - Rudolph p.302
6.Conclusion
Stoics entered the field of Kalam generally only there, where the tradition was silent: in psychology of 
Nazzamites, in physics of early Jabrites and Maturidites, in epistemology of Ash´arites. Their reception 
was vague, they were thought of as mere "natural philosophers" of the past, who nevertheless excited 
interest by their themes, unusual in the contemporary science. Even if this interest was never as intense 
as in case of Aristotle, Galen or Ptolemy, it was enough to incite debates with a worldview, which may 
not have been so different as that of most Stoics, although different in details. It was a way to see 
divine directions not only in proscribed laws and texts, but in everything actually happening, thus being 
open to a wider experience, transcending subjective convictions and expectations in the try to discover 
the universal one.
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